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HERE
Since my military retirement I've been working in the motion picture and television industry.
Mostly I write/produce/direct documentaries for cable television networks such as The History Channel, A&E, and Discovery.
Many are military documentaries for MODERN MARVELS with titles such as Camouflage, Booby Traps and Bullets.
In the past I made dozens of military training/informational films for the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force. Perhaps the most significant was COMBAT LEADERSHIP featuring Lee Marvin. He was very proud of the film. He saw it as a Marine serving Marines. COMBAT LEADERSHIP is on the Bonus Disc of Warner Brothers' re-release on THE DIRTY DOZEN.
I am also a military technical consultant which sometimes takes me on the set for technical accuracy, which I did for two seasons of TOUR OF DUTY, but mostly I help writers find the "military" voice in their scripts.
In the past three years I have had five articles printed in Vietnam magazine. Â I find great satisfaction in telling the stories of men and women who fought in a war that does not get the recognition it so richly deserves.
A few years after retiring from the army, I met my wife Kathryn. She has been a filmmaker for over 30 years with an extensive resume. The last 20 have mostly been documentaries for cable television. She was born and raised in Los Angeles.
Other Comments:
My military career spanned 26 years, beginning in 1956 when I joined the U.S. Marine Corps. Following two years active duty, I spent another two years in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves.
In 1962, I joined the Army National Guard. In 1966 I went on active duty in U.S. Army. After 18 years on active duty, I retired in 1984. I have posted a number of photographs and accompanying narrative depicting Vietnam.
Several of my brothers with whom I served in Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in 1970 have also posted numerous photographs on their profiles. They are TOM HIRST, DANNY LONG, CRAIG TROUP, and RODNEY YOUNG.
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.