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Contact Info
Date of Passing Nov 18, 1997
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Additional Information
Last Known Activity:
"Lam Nut Bau troi, Rung chuyen Trai Dat" (Crack the Sky, Shake the Earth)
~ Signal to communist forces telling them to commence the greatest battle in the history of Vietnam. The Tet '68 offensive was countrywide and well coordinated, with more than 80,000 communist troops striking more than 100 towns and cities. The Saigon region was among those areas hit.
MG Mearns was heavily involved in defending that region. He was in constant overflight contact with the 3rd Squadron 4th Cavalry Regiment forces counter attacking and defending Saigon from hostile NVA forces. The 25th Infantry Division was a major factor in relieving Saigon from enemy forces.
Other Comments:
Most of the profile information was taken from a bio published in the Tropic Lightning News dated 2 Oct 1967.
Filmore Kennady Mearns is the son of BG Robert Walker Mearns and Ethel Brown Mearns. BG Mearns is also went to West Point & was interim commander of the 17th Division in WWI. Filmore Mearns was born 20 Sep 1915. The 1920 US census shows he was born in Utah. Brother's are Dr. Robert B Mearns and James B. Mearns. Filmore Mearns was married to Elizabeth Mary Boles. Daughter is Nancy Elizabeth Mearns. This information was provided by Major John Moore
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.
