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Contact Info
Home Town Heavener
Last Address Arlington, VA
Date of Passing Aug 16, 2005
Location of Interment Arlington National Cemetery (VLM) - Arlington, Virginia
William E. Potts, 83, a retired Lieutenant General in the Army, a decorated veteran of three wars and a military intelligence official in the 1960s and 1970s, died of heart disease August 16, 2005, at Powhatan Nursing Home in Falls Church. He was a longtime Arlington resident.
General Potts was born in Heavener, Oklahoma, and graduated from Oklahoma Military Academy (now Rogers State University) in 1941.
At age 20, six weeks after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, he passed up an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy to enlist in the Army. He participated in the Normandy landings and led Armored Cavalry forces in reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines for Gen. George S. Patton's 3rd Army. His unit was so effective in night operations that the German army's general staff dubbed its soldiers "the ghosts of Patton's Army."
He was only 22 years old when Patton gave him a battlefield promotion to Major in recognition of his leadership as a battalion commander during the Lorraine campaign. He was seriously wounded during the fighting in France.
After World War II, he commanded the 72nd Tank Battalion in combat during the Korean War and the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment along the border between East Germany and West Germany in the late 1950s.
He also served almost five years in Vietnam, where he was responsible for implementing the buildup of Korean, Australian and New Zealand troops in 1965 and 1966. From 1969 to 1972, he served as head of combined military intelligence in Vietnam.
Between tours of duty in Vietnam, General Potts held a number of positions in military intelligence, including chief of staff of the Army Security Agency and assistant chief of staff for Army intelligence in the Pacific. After his last tour of duty in Vietnam, he served as the Army's assistant chief of staff for intelligence and as deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
General Potts received a second undergraduate degree, from the University of Maryland, in the 1950s, as well as two master's degrees from George Washington University, in management and personnel administration in 1955 and in international affairs in 1962. He was a doctoral candidate in executive development and contemporary international relations at American University but was reassigned to Vietnam before finishing the degree.
During his military career, he participated in 15 campaigns and was awarded 51 decorations, including the Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star, the Purple Heart and the French National Order of the Legion of Honor. He is a member of the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame.
After his retirement in 1975, General Potts worked for General Research Corp., Computer Sciences Corp. and Raytheon Systems Co. before retiring a second time in 1999. He also headed a team that produced a 20-volume study of the Indochina conflicts for the Department of Defense and consulted with the federal government on intelligence and operational matters for use in future military operations.
Description This campaign was from 30 March 1972 to 28 January 1973. On 30 March 1972 the North Vietnamese Army launched its greatest offensive of the entire war. The enemy deployed the greatest array of troops and modern weapons to date in a major effort to end the war with conventional forces and seized considerable territory in an effort to exercise control of key provinces throughout Vietnam.
During this critical period the Vietnamization program continued in the face of the North Vietnamese invasion and the successful counterattack by the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Army aviation units played an impressive role throughout the period, flying reconnaissance, close support missions, and transporting troops. As U.S. combat troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, the role of helicopter units increased in importance and they responded to the challenge of continuing to support while preparing the RVNAF to assume their function. Similarly, advisors of all services contributed immeasurably to the defeat of the enemy invasion and the continued Vietnamization process. Army and Marine advisors fought side-by-side with their RVNAF counterparts to stop and defeat the enemy invasion, as the Vietnamese counteroffensive gained momentum and the reduction of field advisers continued. The advisory effort shifted to emphasize training and to assure that the VNAF attained self-sufficiency prior to the complete withdrawal of the U.S forces.
Recapture of Quang Tri City on 16 September 1972 marked the complete failure of the enemy to hold any of the targeted provincial capitols. Massive aid replaced materiel lost during the spring counteroffensive. Retraining and reconstruction of selected RVNAF units increased their capabilities. The completion of the massive logistical buildup of RVNAF was accomplished, which enabled the RVNAF to become more self-sufficient as direct U.S. participation diminished. The US ground role in Vietnam was totally replaced by the RVNAF. During December 1972 and January 1973 the RVIVAF flew more than 45% of air sorties within Vietnam. In November 1972, the RVNAF began a C-130 training program and by January 1973 realized a significant increase in their capability. RVNAF forward air controllers began directing USAF and RVNAF strike aircraft in January 1973. The US policy of Vietnamization continued.
US combat and combat support operations were conducted in support of RVNAF ground operations during the North Vietnamese invasion and the counteroffensive including intensive interdiction of enemy supply routes into Vietnam. Since US ground forces had been reduced to seven battalions, the US ground combat role was limited to defense of key installations. Further reduction in troop ceilings led to the redeployment of all US ground combat battalions, leaving an Army contingent of combat support and service support units.