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Palmer., Bruce, Jr., GEN USA(Ret).
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Contact Info
Last Address Fort Belvoir, VA
Date of Passing Oct 10, 2000
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Bruce Palmer Jr., 87; Led Forces in Vietnam
By David Stout, , October 18, 2000
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17--Bruce Palmer Jr., deputy commanding general of American troops in South Vietnam, later Army vice chief of staff and then the author of a book analyzing the military failure of the United States in Southeast Asia, died on Oct. 10 at a hospital in Alexandria, Va. He was 87.
General Palmer, who earned his fourth star as vice chief of staff in 1968 and retired several years later, died of a stroke, his family said. He lived in a retirement community at Fort Belvoir, Va.
Born April 13, 1913, in Austin, Tex., Bruce Palmer Jr. seemed destined to be a soldier. His father was an Army brigadier general, and a grandfather received the Medal of Honor for heroism in the Civil War.
There were 276 graduates in the West Point class of 1936. William C. Westmoreland ranked 112th, and Creighton W. Abrams was 185th. The sixth-ranking graduate was Bruce Palmer Jr., a short and slightly built man known for his aggressive polo playing and devotion to physical conditioning.
Three decades later, General Palmer would be subordinate to Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, both of whom became commanders of all United States forces in South Vietnam as well as Army chiefs of staff.
Early in 1968, General Palmer was rumored to be in line to succeed General Westmoreland as commander, having earlier won the deep respect of Ellsworth Bunker, the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam. Mr. Bunker and General Palmer had worked together in the Dominican Republic in 1965, when the general commanded American troops sent to that country to quell civil war and Mr. Bunker headed diplomatic efforts to end the violence.
As it turned out, President Lyndon B. Johnson tapped General Abrams to replace General Westmoreland in Vietnam. And General Palmer made his biggest imprint on the Vietnam era in retirement, with pen instead of sword.
In 1984, his book, "The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam," was published by the University of Kentucky Press. It attracted so much attention from students of the war that it was republished a year later by Simon & Schuster.
General Palmer rejected the notion, widely held in and out of the military, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a strategy for winning the war but were hobbled by political interference. On the contrary, he argued; the Joint Chiefs never really decided why American forces were in South Vietnam, and so could not design a winning strategy acceptable to the White House.
In the future, he wrote, the United States would have to adopt new fighting techniques for new kinds of wars. Nor had it been surprising, in his view, that American bombers failed to subdue the North Vietnamese. He noted that North Vietnam got much of its materiel from the Soviet Union or China, and that many military historians believed that heavy bombing had only limited effect even against modern, industrialized countries in World War II.
"Like other so-called `sciences,' the employment of military force - in peace, cold war, or actual conflict - is an art, not an exact science," he wrote.
As a young officer in World War II, he served in Tunisia in 1943 and, a year later, in New Guinea and the Philippines. He was deputy commandant of the Army War College from 1959 to 1961 and held various stateside posts before becoming General Westmoreland's deputy in 1967.
General Palmer, whose decorations included the Silver Star and Bronze Star, was known for a quietly confident leadership style. Officers who served with him said he lost his temper only when he encountered what he thought to be sheer stupidity.
After retiring from the military, he served two years as executive director of the Defense Manpower Commission, which studied the transition to an all-volunteer force.
He was a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute from the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's. He wrote another book, "Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965" (University of Kentucky Press, 1989).
His wife of 60 years, Kathryn, died in 1996. A daughter, Maurene, died in 1950.
The general is survived by a son, Bruce 3d, of Valrico, Fla.; a daughter, Robin Sessler of Kettering, Ohio; eight grandchildren and a great- granddaughter.
In the closing words of his book on Vietnam, General Palmer wrote: "How deep Vietnam has stamped its imprint on American history has yet to determined. In any event, I am optimistic enough to believe that we Americans can and will learn and profit from our experience."
Other Comments:
Bruce Palmer, Jr., (April 13, 1913–October 10, 2000) was a noted United States Army General and acting Chief of Staff of the United States Army from July to October 1972.
Career Summary
Palmer was born in Austin, Texas. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1936 and was commissioned a second lieutenant and served with the 8th Cavalry at Fort Bliss, Texas, 1936–1939. Palmer was promoted to first lieutenant, June 1939, and served as regimental adjutant, June–September 1939.
He graduated from the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas, 1940; was a troop and squadron commander of the 6th Cavalry (Mechanized), 1940–1942; and was promoted to temporary ranks of captain, October 1940, and major, February 1942.
He served in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, 1942–1943; was promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel, February 1943; and was chief of staff of the 6th Infantry Division in Southwest Pacific operations in World War II, 1944–1945.
He was promoted to temporary colonel, January 1945, and permanent captain, June 1946, and major, July 1948; commanded the 63d Infantry in the Korean occupation, 1945–1946; was chief of plans and operations of the First United States Army, 1947–1949; was instructor of tactics and then director of instruction at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, 1949–1951; concurrently completed the basic airborne course; and graduated from the Army War College, 1952.
He was secretary of the general staff and chief of the Plans Division, United States Army, Europe, 1952–1954; was promoted to permanent lieutenant colonel, July 1953; was commander of the 16th Infantry, 1954–1955; served on the faculty of the Army War College, 1955–1957; and was deputy secretary of the General Staff and White House liaison officer, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1957–1959.
He was promoted to temporary brigadier general, August 1959; was deputy commandant of the Army War College, 1959–1961; and was assistant division commander of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, 1961–1962.
He was promoted to permanent colonel, June 1961, and temporary major general, May 1962; was chief of staff of the Eighth United States Army, Korea, 1962–1963; was assistant deputy chief of staff for plans and operations, 1963–1964, and deputy chief of staff for military operations, 1964–1965; was promoted to permanent brigadier general, February 1963, and temporary lieutenant general, July 1964.
He was commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, 1965–1967, and concurrently commander of Task Force 120 and United States Land Forces, Dominican Republic, May 1965, and commander of United States Forces and Army Forces and deputy commander of the Inter-American Peace Force in operations in the Dominican Republic, May 1965–January 1966.
He was commander of the II Field Force, Vietnam, and deputy commander of the United States Army, Vietnam, 1967–1968; was promoted to temporary general, August 1968, and served as vice chief of staff of the United States Army, 1 August 1968–30 June 1972; was acting Chief of Staff of the United States Army 1 July–11 October 1972; provided managerial continuity at the top of the Army during the Westmoreland-Abrams interregnum, supervised the continuing drawdown of Army forces from Vietnam and related Army-wide readjustments, and prepared major revisions in Army organizational structure; resumed duties as vice chief of staff; was commander in chief of the United States Readiness Command, 1973–1974; and retired from the Army, September 1974, coincidentally on the day his close associate General Creighton W. Abrams died.
Personal data
He married Kay Sibert in 1936. She died in 1996. They had a son, Bruce III, and two daughters, Maureen and Robin. General Palmer died on October 10, 2000. He is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.
He wrote two books in his retirement, The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam and Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965.
His father was an Army brigadier general and a grandfather received the Medal of Honor during the Civil War.
Vietnam War/Tet Counteroffensive Campaign (1968)
From Month/Year
January / 1968
To Month/Year
April / 1968
Description This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.