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Casualty Info
Home Town Stanton, TN
Last Address Stanton, TN
Casualty Date Nov 17, 1965
Cause KIA-Killed in Action
Reason Gun, Small Arms Fire
Location Vietnam, South (Vietnam)
Conflict Vietnam War
Location of Interment Fort Moore Post Cemetery (VLM) (Formerly Fort Benning) - Fort Moore, Georgia
Wall/Plot Coordinates 03E 076 / Section C-2, Site 264
Vietnam War/Defense Campaign (1965)/Operation Silver Bayonet I - Battle of the Ia Drang
From Month/Year
October / 1965
To Month/Year
November / 1965
Description Operation Silver Bayonet I (9 to 18 November) On 9 November, the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade replaced the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade and conducted Operation Silver Bayonet I. Its mission was to set up targets for B-52 airstrikes.
The 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade was ordered to switch the operational direction from west to east as if it had lost track of the enemy positions. The B3 Field Front felt for the subterfuge and decided to commence staging for the second attack of the Pleime camp. On 11 November, its three Regiments were ordered to go in assembly areas for reorganization, re-equipment and rehearsals in preparation for the attack set for 16 November.(19) These troop concentrations in assembly areas became available for B-52 airstrike. The J3 Chief/MACV was notified to set the B-52 airstrike in motion. The first wave of bombs would be dropped at a location about 7 and a half kilometers west of LZ X-Ray and the time over target (TOT) was set for 16 hours of 15 November. On 12 November, the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was ordered to get ready to be inserted at Chu Pong massif as a diversionary maneuver. On 13 November, as some recon elements and transportation units of the NVA B3 Field Front had already moved out of their assembly areas, the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was ordered to be inserted at the eastern foot of Chu Pong massif and to conduct an operation to at least 15 November with the intention to lure the B3 Field Front to delay the movement of troops out of the assembly areas to a later date than the TOT.(23) On 14 November, some assault elements of the NVA B3 Field Front started moving out of their assembly areas. At 10:48 hours, the lead elements of the 1/7 Air Cavalry arrived at the LZ X-Ray following a 30 minute bombardment of artillery, aerial rockets, and air strikes. The insertion point was located about 200 meters from the position of the 9th Battalion belonging to the NVA 66th Regiment. The B3 Field Front took the bait and decided to attack the new threat with two battalions - the 7th and the 9th belonging to the 66th Regiment - while ordering the 32nd and the 33rd to hold their positions in their respective assembly areas. The 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade reacted by a sending in a reinforcement comprising the 2/7th and the 2/5th Air Cavalry Battalions, which closed in at 9:10 hours and at 12:05 hours on 15 November respectively. The safety of the 1/7th Air Cavalry Battalion was further beefed up by a "ring of steel" of artillery and by a round the clock air attacks on every route in and out of the landing zone to interdict the 32nd and 33rd Regiments from joining in the fight. The B-52 airstrike entered in action at 16:00 hours and carpet bombed the positions of the 33rd and 32nd Regiments for the 15 and 16 November. The 1/7th Air Calvary Battalion left LZ X-Ray at noon of 16 November, replaced by the 2/7th and the 2/5th. In the morning of 17 November, these two battalions abandoned LZ X-Ray by foot toward LZ Albany and LZ Columbus respectively in a tactical maneuver to "grab the tiger by its tail in another direction"(5) allowing to carpet bombing the positions of units of the 66th Regiment remaining in the vicinity of LZ X-Ray. The Air Cavalry troops suffered heavy casualties at LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany because the enemy tactics had relied mostly on "human waves".
The B-52 airstrike continued for another two days all over the Chu Pong-Ia Drang complex from west to east rendering the heavy canopy area ineffective for concealment and cover. II Corps intelligence estimated the action of the B-52 airstrikes had rendered 2/3 of the enemy force ineffective. The remnants of the NVA forces' escape route to Cambodia was reduced to a narrow corridor along the Ia Drang
