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8/16/2010 1:59:17 PM Reviews and opinions about my book "A Hard Place". Let me begin this with saying how much I appreciate the members for their support,comments and just checking out my books and profile. The numbers to me are extremely pleasing.
Now to the gist of this post. Two and a half years ago I published my Vietnam War story, after it taking me over three years to write.Even at that I only began it after years of urging from my family and friends,especially my son (also a soldier) and my daughter (an Army Brat married to a Marine)without their prompting along with that of their mother I probably would not have written it. Even though I wrote and published it as "Thriller Novel" I had to relive a lot of ugly memories and scars from that war.Along with a bunch of fond and humorous ones. I personaly give nay damn who will,or will not,believe the story! But what I do care about is being called a "phony" and that I probably never even went to Vietnam. Well, my DD214 says I spent three tours there. The Veterans Affairs says that I am 100% Disabled because of it.I have refrained from counter attacking those few malcontent souls who felt it necessary to impune my honor. But it does not sit well with me. Hooah! It's an Army thing!!!!
Jacamo Peterson,SFC US Army (ret),Reno Nevada
My Son, also a John L Peterson has held up the five generation line of Army Service, Sgt ,19D Cavalry Scout (OPFORS) and is also now a Disabled Veteran.(also a Certified Structural and Wildland Firefighter)
My Father was also a John L Peterson MSG, 81st Inf, Pacific Theatre 1942-46
Three of my Uncles jumped into Normandy 6 Jun 1944, Two with the 101st, one with the 82nd..Two others were Merchant Marine.Â
Other Comments:
Presidential Certificate of Appreciation for Armed Forces Service, Richard M Nixon President of the United States, August 1973
Letter of Appreciation for Armed Forces Service, Robert F Froehlke Secretary of the Army, August 1973
Oregon Army National Guard Commendation Medal, Richard A Miller Major General Adj Gen. May 1979
I wrote the Vietnam War book to honor the service and sacrifice of all Vietnam Veterans, Yes that includes me! To all members of all the Armed Forces who were there, whether Volunteer or Draftee,  who served with Honor and Distinction,  this book is dedicated to you. Let us never forget our fallen and lost Brothers. Our cause was just,Our Service was Honorable.
I Have seen TOO many movies about American forces in Vietnam, portraying the soldiers as anti-war draftees who hated the military. That was not the case,over 95% of american soldiers, marines,airmen and sailors served with honor and distinction. We did NOT lose the Vietnam War, we were pulled from the field. Hooah!
Vietnam War/Counteroffensive Phase II Campaign (1966-67)/Operation Junction City
From Month/Year
February / 1967
To Month/Year
May / 1967
Description Operation Junction City (22 February - 14 May 1967) was an 82-day military operation conducted by United States and Republic of Vietnam (RVN or South Vietnam) forces begun on 22 February 1967 during the Vietnam War. It was the largest U.S. airborne operation since Operation Market Garden during World War II, the only major airborne operation of the Vietnam War, and one of the largest U.S. operations of the war. The operation was named after Junction City, Kansas, home of the operation's commanding officer.
The failure to gain surprise lay in discovery of the plans after NVA Col. Dinh Thi Van managed to place one of her agents in social circles that included ARVN Gen. Cao Van Vien and US Gen. William Westmoreland.[citation needed] That agent further reported one ARVN staff officer's comment of the early phase of the operation: "(The Viet Cong) seem like ghosts. All the six spearheads of our forces have been attacked while we don't know exactly where their main force is. Even in Bau Hai Vung that is considered to be a safe area, we lost one brigade.
It's so strange."
The stated aim of the almost three month engagement involving the equivalent of nearly three U.S. divisions of troops was to locate the elusive 'headquarters' of the Communist uprising in South Vietnam, the COSVN (Central Office of South Vietnam). By some accounts of US analysts at the time, such a headquarters was believed to be almost a "mini-Pentagon," complete with typists, file cabinets, and staff workers possibly guarded by layers of bureaucracy. In truth, after the end of the war, the actual headquarters was revealed by VC archives to be a small and mobile group of people, oftentimes sheltering in ad hoc facilities and at one point escaping an errant bombing by some hundreds of meters.
Hammer and Anvil
Junction City's grand tactical plan was a "hammer and anvil" tactic, whereupon airborne forces would "flush out" the VietCong headquarters, sending them to retreat against a prepared "anvil" of pre-positioned forces. Total forces earmarked for this operation included most of the 1st Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division including the 27th Infantry Regiment (United States) "Wolfhounds;" and the [(196th Light Infantry Brigade]) and the airborne troops of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and large armored elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
American forces of II Field Force, Vietnam started operation on 22 February 1967 (while Operation Cedar Falls was winding down), the initial operation was carried out by two infantry divisions, the 1st (commanded by Major General William E. DePuy ) and the 25th (Major General Frederick C. Weyand), who led their forces to the north of the area concerned to build the "anvil" on which, according to the American plans, the forces of the Viet Cong 9th Division would be crushed. At the same time the movement of infantry (eight battalions with 249 helicopters), took place on the same day including the launch of the paratroopers (the only launch carried out during the entire Vietnam War and the largest since the days of Operation Market Garden in World War II), an airborne regiment of the 173 Airborne Brigade, which went into action west of the deployment of the 1st and the 25th Infantry Division.
The operations were apparently at first a success, designated positions were reached without encountering great resistance, and then on February 23, the mechanized forces 11th Armored Cavalry and the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Division, the "hammer" of armor struck against the '"anvil" of the infantry and airborne positioned north and west, giving the enemy seemingly no chance to escape.
In fact, the Vietcong forces, highly mobile and elusive as ever, and with information sources located deep in the south Vietnamese bureaucracy, had already relocated their headquarters to Cambodia, and launched several attacks in mass disorder to inflict losses and wear down the enemy. On February 28 and March 10 there raged two fierce clashes with U.S. forces, the Battle of Prek Klok I and the Battle of Prek Klok II where the US, supported by a powerful potential air strikes and massive artillery support repuled Vietcong attacks, but the strategic outcomes were overall disappointing.
Best available photograph of the 25th Infantry Division. A year after Junction City, the 25th ID shows the M113 Armored Personnel Carriers by which the US enjoyed a firepower and armor advantage in Prek Klok I and II.
On 18 March 1967, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., new commander of II Field Force, Vietnam, in replacement of General Seaman, launched then the second phase of Junction City, this time directly to the east and carried out again by the mechanized divisions, the 1st Infantry Division and 11th Cavalry, reinforced this time from the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (including the 5th Cavalry Regiment). This maneuver gave rise to the toughest battle of the entire operation, the March 19 Battle of Ap Bau Bang II, wherein the 273rd Vietcong regiment put into difficulties the American armored cavalry although eventually forced to retire by a huge amount of firepower.
In the days after the forces of the Viet Cong they launched two more attacks in force, on March 21 and in Ap Gu on April 1, against the 1st and the 25th Infantry Division, both assaults were bloodily repulsed, and the Viet Cong 9th Division came out seriously weakened, though still able to fight and, if necessary, to retreat to safety in areas adjacent to the Cambodian border. On April 16 the U.S. command of II Field Force, in agreement with the MACV, decided to continue operations with a third phase of Operation Junction City, until May 14 certain units of the 25th Division Infantry American, undertook long and exhausting research the enemy, advancing in the bush, raking villages and retrieving large amounts of material logistics Vietcong, but with little contact with the Communist units, now cautiously moved to a defensive footing.
Outcome
The US infantry enjoyed advantages in mechanization over the Viet Cong forces encountered, including the M113 and in certain locales, full battle tanks.
The province of Tay Ninh was picked over thoroughly and Viet Cong forces suffered significant losses, including large amounts of material captured: 810 tonnes of rice, 600 tonnes of small arms, 500,000 pages of documents . According to calculations by the American command the 9th Division VC went seriously weakened by the operations, suffering the loss of 2,728 killed, 34 captured men and 139 deserters, but also the American losses were not negligible, amounting to nearly 300 dead and over 1,500 injured.
After the operations, the American forces were recalled to other areas of operation and then the country, apparently assured to be in the firm control of the South Vietnamese government fell prey again soon to infiltration by the Viet Cong forces returned from their sanctuaries in Cambodia.
When American troops found in some stores of the enemy, 120 reels of film and logistical equipment for the printing of documents, the command of MACV assumed to have finally found the famous COSVN in reality things were very different. The mobile headquarters, commanded by some mysterious and famous personalities such as generals Thanh, Tran Van Tran Between and Do, had quickly retreated to Cambodia, maintaining its operations and confounding the hopes of the U.S. strategic planners.
With a huge consumption of resources and equipment, including 366,000 rounds of artillery and 3,235 tons of bombs, the American forces had inflicted losses on the enemy and demonstrated the remarkable ability of airborne forces and even mechanized forces (also useful in impervious territory), but also strategically Junction City had missed the most important goals and had not led to the expected turning point of the war.