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Minnick, Mark Steven, SGT.
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Contact Info
Home Town North Webster, Indiana
Last Address 14 EMS Ln B65 Warsaw, Indiana
Date of Passing Jan 30, 2008
Location of Interment Mock Addition of the North Webster Cemetery - North Webster, Indiana
Operation Apache Snow was a joint U.S. and South Vietnamese military operation during the Vietnam War in the A Shau Valley. The A Shau Valley was an important corridor for the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), moving supplies into South Vietnam and used as staging area for attacks. Previous sweeps of the valley in Operation Delaware and Operation Dewey Canyon had not been able to keep the NVA from operating in the valley.
Apache Snow was planned as an operation involving ten battalions. The initial assault force consisted of troops from the 187th, 501st, and 506th Infantry Regiments of the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st ARVN Division. The plan was to block escape routes into Laos and assault enemy formations and strongholds. The operation began on May 10, 1969.
The main objective became Hill 937, the resulting battle became known to the soldiers as "Hamburger Hill", an up to date reference to the bloody fighting during the Korean War at a place called "Porkchop Hill". After ten days of fighting, which involved 11 infantry assaults up hill 937 primarily by the 3rd battalion, 187th infantry, (causing heavy U.S. losses), US forces managed to capture the hill. A few weeks later the hill was quietly abandoned by U.S. forces.
Operation Apache Snow continued until June 7, with U.S. troops making limilted contact with the enemy. It failed to deny access to the valley to North Vietnamese forces. The valley continued to be used as staging area for attacks in northern South Vietnam. The month‑long operation accounted for 675 enemy killed, three prisoners, 241 individual and 40 crew‑served weapons captured, and more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition discovered
Other Comments:
The Battle of Fire Support Base Ripcord was a 23 day battle between the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division and the North Vietnamese Army from July 1, 1970 until July 23, 1970. It was the last major confrontation between United States ground forces and North Vietnam of the Vietnam War. Little was known about the battle until 1985, when the FSB Ripcord Association was founded. Three Medals of Honor and six Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded to participants for actions during the operations.
President Nixon secretly began the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam early in 1969. As the only full-strength division remaining in Vietnam in early 1970, the 101st Airborne Division was ordered to conduct the planned offensive Operation Texas Star near the A Shau Valley.
On March 12, 1970, the 3rd Brigade, 101st began rebuilding abandoned Fire Support Base Ripcord which relied, as with most remote bases at the time, on a helicopter lifeline to get supplies in and the personnel out. The firebase was to be used for a planned offensive by the 101st to destroy NVA supply bases in the mountains overlooking the valley. Located on the eastern edge of the valley, and taking place at the same time as the Cambodian Incursion, the operation was considered covert.
Battle
As the 101st Airborne Division planned the attack on enemy supply bases, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was secretly observing their activities. From March 12 until June 30, the NVA was sporadically attacking the firebase. After weeks of reconnaissance by the NVA, on the morning of July 1, 1970 the North Vietnamese Army launched a mortar attack on the firebase. During the 23-day siege, 75 US servicemen were killed, including Colonel Andre Lucas, who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor; and First Lt. Bob Kalsu, the only contemporaneously active pro athlete to be killed during the war.
Fighting from four hilltops, surrounded, and outnumbered nearly ten to one, U.S. forces caused heavy losses on eight enemy battalions, before an aerial withdrawal under heavy mortar, anti-aircraft, and small arms fire. After the U.S. Army withdrew from the firebase, USAF B-52 heavy bombers were sent in to carpet bomb the area Major General (ret) Ben Harrison, then the commander of the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne at FSB Ripcord, is of the opinion that perhaps the NVA losses at Ripcord, just as their losses of their major offensives of the Ia Drang in 1965 and Tet in 1968, dulled the offensive capability of NVA for two full years, resulting in the delaying of their Easter Offensive from 1971 to 1972.
Units involved
United States
2nd Battalion (Currahees), 506th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The main US infantry unit involved.
1st Platoon of the 265th Radio Research Company (Company name / designation was deliberate misinformation), a covert Army unit with direct ties to the National Security Agency.
Vietnam War/Tet Counteroffensive Campaign (1968)
From Month/Year
January / 1968
To Month/Year
April / 1968
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.
