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Contact Info
Home Town Macon
Last Address Denver, CO
Date of Passing Feb 04, 1972
Location of Interment Fairmount Cemetery - Denver, Colorado
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Orlando Ward (born in Macon, Missouri, November 4, 1891- died Denver, Colorado February 4, 1972) was a career United States Army Officer. During World War II, as a Major General, he commanded the U.S. 1st Armored Division during Operation Torch (North Africa). He also served as Secretary to Army Chief of Staff George Marshall in the critical years prior to the war and made major contributions to field artillery procedures in the 1930s that, a decade later, made the American field artillery especially effective in World War II.
Early life and career
Orlando Ward graduated from West Point in 1914. His first assignment was as a lieutenant of black cavalry troops (E Troop of the U.S. 9th Cavalry Regiment) on border patrol in the wilds of Arizona and New Mexico. He later was part of Pershing's forces chasing Pancho Villa into Mexico. Recognizing that the horse had a limited future, he became interested in artillery and changed to that branch of the Army. He was awarded the Mexican Service Medal for serving on this campaign.
At the Second Battle of the Marne, under conditions that rendered other officers in charge useless, he took charge of the 2nd battalion of the U.S. 10th Field Artillery Regiment and kept the battalion effective until the tide of Germans was turned back. He was later awarded the Silver Star for his actions.
During the quiet period between the wars, he continued in field artillery, but was assigned posts like ROTC instructor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (where Charles Lindbergh was one of his students). Eventually, he became an instructor at the Fort Sill Gunnery school, where he and others developed key Forward Observer procedures that made the United States artillery most effective in the Second World War.
World War II
When the Army was in the critical time of building up for World War II, Ward was Secretary to Chief of Staff George Marshall, assisting in finding the resources to build the military while political forces were fighting to keep the United States out of the war and to help the United Kingdom. He worked closely there with Walter Bedell Smith and Omar Bradley.
He left that post (and was promoted major general) to become the second commander of the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division. He supervised the deployment of his division across the Atlantic to North Africa, which was brought piecemeal (with a layover in Northern Ireland) as part of Operation Torch and subsequent operations. The failure of 1st Armored to arrive intact and deploy as a single entity would have important consequences in later action against German forces in Tunisia.
The 1st Armored's first action against the Germans was not promising, when Combat Command 'B' and other Allied forces were thrown back after an advance by German forces. On the night of 10-11 December 1942, during withdrawal from Medjez el Bab, the focal point of the enemy attack, scores of combat vehicles of the 1st Armored's Combat Command 'B' — tanks, half-tracks, and tank destroyers — had bogged down in thick mud and had to be abandoned. The tanks were so badly mired that the advancing Germans themselves could not extricate them. It was a crippling loss. In its brief experience in action, Combat Command 'B' had lost 32 medium and 46 light tanks. The combat vehicles that remained were in poor condition after their long overland journey to the front lines.
Kasserine Pass
At the Battle of Kasserine Pass, the first major battle between Americans and Germans during World War II, elements of the 1st Armored Division were sent reeling back by a series of sudden enemy offensive thrusts. The dispersal of the 1st Armored into separate combat commands across the front by General Kenneth Anderson, with the connivance of his immediate superior, General Lloyd Fredendall, had angered Ward from the start, as it greatly weakened the division's ability to repulse concentrations of German armor and to shift his forces in response to enemy thrusts (Fredendall was later relieved of command and replaced by George S. Patton). However, Ward also bore responsibility for his failure to consult British tank commanders on German panzer tactics and to disseminate that information to his subordinate commanders. As a consequence, elements of the 1st Armored Division at Faïd fell victim to one of Rommel's familiar tactics when they pursued German tanks feigning retirement into a screen of 88 mm high-velocity German anti-tank guns, resulting in large American armor losses.
End of the Tunisian campaign
After the rout at Kasserine, Ward had become increasingly cautious in pursuing retreating German forces, and Patton began to counsel, then admonish Ward of the need for personal leadership of his division in combat, and to keep German forces under pressure. Impatient with the progress of the 1st Armored, Patton took the unusual step of ordering General Ward to personally lead a night assault on a stubbornly defended hill, reminding him of Eisenhower's directive that generals were also expendable in a war. Ward obeyed, and to his own apparent surprise, the attack was successful. Lightly wounded, he was awarded a Purple Heart and the Distinguished Service Cross. However, when Ward continued to exhibit overcaution, Patton, with the concurrence of 18th Army Group commander General Harold Alexander, finally relieved him of duty. In doing so, Patton was following Eisenhower's personal written instructions to him after Patton had replaced General Fredendall: "You must not retain for one instant any man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful of his ability to do his job."
Ward was replaced with General Ernest Harmon, who had successfully intervened to remedy General Fredendall's inaction during the battles of Kasserine Pass. Ward was the only general relieved of his command by Patton during World War II. Returning to the United States, Ward returned to a combat command late in the war with the U.S. 20th Armored Division into Bavaria.
Postwar career
After the war, Ward had two major assignments, first as head of the 6th Infantry Division in Korea (prior to the war there), and later as Chief of Military History, where he oversaw the production of the famous "Green Books," the official U.S. Army military history of World War II.
World War I/Aisne-Marne Campaign
From Month/Year
July / 1918
To Month/Year
August / 1918
Description Aisne-Marne, 18 July - 6 August 1918. Several days before the Germans launched their abortive Champagne-Marne drive, the French high command had made plans for a general converging offensive against the Marne salient. Petain issued orders on 12 July for the attack to begin on the 18th, with five French armies-the Tenth, Sixth, Ninth, Fifth, and Fourth, placed around the salient from left to right-taking part. Spearheading the attack were the five divisions of the French XX Corps (Tenth Army), including the American 1st and 2d Divisions. Early on 18 July the two American divisions and a French Moroccan division, jumping off behind a heavy barrage, launched the main blow at the northwest base of the salient near Soissons. Enemy frontline troops, taken by surprise, initially gave ground, although resistance stiffened after an Allied penetration of some three miles. Before the 1st and 2d Divisions were relieved (on 19 and 22 July respectively) they had advanced 6 to 7 miles, made Soissons untenable for the enemy, and captured 6,500 prisoners at a cost of over 10,000 American casualties.
Meanwhile the other French armies in the offensive also made important gains, and the German commander ordered a general retreat from the Marne salient. The French Sixth Army, on the right of the Tenth, advanced steadily from the southwest, reaching the Vesle River on 3 August. By 28 Judy this army included the American 3d, 4th, 28th, and 42d Divisions. The 4th and 42d Divisions were under control of the I Corps, the first American corps headquarters to participate in combat. On 4 August the American III Corps headquarters entered combat, taking control of the 28th and 32d Divisions (the latter had relieved the 3d Division in the line on 29 July). By 5 August the entire Sixth Army front was held by the two American corps. East of the Sixth Army the French Ninth and Fifth Armies also advanced into the salient. The Germans retired across the Aisne and Vesle Rivers, resolutely defending each strong point as they went.
By 6 August the Aisne-Marne Offensive was over. The threat to Paris was ended by wiping out the Marne salient. The initiative now had definitely passed to the Allies, ending any possibility that Ludendorff could carry out his planned offensive in Flanders. Moreover, the success of the offensive revealed the advantages of Allied unity of command and the fighting qualities of American units. The eight A.E.F. divisions (1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, 42d) in the action had spearheaded much of the advance, demonstrating offensive capabilities that helped to inspire new confidence in the war-weary Allied armies. About 270,000 Americans took part in the battle.
On 24 July, while the Aisne-Marne drive was under way, Foch had outlined his plans for the remainder of 1918 at the only conference of Allied commanders that he called during the war. He proposed that the immediate objective of the Allied offensive should be the reduction of the three main German salients (Marne, Amiens, St. Mihiel), with the goal of improving lateral communications behind the front in preparation for a general offensive in the fall. Reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was assigned to Pershing at his own request.
The excellent showing made by American troops in the Aisne-Marne Offensive gave Pershing an opportunity to press again for the formation of an independent American army. Preliminary steps in the organization of the American First Army had been taken in early July 1918. On the 4th Lt. Col. Hugh A. Drum was selected as chief of staff and directed to begin establishment of army headquarters. After conferences on 10 and 21 July, Foch agreed on the 22d to the formal organization of the First Army, and to the formation of two American sectors-a temporary combat sector in the Chateau-Thierry region, where the already active I and III Corps could comprise the nucleus of the First Army, and a quiet sector farther east, extending from Nomeny (east of the Moselle) to a point north of St. Mihiel-which would become the actual theater of operations for the American Army as soon as circumstances permitted concentration of A.E.F. divisions there. Orders issued on 24 July announced formal organization of the First Army, effective on 10 August; designated Pershing as its commander; and located its headquarters at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, west of Chateau-Thierry.
Stabilization of the Vesle River front in early August led Pershing to alter his plane for forming the First Army. Instead of organizing it in the Chateau-Thierry region and then moving it eastward for the St. Mihiel Offensive, he secured Foch's consent on 9 August to a build-up of First Army units in the vicinity of the St. Mihiel salient. Tentative plans for reduction of the salient called for the concentration of three American corps (about 14 American and 3 French divisions) on a front extending from Port-sur-Seille westward around the bulge to Watronville. Three American divisions would remain on the Vesle front.
Meanwhile Allied forces, including American units operating in other sectors of the Western Front, were making significant gains in the preliminary phases of the great final offensives. For the sake of clarity, the role of American units in the Somme Offensive (8 August11 November), Oise-Aisne (18 August-11 November), and Ypres-Lys (19 August-11 November) Campaigns will be described briefly, before considering in more detail the activities of the main body of A.E.F. troops in the St. Mihiel (12-16 September) and Meuse-Argonne (26 September-11 November) Campaigns.
The eight A.E.F. divisions (1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, 42d) in the action had spearheaded much of the advance, demonstrating offensive capabilities that helped to inspire new confidence in the war-weary Allied armies.
