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Contact Info
Last Address Chicago, ILL
Date of Passing Feb 25, 1971
Location of Interment West Point Cemetery - West Point, New York
Wall/Plot Coordinates Section V, Row C, Site 164.
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Major General Jens A. Doe (20 June 1891-25 February 1971) was an American soldier and General in the first half of the 20th century. He is best known for his command of the 41st Infantry Division in the South West Pacific Area during World War II.
Education and Early Life
Jens Anderson Doe was born on 20 June 1891 in Chicago, Illinois. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 11th Infantry on 12 June 1914. He was stationed with the 11th Infantry successively at Texas City, Texas, Naco, Arizona, and Douglas, Arizona.
Great War
Doe was promoted to first lieutenant on 1 July 1916 and captain on 15 May 1917. From May to August 1917 he was stationed with the 11th Infantry Fort Oglethorpe. He attended a machine gun training course at Fort Sill before assuming command of the 15th Machine Gun Battalion in December 1917. In April 1918, he sailed for France.
Promoted to major on 7 June 1918, Doe served as 5th Infantry Division before assuming command of the 14th Machine Gun Battalion in July. As such, he participated in the Battle of Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensive, where he was wounded. His gallantry earned him the Silver Star.
In November 1918, Doe organised and became an instructor at the Army Machine Gun School at Langres. He was an instructor at the II Corps Schools, and a student at the Artillery Center. In June 1919 he joined the 61st Infantry, returning to the United States with it in June 1919.
Interwar Years
In September 1919 he became an instructor at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. He attended the Field Officers' Course in 1921-1922, after which he was assigned to the 2nd Infantry at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, as a machine gun officer at Fort Custer, and to the United States Military Academy at West Point.
Doe attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth from 1925 to 1926 and on graduation was posted to the 15th Infantry at Tientsin, China. He did not return to the United States until 1930, when he joined the 16th Infantry at Fort Jay. He then commanded the machine gun school at Fort Dix until 1932, when he left to attend the U.S. Army War College. After nearly 18 years as a major, he was finally promoted to lieutenant colonel on 1 January 1936. He was an instructor at the Command and General Staff College and Professor of Military Science and Tactics at University of California, Berkeley.
World War II
Doe joined the newly-reformed 7th Division at Fort Ord in September 1940 and assumed command of its 17th Infantry in November. He was promoted to colonel on 26 June 1941. In June 1942 he was sent to Australia to command the 163rd Infantry.
The 163rd Infantry was selected as the first regiment of the 41st Infantry Division to enter combat, at Sanananda in January 1943. For his leadership, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.
This is to Certify that
The President of the United States of America
Takes Pride in Presenting
THE
DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS
to
Jens A. Doe
His citation read:
For extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy while serving as Commanding Officer of the 163d Infantry Regiment, 41st Infantry Division, in action against enemy forces on 21 and 22 January, near Sanananda, New Guinea. As commander of an infantry regiment which was engaged in wiping out the remaining points of enemy resistance, Colonel Doe distinguished himself with his coolness and gallantry under fire. In the reduction of these strongly fortified areas his outstanding leadership and courageous conduct were a continuous inspiration to his troops. Colonel Doe's presence in the most forward areas and his disregard of personal danger were largely responsible for the high morale of his troops and the successful outcome of these operations. Colonel Doe's inspiring leadership, personal bravery and zealous devotion to duty exemplify the highest traditions of the military forces of the United States and reflect great credit upon himself, the 41st Infantry Division, and the United States Army.
This action also resulted in Doe becoming Assistant Division Commander and being promoted to Brigadier General on 2 February 1943.
Doe led the Persecution Task Force that landed at Aitape, and the Tornado Task Force that landed at Wakde, both of which were built around the 163rd Infantry. For these actions he was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Medal.
His task force was absorbed back into the 41st Infantry Division for the Battle of Biak. In this battle he earned an oak leaf cluster to the Silver Star he had won in the Great War. His citation read:
In the Southwest Pacific in June 1944, he displayed outstanding leadership and devotion to duty under Japanese machine gun, rifle and mortar fire, and in personally moving among forward assault troops. By his calm manner and courageous actions, he greatly assisted the advance.
At Biak the commander of the 41st Infantry Division, Major General Horace H. Fuller asked to be relieved of his command. Both Fuller and Eichelberger had recommended Doe for the next available divisional command, so Doe assumed command of the 41st Infantry Division and was promoted to major general on 1 August 1944. For his leadership at Biak he was also awarded an oak leaf cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal.
In February and March 1945, Doe led 41st Infantry Division at Palawan and Zamboanga, where he earned a second oak leaf cluster to his Silver Star. His citation read:
For gallantry in action at Zamboanga, Mindanao, Philippine Islands from 10 March 1945 to 23 April 1945. During this time in the capacity of division commander General Doe directed the initial assault and the consequent capture of Zamboanga. His outstanding leadership, indomitable courage and skilful tactical knowledge resulted in his division scoring a firm foothold on Mindanao Island. On many occasions without regard to his personal safety, he went forward to units engaged in heavy fighting in order to gain first hand information bout the tactical situation.
Doe also received the Air Medal for his numerous flights over Japanese held areas.
Later life
Doe remained in command of the 41st Infantry Division until it was inactivated in Japan at midnight on 31 December 1945. He returned to the United States for a brief tour of duty at the War Department before assuming command of the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Campbell on 9 August 1946. On 29 September 1946 he assumed command of 3rd Infantry Division, and the 4th Infantry Division from 15 July 1947 – 28 February 1949.
Doe was promoted to the permanent rank of major general in 1948, backdated to 6 September 1944.
He retired from the Army in February 1949.
Other Comments:
BG Jens A. Doe and his aide, 1st Lt. Rob D. Trimble, of the 41st Infantry Division, during the landing at Arare
World War I/Meuse-Argonne Campaign
From Month/Year
September / 1918
To Month/Year
November / 1918
Description Meuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objective of driving the enemy out of France before winter and ending the war in the spring of 1919. The basis for his optimism was the success of Allied attacks all along the front in August. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Allies already had active operations in progress between the Moselle and Meuse, the Oise and Aisne, and on the Somme and Lys Rivers. Foch acknowledged that the Germans could stave off immediate defeat by an orderly evacuation combined with destruction of materiel and communications. Therefore the overall aim of the fall offensive would be to prevent a step-by-step enemy retirement. As Foch anticipated, the Germans eventually contributed to the success of his strategy. Their High Command could not bring itself to sacrifice the huge stores collected behind the front lines, and so delayed the withdrawal of its armies.
Foch's great offensive, planned to begin in the last week of September, called for a gigantic pincers movement with the objective of capturing Aulnoye and Mézières, the two key junctions in the lateral rail system behind the German front. Lose of either of these junctions would hamper seriously the German withdrawal. Despite grumbling from the English that they lacked the necessary manpower, a chiefly British army was assigned the teak of driving toward Aulnoye. The A.E.F. was designated for the southern arm of the pincers, the thrust on Mézières. Simultaneously the Belgian-French-British army group in Flanders would drive toward Ghent, and the French armies in the Oise-Aisne region would exert pressure all along their front to lend support to the pincers attack.
Pershing decided to strike his heaviest blow in a zone about 20 miles wide between the Heights of the Meuse on the east and the western edge of the high, rough, and densely wooded Argonne Forest. This is difficult terrain, broken by a central north-south ridge that dominates the valleys of the Meuse and Aire Rivers. Three heavily fortified places-Montfaucon, Cunel, and Barricourt-as well as numerous strong points barred the way to penetration of the elaborate German defenses in depth that extended behind the entire front. This fortified system consisted of three main defense lines backed up by a fourth line less well-constructed. Pershing hoped to launch an attack with enough momentum to drive through these lines into the open area beyond, where his troops could then strike at the exposed German flanks and, in a coordinated drive with the French Fourth Army coming up on the left, could cut the Sedan- Mézières railroad.
The task of assembling troops in the concentration area between Verdun and the Argonne was complicated by the fact that many American unite were currently engaged in the St. Mihiel battle. Some 600,000 Americans had to be moved into the Argonne sector while 220,000 French moved out. Responsibility for solving this tricky logistical problem fell to Col. George C. Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), First Army. In the ten-day period after St. Mihiel the necessary troop movements were accomplished, but many untried divisions had to be placed in the vanguard of the attacking forces.
On the 20-mile Meuse-Argonne front where the main American attack w to be made, Pershing disposed three corps side by side, each with three divisions in line and one in corps reserve. In the center was the V Corps (from right to left the 79th, 37th, and 91st Divisions with the 32d in reserve), which would strike the decisive blow. On the right was the III Corps (from right to left the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions with the 3d in reserve), which would move up the west aide of the Meuse. On the left was the I Corps (from right to left the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions with the 92d in reserve), which would advance parallel to the French Fourth Army on its left. Eastward across the Meuse the American front extended in direct line some 60 miles; this sector was held by two French Corps (IV and II Colonial) and the American IV Corps in the St. Mihiel sector. Pershing had available to support his offensive nearly 4000 guns, two-thirds manned by American artillerymen; 190 light French tanks, mostly with American personnel; and some 820 aircraft, 600 of them flown by Americans.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive falls into three phases. During the initial phase (26 September-3-October) the First Army advanced through most of the southern Meuse-Argonne region, captured enemy strong points, seized the first two German defense lines, and then stalled before the third line. Failure of tank support, a difficult supply situation, and the inexperience of American troops all contributed to checking its advance.
In the second phase (4-31 October) the First Army, after the inexperienced divisions had been replaced by veteran units, slowly ground its way through the third German line. The enemy was forced to throw in reserves, drawn from other parts of the front, thus aiding the Allied advances elsewhere. In the face of a stubborn defense, American gains were limited and casualties were severe, especially as a result of the newly devised enemy tactic of attacking frontline troops with airplanes. First Army air unite retaliated with bombing raids which broke up German preparations for counterattacks. By the end of October the enemy had been cleared from the Argonne and First Army troops were through the German main positions. Two notable incidents of this phase of the campaign were the fight of the "Lost Battalion" of the 77th Division (2-7 October), and the feat of Corp. (later Sgt.) Alvin C. York, who single-handedly killed 15 Germans and captured 132 on 8 October.
In mid-October the organization of the Second Army was completed, at Toul in the St. Mihiel sector, to provide means for better control of the lengthening American front and solutions of the diverse tactical problems that it presented. Pershing assumed command of the new army group thus formed.
Before the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, and most Allied units serving with the A.E.F. were withdrawn. On 1 November First Army units began the assault of the now strengthened German fourth line of defense. Penetration was rapid and spectacular. The V Corps in the center advanced about six miles the first day, compelling the German units west of the Meuse to withdraw hurriedly. On 4 November the III Corps forced a crossing of the Meuse and advanced northeast toward Montmédy. Elements of the V Corps occupied the heights opposite Sedan on 7 November, thus finally accomplishing the First Army's chief mission-denial of the Sedan- Mézières railroad to the Germans. Marshal Foch, at this juncture, shifted the First Army left boundary eastward so that the French Fourth Army might capture Sedan, which had fallen to the Prussians in 1870. American units were closing up along the Mouse and, east of the river, were advancing toward Montmédy, Briny, and Metz, when hostilities ended on 11 November.
General Pershing authorized the results of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the greatest battle in American history up to that time, in his Final Report: "Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25 percent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machineguns, and large quantities of material." More than 1,200,000 Americans had taken part in the 47-day campaign.
