This Military Service Page was created/owned by
MAJ Mark E Cooper
to remember
Junot, Tony Paul, 1SG.
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Eulogy for our A 301 5th Group Team Sergeant and friend for 45 years.
Master Sergeant Tony Junot was buried at Arlington on Monday, 10 May, 2010. Tony was our Team Sergeant at Ben Cat. He was our mentor and taught us how to be better combat leaders. In Korea, Tony was wounded, captured and escaped. North of our camp in South Vietnam, Tony was again wounded, captured and escaped. He knew war.
Master Sergeant (retired) Junot's military decorations include: Silver Star, Bronze Star for Valor with 2 oak leaf clusters, Soldiers Medal, Purple Heart with oak leaf cluster, Prisoner of War Medal with oak leaf cluster, Combat Infantryman Medal with star and Master Parachute wings. He was a Soldier and a friend. Ben Cat Team Leader BG (R) Joe Stringham and Roy Jacobson, Team demo man, were at Arlington to be with Tony and his family.
BG (R) Stringham and I confirm than he had those earned decorations.
Submitted by Roy Johnson
Vietnam War/Tet Counteroffensive Campaign (1968)
From Month/Year
January / 1968
To Month/Year
April / 1968
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.
