Williams, Harold L., COL

Deceased
 
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Last Rank
Colonel
Last Service Branch
Quartermaster Corps
Last Primary MOS
2624-Logistical Commander
Last MOS Group
Quartermaster
Primary Unit
1977-1978, 510th Field Depot
Service Years
1943 - 1978
Official/Unofficial US Army Certificates
Presidential Certificate of Appreciation
Quartermaster Corps
Colonel
One Service Stripe
Four Overseas Service Bars

 Last Photo   Personal Details 

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This Military Service Page was created/owned by Marines SgtMaj Joe Donald Armstrong (Grasshopper28) to remember Williams, Harold L. (Chappie), COL.

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Contact Info
Date of Passing
May 10, 2016		  

 Official Badges 

Honorably Discharged WW II US Marine Corps Honorable Discharge (Original)


 Unofficial Badges 

Order Of The Golden Dragon Montford Point Marine Congressional Gold Medal


 Additional Information
Last Known Activity:

VIEW COL WILLIAMS USMC SERVICE ON MTWS AT
https://marines.togetherweserved.com/usmc/servlet/tws.webapp.WebApp?cmd=Profile&type=Person&ID=412704
 
   
Other Comments:

 


 HONORING THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF COL. HOWARD L. WILLIAMS (RET)
                                 ______
                                
                         HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS
                               of Florida
                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, May 10, 2016

  Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commemorate the passing of
Colonel Howard L. Williams (Ret), affectionately known as ``Chappie,''
who sadly passed away on March 25, 2016.
  Born and raised in Emporia, VA, Chappie worked briefly in the Norfolk
Navy Yard after high school and then, in 1943, enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps with the 123rd Platoon at Montford Point Camp, New
River, North Carolina. After completing segregated boot training, he
served with honor in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of WW II as a member
of the 1st Marine Ammunition Company 7th Depot. His company provided
ammunition support in the Marshall Islands, Saipan and landed on D Day
at Okinawa in support of the 1st & 6th Marines Division.
  In September 1945, Chappie went ashore with the first troops of the 1st Marine Division 3rd Amphibious Corps in North China to perform occupation duty.
  He was honorably discharged from the Marines in 1946, and as a result of the GI Bill attended Virginia State University, where he graduated in 1950 with a Bachelor's Degree in Industrial Education. While
attending Virginia State he was commissioned as a second Lieutenant in the ROTC. Chappie served in the military for over 30 years in numerous assignments with the United States Marines Corp, Army National Guard and the US Army Reserves. He retired with the rank of full Colonel as
the Director for Supply and Transportation in the 510th Field Depot, United States Army.
  After college, he began a long career teaching in the Baltimore City Public Schools at Harlem Park Middle, Dunbar High, and at Baltimore City College, finally retiring from the Baltimore City School Board in
1994.
  Chappie was the recipient of numerous awards for his contributions to organizations in the community. In June 2012, he received the Congressional Gold Medal for his service in the segregated Marine Corp units known as the Montford Point Marines.
  He leaves behind his wife of 56 years, Marilyn, and two devoted sons, Michael and David.
  Mr. Speaker, I am extremely proud to remember the life and legacy of Colonel Howard L. Williams (Ret), who served this nation with honor and distinction. He will be dearly missed by all.
   

WWII - China-Burma-India Theater/China Offensive Campaign (1945)
From Month/Year
May / 1945		 To Month/Year
September / 1945

Description
(China Offensive Campaign 5 May to 2 September 1945) As victory in Europe appeared increasingly inevitable in the early months of 1945, the Allies began to focus greater military resources on the war against Japan. Throughout the spring of 1945 Allied forces drove the Japanese from Burma and dislodged Japanese forces from key islands in the central and southwest Pacific. With its sea power shattered and its air power outmatched, Japan's only remaining resource was its relatively intact ground force. Although the land campaigns in Burma and the Philippines had been disastrous Or the engaged Japanese forces, those and other outlying garrisons represented only a small percent of its ground troops. The bulk of Japan's army of over two million men was on the mainland of Asia, primarily in China.

Suffering from the travails of a civil war that had begun in 1911, and from pervasive economic problems, China had lost much of its enthusiasm for the struggle against the Japanese. Since 1937, when the Sino-Japanese conflict became an open war, China's best troops had been repeatedly defeated and its richest coastal and riverine cities captured by the Japanese. From the beginning of World War II, Allied planners believed it would be essential to assist China in its war against Japan, but had not regarded it as a decisive theater. Unable to deploy ground forces for operations there, the United States provided air and logistical support, technical assistance, and military advice to the Chinese army for its continuing struggle against the Japanese.

Strategic Setting
Although the ultimate goal of the Allies was the complete expulsion of the Japanese from Chinese soil, that proved a difficult task for both political and economic reasons. Chinese military forces belonged to two hostile camps, the Nationalist army of the pro-Western Kuomintang government commanded by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist "Red" Army of Mao Tse-tung. A latent civil war between the Nationalists and Communists had sharply limited efforts to protect Chinese territory from foreign aggression. Although the two factions had agreed to fight the Japanese instead of each other, the ensuing alliance was at best an uneasy truce. Attempts to coordinate their efforts against the Japanese were markedly unsuccessful. By 1945 Chiang's army was centered at the emergency capital of

 
Chungking, 900 miles to the west of coastal Shanghai, and Mao's forces were based 500 miles north of Chungking in equally remote Yenan. The Allies provided material assistance to the Nationalist army, but dissension among the Nationalist factions made it impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to consolidate his military forces in an effort to combat both the Communists and the Japanese. In fact, both the Communists and the Nationalists held the major part of their armies in reserve, ready to resume their civil war once Japan's fate had been decided elsewhere.
 
Severe economic problems made it difficult for Chiang Kai-shek to sustain his army in the field. China had no industrial base to support the prolonged war, and the Japanese occupation and blockade had made it increasingly hard for the Allies to ship supplies into the country. For logistical support, the Nationalist army depended on the limited Allied tonnage flown over the 14,000-foot Himalayas mountain chain, the so-called Hump, from India into southern China. Previously, those supplies had been delivered by road, but the fall of Burma to the Japanese in 1942 closed that route. No large-scale offensive could be mounted as long as the supply situation remained critical. Early Allied plans for the China theater thus concentrated on supporting Nationalist forces with advice, training assistance, and critical supplies and on establishing air bases from which to conduct strategic bombing attacks against Japan. Eventually, Allied leaders hoped to seize the ports of Hong Kong and Canton, some 700 miles southeast of Chungking, allowing them to establish a maritime supply line to China.

U.S. leaders initially expected little from the Chinese Army. Theoretically, Chiang's army was the largest in the world. In reality, it consisted mostly of ill-equipped, inadequately trained, poorly organized, and ineptly led units. Many soldiers suffered from malnutrition and clothing shortages. Although an administrative system that was primitive at best prevented western observers from making any useful estimates of the precise size and capabilities of the somewhat amorphous mass of troops, clearly it had been unable to halt an enemy advance or fight a modern war since the very beginning of the struggle. Mao's forces, if better motivated, were even less well equipped and, by 1945, were focusing most of their efforts at establishing guerrilla and clandestine political organizations behind the Japanese lines, rather than opposing them directly.

 
   
My Participation in This Battle or Operation
From Month/Year
May / 1945		 To Month/Year
September / 1945
 
Last Updated:
Mar 16, 2020
   
Personal Memories
   
My Photos From This Battle or Operation
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  15 Also There at This Battle:
 
  • Singlaub, John Kirk, MG, (1943-1978)
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