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Collins, Arthur S., Jr., LTG USA(Ret).
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Date of Passing Jan 07, 1984
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Arthur S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
(Retired 1974)
1915-1984
Boston Latin Academy, 1933
U.S. Military Academy, B.S. Class of 1938
George Washington University, M.A., 1964
Commanding General,
I Field Force Vietnam
March 1970-January 1971
Arthur S. Collins, Jr., was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 6 August 1915. He graduated from Boston Latin School in 1933 and the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1938. On 14 June 1938 he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry in the Regular Army. His first assignment was at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, with the 13th Infantry. In November 1939 he was assigned to Fort Davis, Canal Zone, for duty with the 13th and 14th Infantry Regiments. Lt. Collins insisted on being transferred to the 14th Inf from the 13th Inf when they told him the 13th would be redesignated "Artillery."
He returned to the United States in December 1941 and reported to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, where he was assigned to the Battalion Commanders’ Course at Fort Benning, Georgia.
In May 1942 he was assigned to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, for duty as a battalion commander in the 130th Infantry as a battalion commander in the 130th Infantry, as a battalion commander while the 33rd Division moved to Fort Lewis, Washington, to the Desert Training Center, and to Hawaii where General Collins commanded the 1st Battalion of the 130th Infantry on the Islands of Hawaii and Kauai. The 130th Infantry then moved to the Finschaven area in New Guinea, landing in May 1944.
In August 1944 General Collins assumed command of the 130th Infantry. He commanded the regiment through operations on Morotal and Luzon, Philippines, where the 130th Infantry participated in the capture of Baguio and other parts of Luzon. The 130th Infantry then participated in the occupation of Japan, landing there in September 1945. General Collins remained in command of the regiment in the Kobe-Osaka area until the 130th was inactivated in February 1946.
Upon inactivation of the 33rd Division, General Collins returned to Washington, D.C., for assignment to the Army General Staff where he served in the G-1 Division from 1946 to 1948. In June 1948 he was assigned to the Tactical Department, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, where he served as company tactical officer, regimental executive officer, and in 1951 and 1952 commanded the 1st Regiment. In 1952 General Collins began the US Army War College Course at Carlisle Barracks, PA. After graduation in 1953, he was assigned to Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, at Heidelberg, Germany, where he served in the Plans Division of G-3 until January 1954, at which time he moved to the office of the Commander in Chief at that headquarters.
In February 1955 General Collins was designated to command the 10th Infantry of the 5th Division located at Augsburg, Germany, and commanded the regiment until his return to the United States in April 1956. He was then assigned to the faculty of the US Army War College, where he remained until 1959.
In 1959 General Collins returned to the Far East, this time to Korea where he served as Special Assistant for Training to Chief of the US Army Advisory Group, and as G-3 Advisor to the 1st Republic of Korea Army until October 1960. Upon returning to the United States, General Collins was assigned to the J-5 Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was nominated for promotion to brigadier general in September 1961 and in November was designated as Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel of the new United States Strike Command which had just been organized at Mac Dill Air Force Base, Florida. He was promoted to brigadier general on 8 April 1962 and was assigned as Chief of Staff and then as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of United States Strike Command until July 1963.
Having been nominated for promotion to major general in May 1963, General Collins was assigned to the Office of Personnel Operations in Washington, D.C., as Director of Officer Personnel in August 1963, and was promoted to major general on 1 September 1963. He later served a short period as Director of Enlisted Personnel prior to his appointment as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army in July 1964.
In June 1965 General Collins was designed to command the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. He deployed the 4th Division to Vietnam in the Summer of 1966 and commanded the 4th INF. DIV. IN Vietnam from September 1966 to January 1967 when he was promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA, Washington, DC. He served as ACSFOR until January 1970 when he was designated to command the I Field Force, Vietnam. He commanded the I Field Force, Vietnam from February 1970 to January 1971.
In February 1971 General Collins was designated Acting CINCUSAREUR and he served in this capacity until June 1971, at which time he became Deputy CINCUSAREUR and he served in that capacity until his retirement in July 1974.
Gen. Collins died 7 Jan 1984 in Washington, D.C.
Southern Philippines Campaign (1945)/Battle of Mindanao
From Month/Year
March / 1945
To Month/Year
July / 1945
Description The Battle of Mindanao was fought by United States forces and allied Filipino guerrillas against the Japanese from 10 March - 15 August 1945 at Mindanao island in the Philippine Archipelago, in a series of actions officially designated as Operation VICTOR V, and part of the campaign for the liberation of the Philippines during World War II. The battle was waged to complete the recapture of the southernmost portions of the archipelago and secure them from remaining Japanese forces.
The campaign for Mindanao posed the greatest challenge for the liberating American forces, primarily for three reasons: the island's inhospitable geography; the extended Japanese defenses; and the strength and condition of the Japanese forces, which contained the significantly remaining concentration of combat troops in the Philippines.
Like most of the Philippine Islands and other similar places the U.S. Army operated elsewhere in the Pacific, the geographical conditions of Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines, offered very little inspiration for soldiers who would have to fight there. It boasted a long and irregular coastline, the inland topography generally characterized as rugged and mountainous. Rain forests and numerous crocodile-infested rivers covered the terrain, the rest by either lake, swamp or grassland. These grassland regions—along with dense groves of abacá trees, source of hemp fiber—offer the worst obstacles which limit vision and sapping the strength of soldiers who would have to force their way through.
The few roads in Mindanao further complicated the problem of movement. Two of these, was the generously named Highway 1, which cuts across the southern portion of the island, from just south of Parang on Illana Bay in the west to Digos on the Davao Gulf in the east and then north to Davao. The other, Sayre Highway the main north-south road, starts at Kabacan, midway between Illana Bay and Davao Gulf, then runs north through the mountains of Bukidnon and Macajalar Bay (off Misamis Oriental Province) on the northern coast.
The strongest of the Japanese defenses were concentrated around the Davao Gulf area, which was heavily mined to counter an amphibious landing, and in Davao City, the island's largest and most important city. Artillery and anti-aircraft batteries extensively ringed the coastal shoreline defenses. Believing that the Americans would ultimately attack from Davao Gulf and also anticipating that they would be eventually driven from the city, the Japanese also prepared defensive bunkers inland behind its perimeter where they could retire and regroup, with the intention of prolonging the campaign as much as possible.
Operation VICTOR V
On 10 March 1945, the U.S. Eighth Army—under Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger—was formally ordered by Gen. Douglas MacArthur to clear the rest of Mindanao, with the start of Operation VICTOR V, with expectations that the campaign would take four months. Eichelberger had misgivings about the projected timetable for the operation, but nonetheless, his Eighth Army staffers came up with a more effective plan.
Instead of the expected headlong frontal assault on the Japanese defenses, the plan called for securing a beachhead at Illana Bay in the undefended west, then a drive eastward more than a 100 mi (160 km) through jungle and mountains to strike from the rear. The objective, which called for achieving surprise and pressing forward quickly and aggressively by the invading forces, deemed Eichelberger, could unhinge the Japanese both physically and psychologically. The key to the operation's success involved the beachhead performance of the landing force and the ability of the participating units to maintain the momentum of their attack, preempting Japanese reactions, and hopefully before the rainy season started which would complicate movement in the island.
Ground operations were assigned to X Corps under Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, with Maj. Gen. Roscoe B. Woodruff's 24th Infantry Division and Maj. Gen. Clarence A. Martin's 31st Infantry Division as principal combat units. Amphibious Task Group 78.2 (TG 78.2)—under Rear Adm. Albert G. Noble—was tasked to carry the 24th Division and X Corps headquarters to the assault beaches near Malabang by 17 April to secure a forward airfield. Five days later, the 31st Division was expected to be in Parang, 20 mi (32 km) south, located near Highway 1, the route to Davao.
