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SGT Donald Shook (Buffalo Grunt)
to remember
Quinn, William Wilson ("Buffalo Bill"), LTG.
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Contact Info
Last Address Crisfield, Maryland
Date of Passing Sep 11, 2000
Location of Interment Arlington National Cemetery (VLM) - Arlington, Virginia
The Army transforms and technology evolves. Good leadership, however, transcends change that is recognized by generations of soldiers. Every soldier knows exactly what it means when someone is called a "soldier's soldier": clear and decisive leadership ability; a team builder; one who fosters unit cohesion and strong morale; a leader who inspires loyalty and trust by giving back the same.
Lieutenant General William W. Quinn was a "soldier's soldier." Raised in a middle-class family in Maryland, Bill Quinn knew before he graduated from high school that he wanted to be a soldier. Thwarting his father's plans that he become a lawyer, he entered West Point in 1929, doing it the hard way--by working odd jobs, studying extra for exams, and persevering the old fashioned way. He graduated in 1933.
Due to extreme officer shortages, 2LT Quinn was immediately given command of Company L, 5th Infantry Regiment, Fort Mckinley, Maine. Already a common-sense leader, 2LT Quinn called in his First Sergeant and told him:
The first fact I think should be discussed here is that I don't know my ass from third base about running a company. An additional fact is that you and I know it.... I'm going to take your advice and your recommendations as to discipline, of rewards and punishments, of planning, of training, things to do, when to do it, how to do it, the mess, the food, the morale, etc. Now the final fact is that I don't know what lam doing today; but Sergeant Warwick, I will know someday, and it won't be too far oft So I will just let that rest with you.
From 1937-38, 1LT Quinn served as the provost marshal of Manila, in the Philippines. He attended the infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia, during 1938-39 and Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1941.
It was in the North Africa Theater and subsequently in Italy that Bill Quinn made his mark. In 1943-44, Quinn served as the Division and later as the IV Corps G2 in North Africa and Italy, under the command of LTG Alexander M. 'Sandy" Patch. In 1944-45 LTC Quinn was appointed the G2 of the Seventh Army. Although he held the relatively junior rank of lieutenant colonel, he was responsible for coordinating and planning all intelligence supporting the invasion of southern France (15 August 1944).
Four months later, LTC Quinn correctly predicted that a German offensive was planned for New Year's Eve 1944, near Colmar in northeastern France. For this timely intelligence work, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.
Throughout World War II, LTC Quinn worked closely with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to receive the latest intelligence on the situation in Germany and France. Although his sources were disputed at the time by more conventional Army leaders, this association with General "Wild Bill" Donovan and the OSS prepared LTC Bill Quinn for his next assignment.
In late 1945 he was named director of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). His job was to preserve OSS intelligence assets through the post-war drawdown until a national intelligence agency could be formed. In July 1946, LTC Quinn was named chief of operations of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), remaining in that position until 1947, when the organization became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Had the agents and assets of the OSS (SSU/CIG/CIA) not been saved, Quinn wrote, "the talents of Richard Helms, Harry Rositzke, William Harvey, Alfred Ulmer, Jr., Frank Wisner and William Colby, and some of the other great leaders and minds in the intelligence field, would have been thrown to the winds. Their talents would have been lost, as well as the background and mass of experience and bulk of intelligence that had been collected."
When the Korean conflict began in 1950, LTC Quinn was a member of General Douglas MacArthur's staff. He was put in charge of intelligence planning for the amphibious assault at Inchon. His intelligence preparation for the invasion was thorough and accurate and significantly contributed to one of the most daring and successful amphibious landings in history. T.R. Ferenbach, in This Kind of War, wrote: "the XU.S. Army Corps, 70,000 men, was at sea. It had been formed from scratch, operating against time, manpower, and every known logistic difficulty, and its very conception embodied the best of American military capability.... Whatever the early American participation in the Korean conflict had been, the amphibious assault by X Corps was no small operation. It involved more ships and men than most of the island operations of the Pacific War..
Promoted to Colonel, he would later serve as the G2 for the Army's X Corps, but in January 1951 he was given command of the 17th Infantry Regiment. It was his first command of combat troops. The 17th Infantry had just received a new call sign-"Buffalo," and COL Quinn decided to call his troops the Buffaloes. The regiment mailed home press releases about the Buffaloes and a short time later war correspondents began to call him "Buffalo Bill." The name stuck. Clay Blair in The Forgotten War wrote: "Almost overnight the Buffaloes became famous. Hundreds of GIs requested a transfer to the outfit; some even went AWOL to join."
Over the next eight months, COL Quinn was awarded the Silver Star, for personally reorganizing a stalled attack, and the Bronze Star with "V" device, for leading a patrol eight miles behind enemy lines.
Between 1953 and 1955 COL Quinn served as the Chief of the Army section of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (MAG) in Greece. This was followed by infantry command assignments during 1955-57. He was later promoted to Brigadier General and from 1960-61 served in the Pentagon as the chief of the Army's Public Information Division.
In 1961, LTG Quinn was named Deputy Director of the newly established Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In 1964 he left DIA to take command of the U.S. Seventh Army in Germany.
LTG Quinn retired in 1966 but continued to serve soldiers and the nation. He was a consultant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a trustee of the National Historical Intelligence Museum. He was appointed Honorary Colonel for Life of the 17th Infantry Regiment in 1985, and in 1992 he established the 17th Infantry Association to honor all the Regiment's veterans and serving soldiers.
In 1997, LTG Quinn was awarded the Central Intelligence Agency Seal Medallion for his important role in maintaining the nation's intelligence capability between World War II and the onset of the Cold War.
We lost "Buffalo Bill" on September 11,2000, when he passed away at the age of 92. He was buried at Arlington Cemetery. LTG "Buffalo Bill" Quinn was a groundbreaking intelligence professional and legendary infantry commander and established the high standards expected of a "soldier's soldier."
Note: Military Intelligence was not officially recognized as a separate branch of the Army until July 1962. Except in organizations like the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), OSS, officers who possessed the skills for Army Intelligence were called to serve, but were expected to return to their branch for leadership positions and command time.
Other Comments:
William W. "Buffalo Bill" Quinn, 92, a retired Army lieutenant general who was an intelligence officer in Europe in World War II and a frequently decorated regimental commander in the Korean War, died September 11, 2000 at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. He had congestive heart failure.
General Quinn's peacetime career included a period as director of public information of the Army in Washington. In other assignments, he headed the Army section of the U.S. military advisory mission in Greece in the 1950s and served as deputy
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the early 1960s. He later commanded an infantry division. In his last post he was commanding general of the U.S. 7th Army in Germany. He retired from active duty in 1966.
He made his mark as a staff officer in World War II. In March 1944, after serving as a divisional and corps intelligence officer in North Africa and Italy, he was named intelligence officer of the 7th Army.
Although he held the relatively junior rank of lieutenant colonel, he was responsible for gathering and coordinating information for the invasion of southern France on August 15, 1944, that was carried out by U.S. and French troops.
Four months later, he gave timely warning of a desperate German offensive near Colmar in northeastern France. For this, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.
At the end of the war, General Quinn played a role in Washington in the transformation of the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime spy agency, into the Central Intelligence Agency. In late 1945, he was named director of the Strategic Services Unit, which had been set up to preserve OSS intelligence assets. In July 1946, he was named chief of operations of the Central Intelligence Group. He remained in that job until 1947, when the organization became the CIA.
Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet issued a statement after learning of General Quinn's death, hailing him as "a leader and visionary" who played an important role in maintaining the nation's intelligence capability between the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War.
In 1997, General Quinn was awarded the Agency Seal Medallion.
When the Korean War began in 1950, General Quinn, by then a full colonel, was serving on the staff of General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo. General Quinn was put in charge of intelligence for the amphibious assault at Inchon. The attack, carried out by Marines and joined by Army troops two days later, turned the tide of battle in the first phase of the war. He then served as intelligence officer of the X Corps.
In January 1951, he was given command of the 17th Infantry Regiment. The unit had just received a new radio call sign--"Buffalo"--and he decided to call his troops "The Buffaloes." He also started a publicity campaign aimed at hometown newspapers. Two newspaper correspondents gave him the nickname "Buffalo Bill," and it stuck for the rest of his life.
"Almost overnight, the Buffaloes became famous," wrote Clay Blair in "The Forgotten War," a history of the Korean War. "Hundreds of GIs requested a transfer to the outfit; some, General Quinn boasted, even went AWOL to join."
Over the next eight months, General Quinn was awarded the Silver Star, for personally reorganizing a stalled attack, and the Bronze Star with combat "V," for leading a patrol eight miles into enemy territory. Other decorations included the Legion of Merit and Purple Heart.
In September 1951, he returned to the United States. In 1953, he went to Greece for two years with the Joint Military Aid Group. His later assignments were in this country and Germany. He was director of public information from 1959 to 1961, and deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1961 to 1964, when he took command of the 7th Army in Germany.
William Wilson Quinn, who was born in Crisfield, Maryland, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1933 and was commissioned in the infantry. He also graduated from the Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College.
After retiring from the Army, he was a vice president of the Aerospace Group of the Martin Marietta Corporation until 1972. He then established Quinn Associates, a consulting firm.
General Quinn, a resident of Arlington, was honorary colonel of the 17th Infantry, a consultant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a trustee of the National Historical Intelligence Museum and a member of the Army & Navy and Chevy Chase clubs and the Talbot County (Maryland) Historical Society.
WWII - European Theater of Operations/Rhineland Campaign (1944-45)/Siege of Bastogne
From Month/Year
December / 1944
To Month/Year
January / 1945
Description The Siege of Bastogne was an engagement in December 1944 between American and German forces at the Belgian town of Bastogne, as part of the larger Battle of the Bulge. The goal of the German offensive was the harbour at Antwerp. In order to reach it before the Allies could regroup and bring their superior air power to bear, German mechanized forces had to seize the roadways through eastern Belgium. Because all seven main roads in the Ardennes mountain range converged on the small town of Bastogne, control of its crossroads was vital to the German attack. The siege lasted from December 20–27 when the besieged American forces were relieved by elements of General George Patton's Third Army.
Initial combat at Noville[edit]
On 19–20 December, the 1st Battalion of the 506th PIR was ordered to support Team Desobry (Maj. William R. Desobry), a battalion-sized tank-infantry task force of the 10th Armored Division assigned to defend Noville[7] located north-northeast of both Foy and of Bastogne just 4.36 mi (7.02 km) away. With just four M18 tank destroyers of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion to assist, the paratroopers attacked units of the 2. Panzerdivision, whose mission was to proceed by secondary roads via Monaville (just northwest of Bastogne) to seize a key highway and capture, among other objectives, fuel dumps — for the lack of which the overall German counter-offensive faltered and failed. Worried about the threat to its left flank in Bastogne, it organized a major combined arms attack to seize Noville. Team Desobry's high speed highway journey to reach the blocking position is one of the few documented cases wherein the legendary top speed of the M18 Hellcat (55 mph (89 km/h)) was actually used to get ahead of an enemy force as envisioned by its specifications.
The attack of 1st Battalion and the M18 Hellcat tank destroyers of the 705th TD Battalion together destroyed at least 30 German tanks and inflicted 500-1,000 casualties on the attacking forces in what amounted to a spoiling attack.[citation needed] A Military Channel expert historian[who?] credited the M18 tank destroyers with 24 kills, including several Tiger tanks, and believes that, in part, their ability to "shoot and scoot" at high speed and then reappear elsewhere on the battlefield and therefore appear to be another vehicle entirely played a large part in confusing and slowing the German attack, which subsequently stalled, leaving the Americans in possession of the town overnight. The 3rd Battalion was ordered forward from a reserve position north of Bastogne to ease the pressure on 1st Battalion by occupying a supporting position in Foy to the south.
The heavy losses inflicted by the tank-destroyers induced the German commander into believing the village was being held by a much stronger force[7] and he recoiled from further attacks on the village, committing a strategic error while seeking tactical advantage — significantly delaying the German advance and setting the stage for the Siege of Bastogne just to the south. This delay also gave the 101st Airborne Division enough time to organize defenses around Bastogne. After two days, the 2nd Panzer Division finally continued on its original mission to the Meuse River. As a consequence of its involvement at Bastogne, and its failure to dislodge the airborne forces, the column ultimately ran out of fuel at Celles, where it was destroyed by the U.S. 2nd Armored Division and the British 29th Armoured Brigade.
By the time the 1st Battalion pulled out of Noville on the 20th, the village of Foy half-way to Bastogne center had been captured from the 3rd Battalion by a separate attack, forcing the 1st Battalion to then fight its way through Foy. By the time 1st Battalion made it to the safety of American lines, it had lost 13 officers and 199 enlisted men, out of about 600 troops, and was assigned as the division reserve. Team Desobry lost a quarter of its troops and was reduced to just four medium tanks when it passed through the lines of 3rd Battalion.
Battle
19–23 December 1944
The 101st Airborne formed an all-round perimeter using the 502nd PIR on the northwest shoulder to block the 26th Volksgrenadier, the 506th PIR to block entry from Noville, the 501st PIR defending the eastern approach, and the 327th GIR scattered from Marvie in the southeast to Champs in the west along the southern perimeter, augmented by engineer and artillery units plugging gaps in the line. The division service area to the west of Bastogne had been raided the first night, causing the loss of almost its entire medical company, and numerous service troops were used as infantry to reinforce the thin lines. CCB of the 10th Armored Division, severely weakened by losses to its Team Desobry (Maj. William R. Desobry), Team Cherry (Lt. Col. Henry T. Cherry), and Team O'Hara (Lt. Col. James O'Hara) in delaying the Germans, formed a mobile "fire brigade" of 40 light and medium tanks (including survivors of CCR 9th Armored Division and eight replacement tanks found unassigned in Bastogne).
Three artillery battalions were commandeered and formed a temporary artillery group. Each had twelve 155 mm (6.1 in) howitzers, providing the division with heavy firepower in all directions restricted only by its limited ammunition supply. Col. Roberts, commanding CCB, also rounded up 600+ stragglers from the rout of VIII Corps and formed Team SNAFU as a further stopgap force.
As a result of the powerful American defense to the north and east, XLVII Panzer Corps commander Gen. von Lüttwitz decided to encircle Bastogne and strike from the south and southwest, beginning the night of 20/21 December. German panzer reconnaissance units had initial success, nearly overrunning the American artillery positions southwest of Bastogne before being stopped by a makeshift force. All seven highways leading to Bastogne were cut by German forces by noon of 21 December, and by nightfall the conglomeration of airborne and armored infantry forces were recognized by both sides as being surrounded.
The American soldiers were outnumbered approximately 5-1 and were lacking in cold-weather gear, ammunition, food, medical supplies, and senior leadership (as many senior officers, including the 101st's commander—Major General Maxwell Taylor—were elsewhere). Due to the worst winter weather in memory, the surrounded U.S. forces could not be resupplied by air nor was tactical air support available due to cloudy weather.
However, the two panzer divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps—after using their mobility to isolate Bastogne, continued their mission towards the Meuse on 22 December, rather than attacking Bastogne with a single large force. They left just one regiment behind to assist the 26th Volksgrenadier Division in capturing the crossroads. The XLVII Panzer Corps probed different points of the southern and western defensive perimeter in echelon, where Bastogne was defended by just a single airborne regiment and support units doubling as infantry. This played into the American advantage of interior lines of communication; the defenders were able to shift artillery fire and move their limited ad hoc armored forces to meet each successive assault.
The 26th VG received one panzergrenadier regiment from the 15th Panzergrenadier Division on Christmas Eve for its main assault the next day. Because it lacked sufficient troops and those of the 26th VG Division were near exhaustion, the XLVII Panzer Corps concentrated its assault on several individual locations on the west side of perimeter in sequence rather than launching one simultaneous attack on all sides. The assault—led by 18 tanks carrying a battalion of infantry—pierced the lines of the 327th's 3rd Battalion (officially, the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry), and advanced as far as the battalion command post at Hemroulle.
However, the 327th held its original positions and repulsed infantry assaults that followed, capturing 92 Germans. The panzers that had achieved the penetration divided into two columns, one trying to reach Champs from the rear, and were destroyed in detail by two companies of the 1st Battalion 502nd PIR under Lt. Col. Patrick F. Cassidy and four tank destroyers of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Allied control of Bastogne was a major obstacle to the German armored advance, and the morale of Allied forces elsewhere on the Western Front was boosted by news of the stubborn defense of the besieged town.