1SG Brent Hull - Military Timeline

By October 2003 soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division were stationed in hangars at Camp War Horse near Baquba [Baqouba], about 40 miles northeast of Baghdad.

The Big Red One officially assumed comm

By October 2003 soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division were stationed in hangars at Camp War Horse near Baquba [Baqouba], about 40 miles northeast of Baghdad.

The Big Red One officially assumed command from the 4th Infantry Division during a transfer of authority ceremony 16 March 2004. In Baqubah, a TOA ceremony was held between the 2nd Brigade, 4th ID and the 3rd Brigade, 1st ID. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team, nicknamed the Warhorse Brigade, achieved many significant accomplishments during its deployment. From establishing an interim government to administering the Diyala Province and helping rebuild the provincial legal system, the Warhorse Brigade spearheaded the coalition mission in the area. Camp Warhorse served as headquarters to the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division during its rotation.

From March 2005 the support platoon from C Company of the 141st Engineer Combat Battalion was performing such important missions as installing protective barriers, creating vehicle and personnel checkpoints, building guard towers and constructing dirt berms or dikes. Initially the support platoon, under the direction of Sgt. 1st Class Lee Friese, began their work at FOB Warhorse by leveling areas, building roads and installing force protection structures there. But once the word spread about the excellent work the North Dakota Engineers were capable of doing, they were asked to take their equipment and skills to other areas around Baqubah. This has included building a sterile yard for the inspection of outgoing shipping containers, improving force protection at a bridge on a major Army supply route known as the Blue Babe Bridge, building an earthen berm at FOB Gabe for the protection of the Iraqi National Guard training center, and emplacing other force protection structures at the Kahlis city center for the Iraqi Police, Iraqi National Guard and the mayor's office.

It has been reported that at Camp Warhorse a large indoor souk has been established in the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation facility. There, soldiers can buy fake watches and sunglasses, copies of major European soccer teams' shirts, and various other items, including thousands of illegally copied DVDs.

At FOB Freedom, KBR runs a large mess hall manned mainly by Turks. The food is basically the same thing over and over. They re-use everything. Soldiers say it is like eating at a bad Denny’s restaurant all the time.

On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted a detailed resolution that outlined the civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paved the way for peaceful settlement of t

On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted a detailed resolution that outlined the civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paved the way for peaceful settlement of the conflict and the safe return home of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced persons. The resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allowed the security forces to carry weapons to protect themselves and use force in carrying out the resolution's directives. The resolution "authorizes member states and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo" as set out in the military agreement between NATO and the FRY. That peacekeeping operation was meant to enforce the cease-fire, demilitarize the KLA and other Kosovo Albanian groups, and establish a secure environment for the return of the refugees.

The force had a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. The NATO countries were united that in the absence of the NATO Joint Guardian force at the core of any international security presence in Kosovo, the refugees would not return and the other NATO objectives would not be met. A NATO force at the core of an international security presence was regarded as the magnet to attract the refugees back. In the absence of a NATO force with American participation, it was the view of the US Government that it was unrealistic to think the Kosovar Albanians would disarm the KLA, something of great interest to Russia. The US believed that if NATO forces deployed, the rationale for the Kosovar Liberation Army having an armed force to protect itself against Serbs would disappear. The Rambouillet envisaged something like 2,500 Serb military and 2,500 police for a year, though with the commencement of Operation Allied Force NATO required all of those forces going, in views of the probability that the Kosovar Albanians would not come home to a situation where those same forces remain at their posts. NATO envisaged the standing up of thousands of Kosovar Albanian police, including possibly people from the KLA, who would be trained by the international community and could serve police functions.

NATO did not contemplate a partition of Kosovo. It had been unofficially suggested that one possible solution was a de facto partition of Kosovo whereby the Russians would patrol the north, the mineral-rich areas, and NATO would patrol the south.

Before Allied Force began operating, NATO had plans to put in a peacekeeping force of 28,000 people. Of that, 4,000 people would have been Americans. By mid-May 1999 NATO had reassessed its Op Plan for the Joint Guardian mission to see to what degree they would need reinforcement beyond the level that was originally foreseen for the KFOR [Kosovo force] international security presence in Kosovo. NATO had 16,000 troops deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia trained for their mission as well as dealing with the enormous refugee inflow. Certain reinforcements from the UK and from Germany were arrived as of mid-May.

The NATO pre-deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was conducted to be in a position to move very quickly into Kosovo to set up an initial military command structure and an initial infrastructure to get the basic functions going. The goal was not only for other NATO troops to come in quickly but also for the transition authority and for the humanitarian relief organizations, which in the very early stages would need a great deal of military back-up, to establish themselves by the time the NATO core element was on the ground in Kosovo.