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Contact Info
Home Town Bremerhaven
Last Address Georgetown, CA
Date of Passing May 29, 1982
Wall/Plot Coordinates Georgetown Pioneer Cemetery, CA
Earl Gurnsey was born on July 22, 1948, in Bremerhaven, Germany, and later immigrated to the United States. He enlisted in the U.S. Army on March 10, 1966, and completed basic training at Fort Ord, California, in May 1966.
Gurnsey next completed Wireman School at Fort Ord in June 1966, Lineman School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, in August 1966, and Basic Airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia, in September 1966.
His first assignment was as a wireman with Company A of the 501st Signal Battalion at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, from September 1966 to April 1967, followed by service as a radio mechanic and field wireman with Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in South Vietnam from June 1967 to August 1968.
SP4 Gurnsey then volunteered for a 2nd tour of duty in Vietnam, and served as a UH-1 Iroquois helicopter door gunner with the 118th Assault Helicopter Company in South Vietnam from August 1968 until he was captured and taken as a Prisoner of War in Cambodia on November 27, 1968.
After spending 41 days in captivity he was released by his captors on January 6, 1969. SP4 Gurnsey was medically evacuated back to the United States, and was hospitalized at Letterman General Hospital in San Francisco, California, from January 1969 until he was medically retired from the Army on August 13, 1969.
Earl Gurnsey died on May 29, 1982, and was buried at the Georgetown Pioneer Cemetery in Georgetown, California.
Other Comments:
SP4 Earl F. Gurnsey was the door gunner aboard Bandit UH-1C, 66-15015 on 27 November 1968 when the aircraft was struck by .51 cal anti-aircraft fire at XT238290 in the Tay Ninh area, near the Cambodian border.
All aboard the UH-1C gun ship were KIA, except Gurnsey. All efforts to recover SP4 Gurnsey were unsuccessful by both ARVN and 25th Division troops. Some eyewitnesses have said that, "when they flew over the wreckage and tried to drive the enemy soldiers from the area, a "waving hand" could be seen extending from the wrecked aircraft!"
When U.S. troops finally reached the wreckage, the remains of the three crew KIA members were found.
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.
