This Deceased Army Profile is not currently maintained by any Member.
If you would like to take responsibility for researching and maintaining this Deceased profile please click
HERE
Contact Info
Home Town San Francisco
Date of Passing Sep 14, 1983
Location of Interment San Francisco National Cemetery (VA) - San Francisco, California
"Lam Nut Bau troi, Rung chuyen Trai Dat" (Crack the Sky, Shake the Earth)
~ Signal to communist forces telling them to commence the greatest battle in the history of Vietnam. The Tet '68 offensive was countrywide and well coordinated, with more than 80,000 communist troops striking more than 100 towns and cities. The main offensive was preceded by attacks on the border towns of Tay Ninh, An Loc, and Loc Ninh, which were initiated in order to draw defensive forces from the cities. Col Fair was the commander at Tay Ninh.The enemy was quickly beaten back there.
General Fair was one of the toughest officers I ever ran into. He and I crossed paths three times in our careers. The first time we were assigned together in the 25th Infantry Division - Vietnam. ...but it was the last time when I had the most interaction with him.
I was assigned to the ACofS Inspector's General Office, when he came on board as the V Corps Commmander. If General Fair believed an officer or enlisted man did not know what they were doing, he had zero tolerance for them. I once saw him dress down and dismiss a Major who was presenting him with a briefing, a briefing that he believed to be grossly incorrect. Another time he stopped a soldier and engaged him for the lack of a proper haircut. He was quick to make his position on such things known.
Personally, I liked General Fair. He began to make things happen that I had been trying to do for some time. The best of these initatives - he consolidated redundant reports. In one case he consolidated four different ammunition reports. He felt as I did that these extra reports only took away valuable time needed for other purposes at the lower command levels. We both believed the extra reports were being required to help justify positions at the Corps level.
He despertly needed funds to train soldiers with. When they were not forth coming, he began to transfer funds designated for other purposes to fund his training needs. Instructed to stop these funds transfers by the USAREUR Commander, LTG Fair ignored that instruction and continued to march with his plans. After having given him a period of time to cease and correct these money transfers, Gen Blanchard, USAREUR Commander finally relieved him from his command.
Granted the two Generals were not the best of friends because of this and other issues, personal feelings were not really the cause of his relief. Gen Blanchard, would have had a lot of explaining to do to Congress, if he had allowed these transfers of funds to continue. Reallocation of funds in this manner were in the top ten Special Subjects of Interest (SSI) in IG Inspections & investigations. This particular violation, if discovered, was required to be reported by FLASH message traffic directly to Congress.
I salute both of these professional military giants. I consider both to be among my mentors. Gen Blanchard stepped up to bat for me in another matter - but that is another story. ~ D. Patrick
"Fair's approach won plaudits. Novelist Josiah Bunting (The Lionheads), an ex-major himself, praised Fair's leathery style in a Playboy article last fall, describing the general as "an admirable soldier" who is "always in bristling motion." But other officers, whose palms sweat when Fair raked them over with abrasive questions, disliked him intensely. To some enlisted men, Fair was a ... General Patton."
Vietnam War/Tet Counteroffensive Campaign (1968)
From Month/Year
January / 1968
To Month/Year
April / 1968
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.