This Military Service Page was created/owned by
MAJ Mark E Cooper
to remember
Firth, John G., LTC.
If you knew or served with this Soldier and have additional information or photos to support this Page, please leave a message for the Page Administrator(s) HERE.
John Firth, age 59, died 24 Feb, 1985 at Presbyterian Hospital, Charlotte, NC, of congestive heart failure. John retired from the US Army in 1970. He served in Europe during WWII and entered Special Forces in August of 1957 as a member of the 77th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Other Special Forces assignments included duty with the 1st SFGA in Okinawa, Training Group at Fort Bragg, NC, the 8th SFGA in Panama, SF Detachment Korea, and three tours with the 5th SFGA in Vietnam.
His awards and decorations include numerous campaign medals from WWII, the Combat Infantryman’s Badge w/Star, Bronze Star Medal w/OLC, Air Medal, Army Commendation Medal w/OLC, Master Parachutist Badge, Jungle Expert Badge, Vietnamese Ranger Badge, Joint Service Commendation Medal w/OLC, and the Expert Infantry Badge.
When he moved to Charlotte in 1971, he became a Senior ROTC Instructor at Olympic High School. He was a member of the Steele Creek Masonic Lodge737 and of the Scottish Rite Bodies. John was a graduate of the University of Virginia at Charlottesville and a member of their Alumni Association. He was buried with full military honors and Masonic Rites at the Fort Bragg Post Cemetery on 27 Feb, 1985. He is survived by his wife, Jere; sons CPT Craig Firth of Washington, DC, Steven Firth of Boone, NC; a daughter, Mrs. Deborah Moore; brothers, Ellis Firth of Monticello, FL, Joseph Firth of Hampton, VA, a sister, Catherine Adams of Hampton, and three grandchildren.
Vietnam War/Tet Counteroffensive Campaign (1968)
From Month/Year
January / 1968
To Month/Year
April / 1968
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.
