John Duncan Bulkeley was a Vice Admiral in the United States Navy and one of its most decorated naval officers. Bulkeley received the Medal of Honor for actions in the Pacific Theater during World War II. He was also the PT boat skipper who evacuated General Douglas MacArthur from Corregidor in the Philippines.
Bulkeley was born in New York City and grew up on a farm in Hackettstown, New Jersey, where he graduated from Hackettstown High School. He was a 1933 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.
At the dawn of World War II, Bulkeley was a Lieutenant in command of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Three, a Philippine-based detachment of six motor torpedo boats. He hit his stride as a daring, resourceful and courageous leader. He picked up General Douglas MacArthur, 
his family, and his immediate staff, who had been ordered to flee the Philippines, and took them aboard PT 41 and other 77-foot (23 m) motor torpedo boats through over 600 nautical miles (1,000 km) of open ocean. On arriving at Mindanao, MacArthur said, "You have taken me out of the jaws of death. I shall never forget it."
Bulkeley earned many of his array of decorations while in command of that squadron and a subsequent one. In addition to his Medal of Honor, he was awarded a Navy Cross, two Distinguished Crosses, and two Silver Stars.
In September 1942, while in the States helping to raise War Bonds as a Lieutenant Commander, he met former Ambassador to Britain Joseph Kennedy at New York's Plaza Hotel, and shortly after was instrumental in recruiting Lieutenant John F. Kennedy into the Navy's Motor Torpedo Boat Training Center (MTBTC) at Melville, Rhode Island. Kennedy's heroic captaining of the PT 109 would help to launch his first campaign for Congress.
Bulkeley led torpedo boats and minesweepers in clearing the lanes to Utah Beach, keeping German E-boats from attacking the landing ships along the Mason Line, and picking up wounded sailors from the sinking minesweeper USS Tide (AM-125), destroyer escort USS Rich (DE-695), and destroyer USS Corry (DD-463). As invasion operations wound down, he received command of his first large ship, the destroyer USS Endicott (DD-495).
One month after D-Day, he came to the aid of two British gunboats under attack by two German corvettes. Bulkeley's vessel largest gun was smaller than the guns on the German ship. After days of fighting, Bulkeley only had one working gun on his ship. Charging in with only one gun working, he engaged both enemy vessels at point-blank range, sinking both. 
Afterward, Bulkeley rescued the British sailors in the water and then rescued many of the German sailors as well. When asked, he explained, "What else could I do? You engage, you fight, you win. That is the reputation of our Navy, then and in the future."
During the Korean War in 1952, Bulkeley commanded Destroyer Division 132. After the war, he was Chief of Staff for Cruiser Division Five.
In the early 1960s, Bulkeley commanded Clarksville Base, Tennessee, then a tri-service command under the aegis of the Defense Atomic Support Agency. Having lost none of his wartime daring, Bulkeley was known to test the alertness of the Marines guarding the base by donning a ninja suit, blackening his face and endeavoring to penetrate the classified area after dark without detection. This was a dangerous endeavor, as the Marines carried loaded weapons. Ever popular with his men, who both respected and admired him, Bulkeley could be seen driving around the base in his fire-engine red Triumph TR3 sports car with a large silver PT boat as a hood ornament.
Promoted to Rear Admiral by President John F. Kennedy, who commanded PT-109 during World War II, Bulkeley was dispatched to command the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, where he met Cuba's threat to sever water supplies in response to the Bay of Pigs invasion and other assaults by ordering the installation of desalinization equipment to make the base self-sufficient.
Bulkeley retired from active duty in 1975. However, he was recalled to active duty in a retired-retained status in order to serve as the Commander of the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) which conducts inspections and surveys of U.S. naval vessels before their commissioning and deployment. Bulkeley retired from the Navy in 1988, after 55 years of service.
On 6 April 1996, Bulkeley died at his home in Silver Spring, Maryland, at age 84. Admiral Bulkeley was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery.
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On May 20, 1966, close to dusk and in a light rain, B Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry (ABN/AMB), 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Capt. Roy D. Martin was airlifted by Chinook helicopters (CH-47s) into a small clearing located in the mountains east of the Vinh Thanh Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The clearing had been designated LZ Horse and could accommodate only one CH-47 at a time.
The company had been ordered to the LZ to begin operations in search of a large NVA/VC force that had been heavily engaged with other units of the 1st Brigade since May 16th. Specifically, B Company along with C Company 1/8th were to link up on the morning of the 21st and generally proceed along a trail and streambed to the northeast of LZ Horse to engage and defeat an enemy force suspected of being in the area. Capt. William Mozey had arrived earlier that afternoon and had been committed in support of another unit who was heavily engaged to the north of LZ Horse. C Company had moved overland to the 
northeast of the landing zone and had also come under fire. They had beaten back an enemy attack and set up a perimeter for the night. The Battalion Commander, Lt Col. Levin Broughton and his staff on LZ Horse, briefed Martin on the operation that was to take place the next day, and he, in turn, briefed his platoon leaders. Bravo Company was to be on the right flank and Charlie Company to the left as they followed the trail and stream to the Northeast
On the morning of May 21st, B Company moved out of the LZ around 0700 following the trail and stream leading to the northeast. It was already hot and humid even though overcast, with mist in the valleys and light fog at the higher elevations around the LZ. We were tense and fully expected to contact the enemy at some point that day. I commanded the 2nd Platoon and we assumed point for the company. Capt. Martin and his Command Group followed. The 1st Platoon commanded by Lt. Robert Crum from Houston, Texas followed slightly to my right rear and was responsible for right flank security. Behind them was the 3rd Platoon commanded by Lt Jared East from Lake Charles, Louisiana. He was charged with responsibility for rear security and was designated the company reserve. The mortar platoon commanded by Lt. William Hughes from Cordele, Georgia would remain on LZ Horse and provide mortar fire in support of the move, if necessary. C Company was to my left flank on higher ground above the streambed, but to the best of my knowledge, no one from B Company ever made visual contact with them as we began moving.
The area along the stream was moderately covered in vegetation with both tall grass and trees and fair visibility; however, to the left and right the mountains rose quickly from the valley floor and were covered by tall trees and heavy vegetation. It almost felt like the mountainous terrain was closing in on us. About 500-600 meters northeast of LZ Horse the platoon moved to the left away from the stream and along higher ground. We passed through an area of triple canopy jungle that had been the scene of heavy fighting the previous day by either C Company or the company they had relieved on the 20th. The predominant hill located to the northwest of LZ Horse was Hill 766, which meant the uppermost point of the hill was 766 meters high or over 2500 feet above the valley floor. The area we were now crossing was located northeast of LZ Horse and almost due east of Hill 766. Battle litter was strewn throughout an area slightly smaller than a football field and there was a smell of death everywhere. 
I noticed ropes hanging from several tall trees, probably where NVA/VC snipers had been strategically placed to engage any friendly forces entering the area. After passing through the area we moved back toward the stream and continued our move to the northeast. The tension increased dramatically, and we remained on high alert. We had still had not made visual contact with C Company.
Around 1000 hours the platoon came to an intersection in the stream. The right fork went to the south while the other, the one we had been following, continued to the northeast. My point squad had already started to the south. Uncertain of which way to proceed, I called a halt to the march and radioed Capt. Martin explained the situation and asked for instructions on how to proceed. At the same time, I ordered my lead squad up an embankment on our left to take up defensive positions and provide security for the remainder of the platoon which was still spread along the streambed. The tip of this embankment was the point of a finger ridge flowing from the south/southeast down to the streambed. As the squad moved into position at the top of the bank it came under fire and Sp4 Milton Parks, the point man for the platoon, was shot in the hip. The squad immediately returned fire toward the suspected enemy position and the unknown size enemy force withdrew.
Several members of the platoon pulled Parks back to the protection of the streambed where our medic, Sp4 Adell Alston, began working on the wound to stop the bleeding and to prevent Parks from going into shock. The remainder of the platoon took up defensive positions. Capt. Martin, his Command Group, along with 1st Sergeant Ray "Top" Poynter joined me in the streambed. 
1st Sgt Poynter organized a litter for Parks, made from two poles and a poncho, and filled out a casualty report. I then designated a squad, led by Sgt Dewey Underwood, to escort Parks back to LZ Horse since there were no suitable LZ's in the immediate vicinity of our location allowing for evacuation by helicopter. This entire action took approximately 45 minutes to complete.
The company led by the 2nd Platoon again began moving to the northeast and parallel to the stream. We were about 50 yards south of the stream traversing over the ridge where the enemy had fired on us. We crossed this ridge, which flowed from higher ground towards the streambed, moved through a draw, crossed another ridge and draw, and then approached a third finger ridge. As the platoon moved up this ridge, we found enemy positions that had recently been occupied by an NVA/VC force of unknown size. Cooking fires were still smoldering, and rice was scattered around the fires. A heavily traveled trail 4 to 5 feet wide ran along the center of the finger and led down towards the streambed. As I recall this ridge or finger was about 500 - 800 meters from the earlier firing incident and what I estimated to be about 2500 meters from LZ Horse.
At this juncture Capt. Martin called a halt to our route of march and told the platoons to establish a perimeter so he could contact and meet Capt. Mozey near the streambed. It was around 1230 in the afternoon. On Martin's instructions, I moved the 2nd Platoon to cover the south and eastern side of the finger, covering the southeastern portion of the trail with one of my machine guns. I could see another ridge to the east/northeast with another draw between our position and that ridge. Close to the stream, this draw was open; but, toward the higher ground, it was heavily vegetated, covered with boulders, and looked very steep. Lt. Crum's 1st Platoon covered a portion of the north and the east side of the perimeter overlooking the draw and the streambed. Lt. East and his platoon covered the remainder of the perimeter by linking in with both platoons. C Company was now positioned across the streambed to our north and were higher up on a hill mass, somewhat parallel to and overlooking our perimeter. Martin advised us to eat lunch during this halt as we might not have an opportunity to do so later. He then met and conferred with Mozey near the streambed, so they could plan their next move and preclude any confusion by either company when we resumed the assigned mission.
During this break, my machine gun crew covering the trail spotted 2 or 3 enemy soldiers about 50 yards from their position moving down the trail towards our perimeter; however, before they could engage, the enemy soldiers turned to the east and vanished into the triple canopy jungle. I reported this to Martin and alerted the other platoon leaders. When Martin returned from his meeting with Mozey he called the platoon leaders to the Command Group location in the center of the perimeter where he again briefed us on our mission. We would continue our line of march to the 
northeast generally paralleling the stream and attempt to make contact and destroy any NVA/VC force in the area. We would continue as before with the 2nd Platoon in the lead, followed by the Command Group, the 1st Platoon, and then the 3rd Platoon. C Company would monitor our initial movement from their positions across the streambed and provide fire support if needed. They would then move parallel to our company once we reached the next finger ridge. According to Martin, he had noted unoccupied enemy bunkers on C Company's side of the stream and Mozey and his men now occupied some of these bunkers. These positions would provide C Company a good view of both the stream and the draw as Bravo Company traversed this area.
At approximately 1400 hours, the platoon moved off the finger ridge, swung away from the stream, and moved slightly to the right. The Command Group followed. The movement was cautious and painstaking slow since we had spotted enemy soldiers in the area. In addition, the draw was heavily vegetated, boulder-strewn, and tall trees covered the area further impeding our movement. In retrospect, I believe the 1st Platoon, instead of following the route taken by my platoon and the Command Group, swung to the left toward the stream and into a more open area. This made their movement easier, but also made them more vulnerable to the attack that was forthcoming.
As the 2nd Platoon finally reached and began moving over the next finger ridge, a violent and sustained burst of NVA/VC heavy weapons fire erupted behind us and was directed at the remainder of the company following my platoon. The fire came from well-concealed enemy positions and bunkers to my right rear and from the ridge above the draw. At least two 50-caliber and several 30-caliber machine guns, as well as AK-47 automatic rifles and SKS assault rifles, were raining accurate and deadly fire on the 1st Platoon which had taken casualties immediately and were now pinned down. The 3rd Platoon, which had just begun their movement into the draw, was also receiving fire and were also pinned down. Without question, the NVA had initiated an almost perfect ambush on the 1st and 3rd Platoons. It was now almost 1500 hours.
After the initial shock I realized no enemy fire was being directed at the 2nd Platoon and on instructions from Capt. Martin immediately ordered the platoon to move on line and begin maneuvering up the finger towards the enemy positions to flank the enemy positions. Despite what I had been taught during tactics training at The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia to charge the enemy positions and attempt a breakout, I instructed the platoon to stay low and to crawl up the finger towards the entrenched enemy force. I still did not know the size of the enemy force but knew it was substantial from the number of machine guns and small arms firing on the rest of the company. I suspected at least a reinforced company or larger.
As we pushed up the finger the platoon still did not draw any fire; however, as we neared the upper portion of the ridge one of my soldiers yelled: "there's a GI up here." Looking to my front and left I spotted a fully armed NVA soldier in khaki uniform and helmet standing about 30 yards away. He appeared to be looking for us, which I assume he thought, would have charged up the finger. Several of the platoon members immediately took him under fire and he dropped where he stood. In response, the platoon was greeted with a hail of fire from the top and the left side of the ridge. Apparently, the NVA/VC force had either established another ambush position to prevent us from attacking the enemy positions that were firing on the remainder of the company or they had unknowingly left a gap in their positions. Surprisingly none of the platoon members were hit although we could hear bullets whipping by, impacting trees, and snapping branches over our heads.
Worried of a second ambush I ordered the platoon to withdraw back towards the stream where we met the Company Command Group. They were hunkered down behind several large trees in a defiladed position about 50-75 yards from the stream and at least a similar if not greater distance to top of the ridge. Looking back towards the 1st Platoon's position in the draw, I could see Sgt Gerald Hoover lying dead about 15-20 yards from where we were located. Capt. Martin, in a calm and steady voice, stated that Hoover had reported Lt. Crum was dead as were several others from the 1st Platoon just prior to Hoover himself taking a round in the chest which killed him instantly. The CO also said the 3rd Platoon, which for the most part was still occupying the ridge where we had lunch, could not move due to heavy fire from enemy positions above him. I told Martin that we had attempted to flank the enemy positions who were firing on the other two platoons but were unsuccessful as the platoon had drawn fire from what appeared to be well-concealed positions to our front and left as we moved up the finger. I also told him we had not received any fire from outright and there appeared to be a gap in the NVA/VC positions.
Capt. Martin made a quick decision on the spot and again in his steady and calm voice said, "We are going to attack." The platoon and the Command Group then began moving up the finger, but this time maneuvered to the right side of the ridge and towards the draw where 1st Platoon was trapped. The rain had begun falling in sheets at the outset of our move and the light was fading quickly due to the heavy downpour and the tall trees around us which virtually 
blocked out the sky. C Company and our 3rd Platoon aided our movement at the request of Capt. Martin by placing a heavy volume of fire on the NVA/VC force near the top of the ridge where the initial enemy fire came from. This concentrated fire evidently caused the enemy to stay down and probably prevented any reinforcement of the main enemy positions; however, they did continue to fire on the 1st and 3rd Platoons, but at a much-reduced volume. Additionally, Capt. Martin had requested and received operational control of a platoon led by Lt. Frank Vavrek from C Company to fill the gap created when the critically injured 1st platoon survivors and wounded began withdrawing towards the 3rd Platoon and Charlie Company elements. These moves allowed us to move unheeded and unnoticed past the enemy bunkers near the top of the ridge. Capt. Martin then called for Charlie Company and our 3rd Platoon to shift their fire to the top of the ridge above our location and on suspected enemy routes of movement into the area. I later learned that both East's and Vavrek's platoons also successfully fought of an attack by an NVA platoon size element who was attempting to outflank them.
On reaching a position slightly below the top of the ridge the platoon and the Command Group turned right paralleling a trail behind the enemy positions. Platoon Sergeant James L. Johnson tripped over some communications wires running from the enemy positions below us to an unknown location. He cut the wire thus severing any communications between the enemy forces. Johnson and Sgt Arsenio Lujan, along with several men, then took up security positions to prevent any reinforcements from approaching from the south or east. The platoon deployed on line behind the dug-in enemy positions. The Command Group also deployed along this same line with Martin, his RTOs, the company medic and the Artillery Recon Sergeant to the right of my position. Sp4 William Goode, the platoon mortar forward observer, was to my left and one rifle squad led by Sgt Leroy Christian was deployed just beyond him. Sgt Antonio Lopez' rifle squad was to my right just past the Command Group. The weapons squad's machine gun crews were interspersed with both rifle squads. By my estimate, the total strength of our assault force including the Command Group was between 30 to 35 men. Once we were deployed Martin ordered the attack on the enemy positions below us.
As we began moving downhill the enemy apparently had become aware, they had been flanked and were beginning to reposition to meet our attack. We immediately took them under fire and started inflicting casualties. I moved behind a large tree and told Sp4 Allen Ritter, my RTO, t
o stay behind me and the tree; however, he stepped out to engage an NVA soldier trying to escape the deadly fire. An enemy machine gun opened fire on our position wounding Ritter in or just above the knee. I spotted the machine gun as I and the platoon medic pulled him to safety. The medic began working on him immediately to stop the bleeding and bandage the wound.
The gun was about twenty-twenty five yards from my position, was well camouflaged, and was located just to the left side of a well-traveled trail which led down towards the stream. I realized this position was a direct threat to the assault and, if not neutralized, would jeopardize our movement on the bunker complex. Without hesitation, I pulled a grenade from my harness, released the pin, waited two counts and then threw it at the machine gun position. As it exploded, I sprinted downhill toward the position and shot the three NVA soldiers occupying the position. The gunner, although dazed and seriously wounded, was attempting to reach for the machine gun when I shot him. I then looked down the trail and saw another NVA soldier moving up the trail toward me carrying additional machine gun ammunition evidently with the intent to re-supply the position. I fired twice shooting him in the center of the chest and he fell on the spot. He had an SKS assault rifle slung on his back. I retrieved the rifle, slung it across my back, and began moving towards another bunker to the right of the trail. I tossed a grenade through the rear entrance, took cover until it explodes, and then sprayed the bunker with M-16 fire. I don't know if I killed all the people in the bunker, but there was no further fire from it.
To the right and left I could see the remainder of the platoon and the Command Group advancing on the bunker complex, destroying each of the bunkers as they progressed down the hill. I specifically recalled Sp4 Goode and the squad to my left throwing grenades, firing their M-16s, M-79 grenade launchers, and machine guns as they moved toward and through the bunkers. I could also see Capt. Martin, the rest of the command group, and Sgt Lopez and his squad doing the same to my right. I saw Martin take out a least one sniper in the trees to our front and attack several of the bunkers that had been firing on our 1st and 3rd Platoons. I also saw Lopez drop another NVA soldier moving up the trail towards his and Capt. Martin's position. Although I did not witness any other platoon members individual actions, there is little question they had inflicted heavy casualties on the NVA force, since they were no longer returning fire at either the assault force or the friendly forces at the bottom of the ridge and enemy soldiers were being shot as they attempted to flee the area.
It was now close to 2000 hours and a heavy downpour continued to fall. Darkness had fallen and flares, called in by C Company's forward observer, guided us as we neared the bottom of the finger where we were met by Lt. East's 3rd Platoon and Vavrek's platoon. 
Capt. Martin asked both platoon leaders to begin evacuating the wounded and dead across the streambed and into the safety of C Company's defensive perimeter which had now been established on the opposite ridge. He asked my platoon to provide security for the two platoons as they conducted the evacuation. There remained a concern that the NVA would reorganize and resume their attack, although this did not happen. Capt. Martin then formed a search party and began scouring the draw for any dead or missing warriors who had not yet been recovered.
The search and evacuation lasted several hours as the wounded and the dead were transported across the steam and up the trail into Charlie Company's perimeter on the high ground to the North. This alone proved to be a daunting task as the trail leading to the perimeter had become a muddy morass. Troopers would make their way five or ten feet up the trail with the wounded and dead and then lose their footing and slide back down the trail as much as six feet or more. The movement was finally completed after midnight when the Command Group and the 2nd Platoon closed on the perimeter. 1st Sergeant Poynter met me as I entered the security of Charlie Company's position and told me that Ritter, my RTO, had not made it. He stated Ritter died shortly after being carried him into the perimeter. The news was heartfelt and deeply saddening insomuch as the medic and others had been able to keep him alive and transport him to the safety of Charlie Company only to have him expire just within friendly lines.
The wounded and dead were located toward the center of the perimeter and the medics from both companies were working on the wounded. A company headcount was taken, and it was discovered Lt. Crum and Pvt Angel Rodriguez were still missing. Capt. Martin, after conferring with Mozey, decided a search would be conducted in the morning since all reports from the remainder of the 1st Platoon said Crum and Rodriguez had been killed. Capt. Martin then directed me to move the 2nd Platoon further up the ridge to the northeastern end of the perimeter and take up positions in case of further attacks during the night. Just moving the platoon further up the ridge to this area proved to be a task with the muddy conditions and the fact all of us were totally exhausted. After locating the last element of Charlie Company on the northern portion of the ridge, I instructed the squad leaders to dig in as best they could and place their men into three-man defensive positions. I also instructed each position to keep one man on alert and that they eat what rations they still had. I positioned the platoon headquarters just behind the northernmost point of the perimeter and notified Capt. Martin when we were finally in position. It was now May 22 and artillery units continued to fire illumination rounds throughout the night. It continued to rain heavily and although there was occasional rifle fire there were no probes attempted on the perimeter the rest of the night.
As the morning of the 22nd broke, helicopters flew over the perimeter and dropped much-needed supplies, including chainsaws that allowed troops to open a clearing, so the wounded and dead could be evacuated by baskets winched down from a 
CH-47 Chinook helicopter. The wounded were lifted out first, then the dead. Captured equipment and documents were evacuated last. My platoon, along with the remainder of Bravo Company, took this opportunity to rest, clean weapons, and re-supply with ammunition and rations.
Charlie Company, guided by Pvt David Dolby and Pvt Kenneth Fernandez from the 1st Platoon, returned to the site of initial contact and were able to find and recover the bodies of Lt. Crum and Pvt Rodriguez. They evacuated the bodies to the safety of the perimeter. The total killed in the battle now numbered eleven; eight from the 1st Platoon, Sp4 Alan Ritter from my platoon, and two from Vavrek's platoon. There were also at least 15 wounded, most from the 1st Platoon.
Charlie Company returned to the top of the ridge where the NVA had initiated the battle. According to Mozey, he and his company found over 50 NVA bodies including the body of a senior NVA commander and a Chinese advisor, in one of the bunkers. They also found numerous blood trails and battle litter leading away from the area indicating the NVA had suffered more casualties as they pulled out. They made no contact during their search of the area and then returned to the ridge where Bravo Company still manned the perimeter with additional weapons and materials they had found. Evacuation of all materials was completed later that day by helicopter and both companies, as I recall, remained on the ridge that night before moving their separate ways on May 23rd.
Bravo Company was ordered back to LZ Horse by a circuitous overland route through the mountainous terrain and jungle with the 2nd Platoon again moving as the point for the company. During the move, we discovered another major NVA/VC base camp and several graves near another stream to the west of the battle site. The encampment can hold at least a battalion size element, complete with latrines, cooking areas dug into the banks above the stream in such a manner as to diffuse the smoke, and sleeping areas; however, we made no further contact with any enemy soldiers in the area and returned to the LZ without further incident.
We were then airlifted from LZ Horse to LZ Colt where we assumed defensive positions with other units of the battalion on a forward artillery base along with a unit from the Republic of Korea. The perimeter was probed several times by small enemy units and we were continually fired on by snipers at the new location. A new Lieutenant, Robert Heath, was assigned to the company to replace Lt. Crum. We patrolled aggressively around the LZ in platoon size elements. 
It was during one of these patrols that Capt. Martin, while guiding my platoon to one of the sniper locations from a helicopter, was seriously wounded in the leg by the sniper. He was immediately evacuated for medical attention and never returned to the company. His loss was felt immediately not only by my platoon but by the entire company and battalion. We never located the sniper, nor did we make any contact with enemy forces during the remainder of our stay at LZ Colt. The company, under a new commander Capt. Gerrell V. Plummer, made several additional air assaults and conducted platoon and company patrols for several days in the mountainous terrain in the area of operations between the Vinh Thanh and the Soui Ca Valleys.
As Operation Crazy Horse wound down the company patrolled to the west and finally back to the Vinh Thanh Valley. We were then moved by motor convoy back to the base camp at An Khe in early June, bringing an end our involvement in Operation Crazy Horse.
This article is dedicated to the members of the Command Group led by Capt. Roy D. Martin, the men of the 2nd Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, to the men of the 1st and 3rd platoons, and to the men of Charley Company who provided much-needed fire support during the assault on the enemy positions. It is especially dedicated to those men who paid the ultimate sacrifice on 21 May 21, 1966, and who to this day hold a special place in my heart.
Bravo Company Charlie Company
2nd Lt. Robert H. Crum, Jr Sp4 David M. Jolley
Sgt Gerald D. Hoover Sp4 Michael G. Vinassa
Pfc David J. Canales
Pfc Michael G. Cryar
Sp4 Richard F. Lease
Pfc Gerald E. Metcalf
Sp4 Allen J. Ritter
Pfc Michael E. DeVoe
Pfc Angel E. Rodriguez
Battle of Inchon
The Battle of Inchon was an amphibious invasion and battle of the Korean War that resulted in a decisive victory and strategic reversal in favor of the United Nations. The operation involved some 75,000 troops and 261 naval vessels and led to the recapture of the South Korean capital of Seoul two weeks later. The code name for the operation was Operation Chromite.
The battle began on September 15, 1950, and ended on September 19th. Through a surprise, amphibious assault far from the Pusan Perimeter that United Nation and South Korean forces were desperately defending, the largely undefended city of Incheon was being bombed by UN forces from the air and from the allied ships off the coast of Incheon.
On September 16th, in an attempt to stop the advance of the UN forces, North Korean People's Army (NKPA) sent six columns of T-34 tanks to the beachhead. They were quite alone, without infantry support. They were spotted by a strike force of F4U Corsairs at the village of Kansong-ni, east of Inchon and two flights of F4U Corsairs from Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (VMF-214) bombed the attackers. The armored columns suffered extensive damage and the U.S. forces lost one airplane. A quick counter-attack by M26 Pershing tanks destroyed the remainder of the North Korean armored division and cleared the way for the capture of Incheon.
The battle ended a string of victories by the invading Korean People's Army (KPA). The subsequent United Nations recapture of Seoul partially severed the NKPA's supply lines in South Korea.
The United Nations and South Korean forces were commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur who was the driving force behind the operation, overcoming the strong misgivings of more cautious generals to a risky assault over extremely unfavorable terrain.
Invasion of the Philippines
On Dec. 8, 1941, just one day following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese launched an attack on the United States and Filipino forces in the Philippines. The defending forces outnumbered the Japanese by 3 to 2, however, they were a mixed force of non-combat experienced regular, National Guard, constabulary and newly created Commonwealth units. The Japanese used first-line troops at the outset of the campaign and concentrating their forces enabled a swift overrun of most of Luzon during the first month. The outnumbered defenders withdrew into a defensive holding position in the Bataan Peninsula where they were able to hold for four more months.
The conquest of the Philippines by Japan is often considered the worst military defeat in United States history. About 23,000 American military personnel were killed or captured, while Filipino soldiers killed or captured totaled around 100,000
For the next three years, Allied forces retook each island held by the Japanese Imperial army and navy forces. With these successes, Gen. Douglas MacArthur felt it was time to return to the Philippine Islands. On October 20, 1944, the U.S. Sixth Army-supported by naval and air bombardment-landed on the favorable eastern shore of Leyte, one of the islands of the Visayas island group, northeast of Mindanao.
Their second major target to attack was Mindoro. This large island is directly south of Luzon and Manila Bay, and MacArthur's main goal in taking it was to be able to construct airfields on it for fighter planes that could dominate the sky over the most important island of Luzon, with its major seaport and the capital city of Manila.
Mindoro was only lightly occupied by the Japanese Army, and much of it was held by Filipino guerrillas, so Mindoro was quickly overrun. U.S. Army engineers set about rapidly constructing a major air base at San Fabian.
Mindoro was a major victory for the 6th Army, and it also provided the major base for the next move of MacArthur's 6th Army: the invasion of Luzon, especially at Lingayen Gulf on its western coast which were invaded on January 9, 1945, when the first units were landed there.
Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, 40 miles (64 km) northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.
Two more major landings followed one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on February 3, 1945, elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry Regiment passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.
Gallipoli Campaign
The Gallipoli Campaign (April-December, 1915) was the British and Allies' attempt to capture the Dardanelles and eventually march on Istanbul, forcing the surrender of the Ottoman Empire and gaining control of the Black Sea beyond. It was the first time in modern history that a large-scale amphibious operation was ever attempted. However, it is widely viewed that this campaign was mismanaged and under-committed to from the start. The most successful operation of the campaign, in fact, was the evacuation.
Gallipoli is the long strip of land that runs across from the North-Western tip of the European side of Turkey. Both these sides of the Dardanelles were heavily defended by Ottoman forts and guns. It was Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, who proposed the plan to take Istanbul. The initial attempt was a naval assault.
The British sent a force, comprised of many old and outdated warships, to take the straights, but to no avail. The next attempt was by land and so British (including Canadians and Indians), French, Australian, and New Zealand troops were shipped out to Gallipoli.
British ships bombarded the tip of the peninsula, pulverizing Ottoman forts, but losing the element of surprise. The Turkish and Arab troops shored up their defenses with high ground, trenches, machine guns and barbed wire set in the water.
The British and French landed at Cape Helles, the most Southern point, and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) landed on what became known as Anzac Cove, a few miles to the North on the Aegean side of Gallipoli to cut of the Ottomans and meet the other divisions in the middle. But by the end of the day, the Allied forces had hardly made it off the beaches, and 5,000 troops were killed or wounded.
From that day onward, the campaign was a bloody stalemate. The last attempt to break this came in August. The Sari Bair Offensive, which was spearheaded from Anzac Cove, succeeded in pushing several miles inland before the Ottomans finally overcame the weary and few men were left after the haphazard assault.
The British and French would finally leave Cape Helles in early January 1916.
The full-scale evacuation of troops began on December 15th. This only happened by night, starting with supports and reserves, and then thinning out the trenches. By December 19th, 36,000 troops were evacuated out to sea, and only 10,000 remained.
That night, the remaining troops snuck off. On their way out, many set rifles and explosives on innovative timing devices and planted grenades and mines to both make the Ottomans think they were still there and to harass them with booby traps when they did finally come to inspect the abandoned trenches.
At 4:10 AM on December 20th, Anzac Cove and Sulva Bay were empty, without a single casualty. Though it is thought that the Ottomans were totally deceived by White's plan, it is entirely possible that Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish General in Gallipoli, was willing to let the Allies slip away, as the campaign caused thousands of casualties among his troops.
By the end of the Gallipoli Campaign, the Allies had suffered well over 100,000 casualties; that number was roughly doubled for the Ottoman Empire.
Battle of Okinawa
The Battle of Okinawa was fought in the Pacific Theater between the Allies, spearheaded by the U.S. and forces from Japan. It was the second biggest amphibious battle from sea to land of World War II, after the Battle of Normandy. It was also one of the bloodiest battles in history. Fought from April to June 1945, the battle itself was made up of a string of skirmishes in the Ryukyu Islands, whose center was the island of Okinawa.
To those Japanese who thought the war was winnable, Okinawa was the last chance. The island lay within 350 miles - easy flight distance - from the Japanese homeland and was, by American design, to be the base from which the southernmost Home Island, Kyushu, would be pummeled to dust ahead of the expected follow-on invasion. Anything short of complete victory over Allied air, naval and ground forces spelled doom for Japan - and no such victory was remotely in the cards.
On April 1, 1945, the Allies launched a full amphibious assault on the islands with the aim to defeat the Japanese at Okinawa and to set up an airbase from which American planes could bomb the Japanese mainland. The landings, however, were made against zero opposition and with almost no casualties. Far from going into a state of optimism, however, the many veterans in the assault force realized that a very hard road lay before them, that the Japanese had chosen to dig deep and fight on their own terms.
The battle is one of the fiercest and bloodiest in the entire Pacific campaign due to the striking intensity of Japanese Kamikaze attacks and numerical strength of Allied warships, armored vehicles, and ground troops. For 80 days, reinforcements were landed on the Allied side who had effectively cut off all routes to the island for the Japanese, which was thus unable to reinforce or resupply their troops. The last remains of Japanese resistance ceased on June 21, 1945.
The attack on Okinawa had taken a heavy toll on both sides. The Americans lost 7,373 men killed and 32,056 wounded on land. At sea, the Americans lost 5,000 killed and 4,600 wounded. The Japanese lost 107,000 killed and 7,400 men taken prisoner. It is possible that the Japanese lost another 20,000 dead as a result of American tactics whereby Japanese troops were incinerated where they fought.
The Americans also lost 36 ships. 368 ships were also damaged. 763 aircraft were destroyed. The Japanese lost 16 ships sunk and over 4,000 aircraft were lost.
D-Day Landings in Normandy
The Normandy landings were the landing operations on Tuesday, June 6, 1944, of the Allied invasion of Normandy in Operation Overlord during World War II. Codenamed Operation Neptune and often referred to as D-Day, it was the largest, most decisive Amphibious Assaults in modern history. The operation began the liberation of German-occupied northwestern Europe from Nazi control and laid the foundations of the Allied victory on the Western Front.
While the Battle of Okinawa involved more ground troops, landing on the beach-heads, Operation Overlord is often seen as more significant, having a greater impact in history that Okinawa.
The Allied forces consisted of a total of 156,000 men compared to almost 50,000 Germans with support from 170 coastal guns. Hitler - anticipating such an assault - ordered Field Marshall Erwin Rommel to take command of the German forces in 1943 and build the Atlantic Wall to thwart attempts by the Allies to retake France, Belgium, The Netherlands or Norway.
Hours before the landings began, a massive airborne assault targeting the German batteries and defenses on the shore was executed at midnight where thousands of airborne troops landed deep behind enemy lines.
The amphibious landings began at 0630 on target beaches that were divided into 5 sectors; Utah and Omaha for the Americans, Gold and Sword for the British and Juno for the Canadians. The men landing at Utah, Sword, and Gold faced slightly lighter resistance than expected, but on Juno and on Omaha the Germans made the Allies pay a heavy price for every inch they gained.
Nearly 160,000 troops crossed the English Channel on D-Day, with 875,000 men disembarking by the end of June. Allied casualties on the first day were at least 10,000, with 4,414 confirmed dead. The Germans lost 1,000 men. The Allied invasion plans had called for the capture of Carentan, St. Lo, Caen, and Bayeux on the first day, with all the beaches (other than Utah) linked with a front line 10 to 16 kilometers (6 to 10 mi) from the beaches; none of these objectives were achieved. The five bridgeheads were not connected until June 12th, by which time the Allies held a front around 60 miles and 15 miles deep. Caen, a major objective, was still in German hands at the end of D-Day and would not be completely captured until July 21st. The Germans had ordered French civilians other than those deemed essential to the war effort to leave potential combat zones in Normandy. Civilian casualties on D-Day and D+1 are estimated at 3,000 people.
This was the most decisive invasion during World War II, opening the way for a counter-offensive against the Nazi German occupation of Allied countries in Western Europe.
Two distances that appear the same in a flat tactical map may be very different when moving infantry divisions over difficult or treacherous terrain like swamps, jungles, forests, and hills - such terrain hinders movement and speed enormously and can be the determining factor in losing or winning any operation. Vietnam is composed mostly of that treacherous terrain, and its implacable hostility posed a problem for vehicles so big that a new concept was born.
The idea was to form an infantry unit that had integrated air mobility. In 1963, the 11th Air Assault was called to field test that concept - the unit had to function like any other light infantry unit, but with helicopters replacing their wheeled and tracked vehicles.
The "air vehicles" would not just supplement the unit, but rather become its backbone. For more than two years, all aspects of this theory were refined, and field-tested in several war games, and by June 1965 a permanent unit was organized: the 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile, or "1st AirCav."
In Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry set up camp in a place called An Khe, northeast of Saigon. They cleared several acres of terrain, mostly using handheld tools since construction machines were too heavy to transport, and improvised an airfield and heliport with several helipads, which they affectionately named "The Golf Course" due to its varying elevations and grass heights.
The 1st AirCav consisted of maneuver battalions, artillery battalions, the main AirCav squad, a logistics squad, and even its own aviation group. Not surprisingly, it was able to act as a self-sufficient army. They even ferried their own supplies to and from the base and headquarters, and they had a CH-47 Chinook battalion that could also ferry many of the foot battalions quickly into and out of strategic zones, along with their artillery pieces and ammunition.
Drops into hot zones, however, were made by UH-1H Hueys. In any mission, a vital asset to every helicopter pilot was his door gunner-every chopper had at least one of them, and never went out without one. Door gunners were crucial for defending the aircraft from the sides while it was in a hovering position, its most vulnerable stance.
The 1st Cavalry Division had some conventional artillery and rocket artillery capability of its own, with the bonus that they could field any artillery piece anywhere almost instantly, but the most powerful supporting force available to them was the Air Rocket Artillery (ARA) battalion.
Any field commander in the division had the ability to call for a helicopter strike by the ARA, just as they would call an artillery strike, with the added benefit that the ARA’s supporting range was much greater than the coverage any artillery piece could provide. Fixed artillery doesn’t move once deployed, but the range of a Heli strike is the range of the helicopter itself.
The versatility the division had was staggering and its mobility unparalleled, since it was not bound by any obstacles in the terrain. They could perform almost any mission and the troops always arrived in the combat zone rested and fresh and could advance with the confidence that air and artillery support was just one step behind them. They also knew they would never be cut off from being resupplied.
Their missions included but were not limited to: search and rescue, search and destroy, combat air assault, fire support, medical evacuation (medevac), reconnaissance, resupply, artillery transport to and from front lines, shadowing the enemy, and so on.
The division used ladders and ropes to drop logistical teams where no landing zones existed. Engineers on the ground would open clearing of level terrain and improvise a landing zone, while scout choppers kept them safe from enemy ambushes and the ARA was ready to provide covering fire if the enemy slipped past the scouts.
Contrary to popular belief, the 1st Cavalry’s mobility was not impaired during bad weather or during the night. In Vietnam, bad weather was spotty and could be overcome by enough planning, even if it meant landing somewhat off target, and most choppers were fully equipped to operate during the night as well. But having a whole division so mobile that it could spread over hundreds of miles on any given day was not without challenges.
Communication was the key to efficiency, so unlike other divisions, the 1st Cavalry had a special, more portable, and more potent version of the radio equipment every other unit had in their vehicles. Bell UH-1D Iroquois helicopters were outfitted with a variety of lightweight communication equipment to serve as mobile short-range command and control liaison vehicles, and a CV2 Caribou was outfitted with long-range communication equipment and used as a strategic command and control center.
The Caribou could also patch comms to allow conference calls among all commanding officers. This was devised so that every vehicle in the division could always communicate.
In case of jamming, or any other logistical impairments to communication, a Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhe "sky-crane" helicopter-a massive aircraft designed to lift equipment that could not be fitted inside a cargo plane-would transport a big metal container full of radio equipment that could be set up and used as a mobile headquarters near the field.
A typical Aircav mission structure would be as follows:
First, a team of scout helicopters, such as the Bell H-13 Sioux, would scout and secure landing zones for artillery pieces around suspected hot zones. Then CH-47s would ferry the artillery pieces along with their crews and ammunition to those landing zones. 
Next, CH-47s carrying infantry would make drops near those hot zones.
Drops at the hot zones themselves would be handled by UH-1s, with gunships guarding them and laying down suppressive fire at the landing zone inside the hot zone. UH-1s were also tasked with carrying supplies to the troops and doing medivacs. Meanwhile, the ARA flight stood close by, ready to provide supporting fire during the whole operation.
The 1st Cavalry Division would serve in the Vietnam War until the very end, thus causing the war to be nicknamed "The Helicopter War" and becoming the proof of concept that in modern wars, mobility would be paramount. However, this was achieved with much sacrifice because a great number of helicopters were shot down, reminding commanders that no unit is above getting ambushed.
On June 6, 1944, the Allies invaded Normandy. For the German troops defending this region of occupied France, it was the beginning of a desperate fight as they tried to halt the Allied invasion of Western Europe.
The quality of the German troops varied but was generally quite high. Some were SS men, highly politicized troops dedicated to the Nazi cause, brash and confident in the certainty of victory. Some were seasoned veterans who had fought across Europe, including the bitter fighting on the Eastern Front. Some were new soldiers or came from units that had seen little battlefield action.
To many, it must have been clear that this was the last chance for victory. If they could not stop the Allies while they were contained in this small area, then they would never stop them at all.
Germany's proud military tradition and its successes early in the war had left many soldiers dismissive of the quality of their opponents. They were about to see how wrong their assessment had been.
The first days of fighting took place amid chaos and confusion. Though an invasion was expected, Allied counter-intelligence work had left the Germans expecting it further east, around Calais. Even as the enemy hit the beaches, there was confusion about where attacks were coming and what would follow.
The chaos was made worse by the damage done to communication lines. Resistance operatives and Allied bombers had destroyed roads, railways, bridges, and phone lines. It was hard to get messages through and harder still to get troops to where they needed to be.
The Germans had the advantage of fighting on the defensive. This was a particularly powerful advantage in Normandy because of the terrain.
Much of Normandy was filled with bocage, a landscape of winding roads between high hedgerows and hills. It provided countless places of concealment. From these, the Germans launched ambushes against the Allied troops as they advance.
Having to advance meant having to take risks, and the Germans made the most of that. They waited for the Allies to come to them, staying in cover for as long as possible, firing at exposed enemies from covered positions.
The Germans had occupied this territory for four years and during the final year, they had been making concerted preparations for its defense. They might struggle to move troops up, but they could use the bunkers, pillboxes, and trenches already in place. Whether it was fighting for the beaches on the first day or defending key positions like the city of Caen, they were ready to stand firm.
They often rushed troops to counter in an area. There, they would make use of their skill and experience to hold up the crude offensive tactics of the Allies for as long as possible. The weight of numbers and firepower meant that, sooner or later, they would have to give up, retreat to the next line, and settle in to fight again.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commanding the defense, was a great believer in bold action. He tried to throw together a decisive counter-attack but never managed. Fuel shortages, tactical challenges, and enemy action always thwarted him.
Rommel was still one of Germany's best commanders, and he put up a fierce fight. When he was injured in an Allied air attack on July 17th and so put out of action, it was a serious blow to his troops.
However hard they fought, the Germans were at a constant disadvantage. The Allies had more men, more resources, and less trouble getting them to where they were needed.
Critically, the Allies ruled the skies, allowing them to launch regular air strikes against German positions which the Germans could not counter. Combined with substantial forces of artillery, this could leave German defenses seriously compromised before an attack even began.
Though they were inflicting serious losses on the attackers, the Germans were suffering their own losses, which they were less able to replace. Every time they fell back from a position they did so with fewer men and less equipment than they had before. Supply shortages and transport problems meant that replacements were slow in coming.
The loss of key commanders was particularly challenging. On June 12, 1944, an Allied air attack killed Wehrmacht General Erich Marcks, commander of the 12th SS Panzer division. Five days later, General Heinz Hellmich, the commander of the 243rd Infantry was killed by an Allied air attack. The head of the 77th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Stegmann, was lost in mid-June with 300 of his men after getting caught up in Allied shelling.
In just over a month, the Germans lost 2,360 officers, 94,000 men, and 225 tanks. Only 6,000 men and 17 tanks arrived as replacements.
Four days before he himself was injured, Rommel predicted that the front would collapse within a month. He was right.
In late July, the Americans launched Operation Cobra, a breakout on the western flank. Hit hard by Allied air power and armor, the Germans there were unable to hold. Commanded by General Patton, American forces swept south and then east, flanking the remaining Germans.
By the middle of August, tens of thousands of German soldiers were trapped in a pocket of ground outside Falaise, about to be surrounded. They kept fighting fiercely, but the end was clearly in sight. Some fled through a gap to the east before it was closed. Thousands more fell captive when the gap was closed, and the defenders were forced to surrender.
In Normandy, German troops fought to keep a country they ruled against its will, to prop up a murderous regime. No moral argument could justify their presence there. But they fought with skill, courage, and tenacity. It was a struggle against the odds that revealed the character of the German soldier.
In 1939, a team of British covert agents traveled to Poland. Sent to help resist the German invasion, they arrived too late to make a difference. But their mission would prove vital to Allied operations in the rest of the war.
In the summer of 1939, Europe hung on the precipice of war. The British establishment, long dismissive of the threat of a major conflict, hurried to prepare for the coming storm. In an office in London, a small team led by Colin Gubbins hurried to build a covert operations unit.
On August 19, vital news reached Gubbins. British intelligence had learned that the Germans were about to invade Poland. Three days later, word of a pact between the Soviet Union and Germany made clear to the world what was coming for Poland.
Gubbins had made two previous trips to Poland, fostering links with Polish intelligence. If those efforts were not to go to waste, and if his men were to help in this opening act of the war, then he needed to act now.
In a matter of days, Gubbins pulled together a team of twenty operatives, led by himself. Dressed in civilian clothes, they would travel to Europe with false passports, using covers such as an entertainer, an insurance salesman, and an agricultural expert. Their aim was to get to Warsaw, connect with the Poles, and help them prepare for a campaign of guerrilla warfare against the Germans.
The men gathered at Victoria Station to catch a train for the first leg of their journey. They had been told to dress as civilians so that they could blend in, but they lacked experience in this sort of work, and it showed.
Gubbins wore a bright green hat while one of his traveling companions had equally conspicuous tartan trousers. All of their newly printed passports bore consecutive numbers, which could have raised the suspicions of a vigilant inspector.
These would provide lessons for the future, but there was no time to correct them now. The men boarded the train and headed for the impending war.
To avoid drawing the attention of the Germans, the British agents took a circuitous route to Poland. They caught a train to Marseille in southern France, boarded a boat from there to Alexandria in Egypt, and then finally took a plane to the Polish capital of Warsaw.
Unfortunately, the precious days it took to pull the team together and then make their drawn-out journey were the last ones of peace Europe had left. By the time Gubbins and his operatives arrived in Poland, the German attack had begun.
World War II had arrived.
Gubbins rushed around the country, renewing old contacts, making new ones, and trying to find out how his men could help resist the German advance. He met up with the brilliant head of Poland’s Deuxieme Bureau, Stanislav Gano, renewing the links between Polish and British intelligence.
He was also introduced to members of the resistance network Poland was already building as the country saw its armies swept aside.
For two weeks, Gubbins raced around Poland, frantically trying to work out what was happening and to send intelligence back to London. It swiftly became clear that his plan had been misguided. The Poles were being so decisively overwhelmed that there would be no time for guerrilla warfare, never mind time for his men to get involved.
With the country on the verge of capitulation and Britain now at war with Germany, Poland was no place for a group of hastily assembled and ill-prepared British operatives. Gubbins gave his men the order to scatter, get across the border, and travel home as best they could.
Like thousands of servicemen from the collapsing Polish forces, Gubbins headed south across the border into Romania, which at the time was neutral in the war, its independence guaranteed by the delicate balance between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other. Together with one of his teammates, Peter Wilkinson, Gubbins wound up in Bucharest. There, the two Britons drank away their sorrows at the collapse of their much-anticipated first guerrilla campaign.
By October, Gubbins was back in Britain, preparing his organization for the long campaigns of intelligence gathering and sabotage that would become their war.
Though the Polish expedition appeared to many to have been a dismal failure, it led to one act that would have incredible significance in the course of the war.
Polish intelligence had been working on cracking Germany’s military codes. Though the work was incomplete, they had made valuable progress, including the capture of a critical piece of equipment.
While Poland was being conquered, a meeting took place in the Pyry Forest, a meeting so secret that its details remain uncertain 80 years later. What we know for sure is that Polish intelligence handed a bulky leather hold all to a British agent - possibly Gubbins himself.
This was passed on to another Briton, Wilfred “Biffy” Dunderdale, who transported the contents of the bag safely back to Britain. So critical was this item that it was met at Victoria Station by the head of MI6.
This was the Enigma machine. Its decryption would allow the Allies to read high-level German communications throughout much of the war, regularly saving lives and altering the outcome of the conflict. That work was made possible thanks to Gubbins’ failed Polish guerilla war.
In August 1944, the War Ministry in Tokyo had issued a directive to the commandants of various POW camps, outlining a policy for what it called the 'final disposition' of prisoners. A copy of this document, which came to be known as the 'August 1 Kill-All Order,' would surface in the war crimes investigations in Tokyo.
The document read in part that POWs are to be destroyed individually or in groups and whether it is accomplished by means of mass bombing, poisonous smoke, poisons, drowning, or decapitation, dispose of them as the situation dictates and not to leave a single POW alive.
Already aware that the Japanese would kill all POWs, a rescue plan had already been developed and went in action on January 28, 1945, when 121 hand-selected U.S. troops slipped behind enemy lines in the Philippines. Their mission: March thirty rugged miles to rescue 513 POWs languishing in a hellish camp, among them the last survivors of the infamous Bataan Death March. A recent prison massacre by Japanese soldiers elsewhere in the Philippines made the stakes impossibly high and left little time to plan the complex operation.
In Ghost Soldiers, the author Hampton Sides vividly re-creates this daring raid, offering a minute-by-minute narration that unfolds alongside intimate portraits of the prisoners and their lives in the camp. Sides shows how the POWs banded together to survive, defying the Japanese authorities even as they endured starvation, tropical diseases, and torture. Harrowing, poignant, and inspiring, Ghost Soldiers is the mesmerizing story of a remarkable mission. It is also a testament to the human spirit, an account of enormous bravery and self-sacrifice amid the most trying conditions.
Reader Reviews
This book's story is beautifully told. Hampton Sides is a great writer and makes the history of these soldiers and prisoners and Philippine guerillas and even civilians come to life. The story recorded in this book really happened and it became apparent several times that none of their plans would have succeeded without the aid of divine providence.
~ Jesse Whitehead
I was aware of the Bataan Death March but did not know anything about the daring rescue mission to liberate 513 prisoners of the Cabanatuan POW camp where many of the survivors were imprisoned. The time is the end of January 1945. The United States Army is advancing in the Philippines and the retreating Japanese have already executed American prisoners elsewhere. One hundred and twenty-one hand-picked troops from the elite Army 6th Ranger Battalion are selected to slip behind enemy lines and go 30 miles to Cabanatuan on a daring rescue mission and then march 30 miles back with the liberated POW's whose condition is unknown after 3 years in a hellish camp.
If you enjoyed books like' Unbroken: A World War II Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption' and 'Flags of Our Fathers' you will enjoy this book. It is an important story and should not be forgotten.
~Jim
If this book is on your TBR list, move it to the top. If it isn't on your list, add it!! It is simply excellent as it tells the story of the Bataan Death March, those survivors who ended up in Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines, and the subsequent greatest rescue mission of World War II.
This is a must read and I highly recommend it.
~ Jill Hutchinson
Interesting and well-written. I might reread it. I'm sorry I didn't keep notes. I recall Sides giving an excellent book talk at the Eldorado, NM Public Library. We both lived there then.
He wrote the book just in time to talk to the last survivors of the Bataan Death March, who were mostly from New Mexico.
If you haven't read this, well, you should. Though it gets terribly grim.
~ Peter Tillman
About the Author
Hampton Sides is best-known for his gripping non-fiction adventure stories set in war or depicting epic expeditions of discovery and exploration. He is the author of the bestselling histories 'Ghost Soldiers,' 'Blood and Thunder,' 'Hellhound On His Trail,' and, most recently, 'In the Kingdom of Ice,' which recounts the heroic polar voyage of the USS Jeannette during the Gilded Age.
Hampton is editor-at-large for Outside and a frequent contributor to National Geographic and other magazines. His journalistic work, collected in numerous published anthologies, has been twice nominated for National Magazine Awards for feature writing.
A native of Memphis and a Yale graduate, Hampton is the 2015 Miller Distinguished Scholar at the Santa Fe Institute and an advisory board member of the Mayborn Literary Nonfiction Conference and the Author's Guild. A frequent lecturer, Hampton divides his time between Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Colorado College, where he teaches narrative non-fiction and serves as Journalist in Residence.