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Collins, Arthur S., Jr., LTG USA(Ret).
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Date of Passing Jan 07, 1984
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Arthur S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
(Retired 1974)
1915-1984
Boston Latin Academy, 1933
U.S. Military Academy, B.S. Class of 1938
George Washington University, M.A., 1964
Commanding General,
I Field Force Vietnam
March 1970-January 1971
Arthur S. Collins, Jr., was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 6 August 1915. He graduated from Boston Latin School in 1933 and the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1938. On 14 June 1938 he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry in the Regular Army. His first assignment was at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, with the 13th Infantry. In November 1939 he was assigned to Fort Davis, Canal Zone, for duty with the 13th and 14th Infantry Regiments. Lt. Collins insisted on being transferred to the 14th Inf from the 13th Inf when they told him the 13th would be redesignated "Artillery."
He returned to the United States in December 1941 and reported to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, where he was assigned to the Battalion Commanders’ Course at Fort Benning, Georgia.
In May 1942 he was assigned to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, for duty as a battalion commander in the 130th Infantry as a battalion commander in the 130th Infantry, as a battalion commander while the 33rd Division moved to Fort Lewis, Washington, to the Desert Training Center, and to Hawaii where General Collins commanded the 1st Battalion of the 130th Infantry on the Islands of Hawaii and Kauai. The 130th Infantry then moved to the Finschaven area in New Guinea, landing in May 1944.
In August 1944 General Collins assumed command of the 130th Infantry. He commanded the regiment through operations on Morotal and Luzon, Philippines, where the 130th Infantry participated in the capture of Baguio and other parts of Luzon. The 130th Infantry then participated in the occupation of Japan, landing there in September 1945. General Collins remained in command of the regiment in the Kobe-Osaka area until the 130th was inactivated in February 1946.
Upon inactivation of the 33rd Division, General Collins returned to Washington, D.C., for assignment to the Army General Staff where he served in the G-1 Division from 1946 to 1948. In June 1948 he was assigned to the Tactical Department, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, where he served as company tactical officer, regimental executive officer, and in 1951 and 1952 commanded the 1st Regiment. In 1952 General Collins began the US Army War College Course at Carlisle Barracks, PA. After graduation in 1953, he was assigned to Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, at Heidelberg, Germany, where he served in the Plans Division of G-3 until January 1954, at which time he moved to the office of the Commander in Chief at that headquarters.
In February 1955 General Collins was designated to command the 10th Infantry of the 5th Division located at Augsburg, Germany, and commanded the regiment until his return to the United States in April 1956. He was then assigned to the faculty of the US Army War College, where he remained until 1959.
In 1959 General Collins returned to the Far East, this time to Korea where he served as Special Assistant for Training to Chief of the US Army Advisory Group, and as G-3 Advisor to the 1st Republic of Korea Army until October 1960. Upon returning to the United States, General Collins was assigned to the J-5 Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was nominated for promotion to brigadier general in September 1961 and in November was designated as Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel of the new United States Strike Command which had just been organized at Mac Dill Air Force Base, Florida. He was promoted to brigadier general on 8 April 1962 and was assigned as Chief of Staff and then as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of United States Strike Command until July 1963.
Having been nominated for promotion to major general in May 1963, General Collins was assigned to the Office of Personnel Operations in Washington, D.C., as Director of Officer Personnel in August 1963, and was promoted to major general on 1 September 1963. He later served a short period as Director of Enlisted Personnel prior to his appointment as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army in July 1964.
In June 1965 General Collins was designed to command the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. He deployed the 4th Division to Vietnam in the Summer of 1966 and commanded the 4th INF. DIV. IN Vietnam from September 1966 to January 1967 when he was promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA, Washington, DC. He served as ACSFOR until January 1970 when he was designated to command the I Field Force, Vietnam. He commanded the I Field Force, Vietnam from February 1970 to January 1971.
In February 1971 General Collins was designated Acting CINCUSAREUR and he served in this capacity until June 1971, at which time he became Deputy CINCUSAREUR and he served in that capacity until his retirement in July 1974.
Gen. Collins died 7 Jan 1984 in Washington, D.C.
Vietnam War/Tet Counteroffensive Campaign (1968)
From Month/Year
January / 1968
To Month/Year
April / 1968
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.
