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Contact Info
Home Town West Palm Beach
Last Address Sarasota, FL
Date of Passing May 24, 2008
Location of Interment Arlington National Cemetery (VLM) - Arlington, Virginia
Brigadier General Donald C. "Don" Blackburn (United States Army, retired) (September 14, 1916 - May 24, 2008) was a United States Army Special Forces officer, best known for his significant command and developmental roles in the U.S. Army Special Forces. Commander of the highly classified Studies and Observations Group 1965-66.
Army service
Donald Blackburn was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry Reserve on May 30, 1938, and entered into active duty with the Army Sept. 22, 1940, assigned to the 24th Infantry at Fort Benning, Ga. At the outbreak of World War II, he was serving as an advisor to a battalion of the 12th Infantry, Philippine Army. Upon the fall of Bataan in April 1942, he evaded capture and until October 1945 conducted guerrilla warfare on the island of Luzon. During this latter period, he reorganized and commanded the 11th Infantry, Philippine Army, which was integrated in October 1945 as a regular unit in the Philippine military establishment.
Since World War II, Blackburn has served in various command and staff assignments. He was assigned to the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership, Tactical Department, United States Military Academy, in 1950. During 1953, he attended the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. He was then assigned to NATO's Allied Forces Northern Europe, Oslo, Norway. On return to the United States in 1956, he was assigned as commanding officer, 3rd Training Regiment, Fort Jackson, S.C. In 1957, he was assigned to MAAG, Vietnam, and served as the senior advisor to the commanding general, 5th Military Region (Mekong Delta). In October 1958, he was assigned as commanding officer, 77th Special Forces Group (now the 7th SFG) where he was instrumental in initiating Special Forces operations in Southeast Asia. He attended the 1960 class of the National War College. He served as deputy director of developments for Special Warfare, Office of the Chief of Research and Development from 1961-1964, and then was reassigned to the office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations as Director of Special Warfare. Blackburn was SOG Commander (Studies and Observations Group) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from May 1965 to May 1966. He served as assistant deputy director, Defense Communications Planning Group from August 1966 to August 1967. He was the assistant division commander, 82nd Airborne Division from September 1967 to October 1968. He was the Director of Plans and Programs, office of the Chief of Research and Development from October 1968 until his retirement in 1971.
In retirement
Following his retirement from military service, Blackburn took a position with Braddock, Dunn and McDonald, where he served as vice president, special projects until he retired in 1979.
While 77th/7th SFG(A) Commander, he assembled the first Operation White Star Mobile Training Teams. The first itieration was led by Bull Simons whom he had first gotten to know from the Philippines. He was the director of plans and programs, office of the Chief of Research and Development from October 1968 until his retirement in 1971. While in the position, he authorized and oversaw the initial electin of the Son Tay POW for Operation Ivory Coast, briefing LTG Wheeler. He was part of the briefing with Dr. Henry Kissinger. He is the one that chose BG Manor (Air Force and overall commander of the Raid), Bull Simons, Dick Meadows and "Doc" Cataldo. After the Raid, he was the one that navigated the furor over the fact there were no prisoners.
Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Campaign (1965-66)
From Month/Year
December / 1965
To Month/Year
June / 1966
Description This campaign was from 25 December 1965 to 30 June 1966. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of political, economic, sociological, and military factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that American military objectives should be to cause North Vietnam to cease its control and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos, to assist South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and to assist South Vietnam in pacification extending governmental control over its territory.
North Vietnam continued to build its own forces inside South Vietnam. At first this was done by continued infiltration by sea and along the Ho Chi Minh trail and then, in early 1966, through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). U.S. air elements received permission to conduct reconnaissance bombing raids, and tactical air strikes into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, but ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces fought a war of attrition against the enemy, relying for a time on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war.
During 1966 there were eighteen major operations, the most successful of these being Operation WHITE WING (MASHER). During this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division, Korean units, and ARVN forces cleared the northern half of Binh Dinh Province on the central coast. In the process they decimated a division, later designated the North Vietnamese 3d Division. The U.S. 3d Marine Division was moved into the area of the two northern provinces and in concert with South Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units, conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.
The largest sweep of 1966 took place northwest of Saigon in Operation ATTLEBORO, involving 22,000 American and South Vietnamese troops pitted against the VC 9th Division and a NVA regiment. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos.
By 31 December 1966, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 385,300. Enemy forces also increased substantially, so that for the same period, total enemy strength was in excess of 282,000 in addition to an estimated 80,000 political cadres. By 30 June 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800, but enemy strength had increased as well.
On 8 January U.S. and South Vietnamese troops launched separate drives against two major VC strongholds in South Vietnam-in the so-called "Iron Triangle" about 25 miles northwest of Saigon. For years this area had been under development as a VC logistics base and headquarters to control enemy activity in and around Saigon. The Allies captured huge caches of rice and other foodstuffs, destroyed a mammoth system of tunnels, and seized documents of considerable intelligence value.
In February, the same U.S. forces that had cleared the "Iron Triangle", were committed with other units in the largest allied operation of the war to date, JUNCTION CITY. Over 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions engaged the enemy, killing 2,728. After clearing this area, the Allies constructed three airfields; erected a bridge and fortified two camps in which CIDG garrisons remained as the other allied forces withdrew.