Criteria After 1 October 1995, the Kansas National Guard Medal of Excellence with certificate/citation may be awarded to any Soldier of the Kansas Army National Guard, Civilians, former members of the Kansas N... After 1 October 1995, the Kansas National Guard Medal of Excellence with certificate/citation may be awarded to any Soldier of the Kansas Army National Guard, Civilians, former members of the Kansas National Guard, and State or Federal public officials. Public officials include, but are not limited to senators, representatives, and congressional aides and staff employees. The recipient must distinguish himself/herself for clearly exceptionally meritorious service in a duty of great responsibility, exceptionally significant public service or acts of heroism, valor or bravery, performed under circumstances of personal hazard or danger and the voluntary risks of life. Awards are not made solely on the basis of having saved a human life.
Method of Submission. Letter of recommendation is endorsed by commanders through channels to AGKS-DCSPER for action by The Adjutant General of Kansas, who is the final approving authority.
The Governor, or in his/her absence, The Adjutant General, will present this award.
KSNGMOEX EPS points awarded value is 35 points. MoreHide
Criteria After 1 July 1979, the Kansas National Guard Distinguished Service Medal with certificate/citation may be awarded to any Soldier of the Kansas National Guard who distinguishes himself/herself by heroi... After 1 July 1979, the Kansas National Guard Distinguished Service Medal with certificate/citation may be awarded to any Soldier of the Kansas National Guard who distinguishes himself/herself by heroic achievement or exceptional meritorious service. Superior performance of normal duties will not alone justify the award of this decoration. Awards are made for acts of heroism, valor or bravery, performed under circumstances of personal hazard or danger and the voluntary risk of life. Awards may be made solely on the basis of having saved a human life.
Method of Submission. Letter of recommendation is endorsed by the commanders through channels to AGKS-DCSPER for action by The Adjutant General of Kansas, who is the final approving authority.
The Governor or, in his/her absence, The Adjutant General will present this award.
KSNGDSMD EPS points awarded value is 30 points. MoreHide
Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. MoreHide
Comments
Remarks: Action in Rheims, St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne Offensives; Wounded Sep 27, 1918, at the Meuse-Argonne, died one day later. Sepnt 120 days on the frontlines;
Criteria May be awarded to any state/local officials, civic leaders, or Adjutant General�??s Department employee who in a position of great responsibility, distinguished themselves with outstanding and excep... May be awarded to any state/local officials, civic leaders, or Adjutant General�??s Department employee who in a position of great responsibility, distinguished themselves with outstanding and exceptional service in support of the Adjutant General�??s Department, Kansas National Guard and the State of Kansas. MoreHide
Criteria The World War I Victory Medal was awarded for military service during the First World War. It was awarded for active service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918; for service with the American... The World War I Victory Medal was awarded for military service during the First World War. It was awarded for active service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918; for service with the American Expeditionary Forces in European Russia between November 12, 1918, and August 5, 1919; or for service with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia between November 23, 1918, and April 1, 1920. MoreHide
Description Somme Defensive, 21 March - 6 April 1918. The German high command decided to attack on the British-held Somme front in the direction of Amiens. A breakthrough at this point would separate the French fSomme Defensive, 21 March - 6 April 1918. The German high command decided to attack on the British-held Somme front in the direction of Amiens. A breakthrough at this point would separate the French from the British, push the latter into a pocket in Flanders, and open the way to the Channel ports.
The offensive began on 21 March 1918 with three German armies (about 62 divisions in all) in the assault. British defense lines were pierced in rapid succession. By 26 March Amiens was seriously threatened, and on the following day a gap was created between the French and British armies. But the Germans lacked reserves to exploit their initial phenomenal successes, and the Allies moved in enough reserves to bring the offensive to a halt by 6 April. The Germans had advanced up to 40 miles, had captured 1,500 square miles of ground and 70,000 prisoners, and had inflicted some 200,000 casualties. They had failed, however, to achieve any or their strategic objectives; destruction of the British, disruption of Allied lateral communicational and capture of Amiens.
On 25 March 1918, at the height at the German drive, Pershing placed the four American divisions at that time ready for combat at the disposal of the French. But only a few American units were engaged. They included the 6th, 12th, and 14th Engineers and the 17th, 22d, and 148th Aero Squadrons, a total of about 2200 men.... More
Description Lys, 9 - 27 April 1918. Ludendorff still hoped to destroy the hard-hit British Army before it had a chance to recover from the effects of the Somme drive. This was the purpose of a new German attack lLys, 9 - 27 April 1918. Ludendorff still hoped to destroy the hard-hit British Army before it had a chance to recover from the effects of the Somme drive. This was the purpose of a new German attack launched on 9 April 1918 on a narrow front along the Lys River in Flanders. The Germans committed 46 divisions to the assault, and, using Hutier attacks once again, quickly scored a breakthrough. The British situation was desperate for some days. Haig issued his famous "backs to the wall" order and appealed to Foch for reinforcements. But the Allied Supreme Commander, convinced that the British could hold their line, refused to commit reserves he was building up in anticipation of the day when the Allies would again be able to seize the initiative. Foch's judgment proved to be correct, and Ludendorff called off the offensive on 29 April.
Since 21 March the Germans had suffered some 350,000 casualties without having attained any vital objectives; in the same period British casualties numbered about 305,000. About 500 Americans participated in the campaign, including troops of the 16th Engineers, 28th Aero Squadron, and 1st Gas Regiment.... More
Description The Battle of Cantigny, fought May 28th 1918 was the first major American battle and offensive of World War I. The U.S. 1st Division, the most experienced of the five American divisions then in FranceThe Battle of Cantigny, fought May 28th 1918 was the first major American battle and offensive of World War I. The U.S. 1st Division, the most experienced of the five American divisions then in France and in reserve for the French Army near the village of Cantigny, was selected for the attack. The objective of the attack was both to reduce a small salient made by the German Army in the front lines but also to instill confidence among the French and British allies in the ability of the inexperienced American Expeditionary Force (AEF).
Capture of Cantigny
At 06:45 [H Hour], 28 May 1918, American Soldiers of the 28th Infantry Regiment left their jump-off trenches following an hour-long artillery preparation. Part of the preparation was counter-battery fire directed at German artillery positions. A rolling barrage, advancing 100 meters every two minutes, was calculated to give the attacking troops time to keep up with it.
The 28th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Hansen Ely, commanding) plus two companies of the 18th Infantry, three machine-gun companies and a company of engineers (3,564 men), captured Cantigny from the German Eighteenth Army. The village was situated on high ground surrounded by woods, making it an ideal observation post for German artillery.
Because the Americans did not have them in sufficient quantity, the French provided air cover, 368 heavy artillery pieces, trench mortars, tanks, and flamethrowers. The French Schneider tanks were from the French 5th Tank battalion. Their primary purpose was to eliminate German machine gun positions. With this massive support, and advancing on schedule behind the creeping artillery barrage, the 28th Infantry took the village in 30 minutes. It then continued on to its final objective roughly a half kilometer beyond the village.
Defense against German counterattacks
The first German counterattack, a small attack at 08:30 against the extreme right of the new American position, was easily repulsed, but German artillery bombarded the 28th Infantry for most of the day. At 17:10 the first large-scale counterattack took place, and a company of the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry commanded by Major Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. was used to reinforce a weak spot in the American line. Another German counterattack at 18:40 was also repulsed by a combination of artillery and Infantry defensive fire. A series of counterattacks over the next two days were also defeated by both American regiments, and the position held.
The Americans reduced the salient and expanded their front by approximately a mile. A minor success, its significance was overshadowed by the battle underway along the Aisne. The U.S. forces held their position with the loss of 1,603 casualties including over 300 killed in action; they captured 250 German prisoners. Matthew B. Juan, a Native American war hero, was killed during this battle.
The American success at Cantigny assured the French that American divisions could be entrusted in the line against the German offensive to take Paris. The victory at Cantigny was followed by attacks at Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood in the first half of June.... More
Description Aisne 27 May - 5 June 1918. The next major German attack fell on 27 May on the thinly held but formidable terrain along the Aisne River known as the Chemin des Dames. The original objective of this neAisne 27 May - 5 June 1918. The next major German attack fell on 27 May on the thinly held but formidable terrain along the Aisne River known as the Chemin des Dames. The original objective of this new offensive was to draw southward the Allied reserves accumulated back of the British sector, in preparation for a final German attempt to destroy the British Army in Flanders. The French and British defenders were taken completely by surprise, and their positions were overrun rapidly on a forty-mile front. German progress on the first day was so rapid (advances up to 13 miles were made at some points) that Ludendorff altered his plans and decided to make the diversionary attack a main effort. Most of the Aisne bridges were captured intact. The thrust toward Rheims failed but Soissons was taken, and by 31 May the Germans had reached the outskirts of Chateau-Thierry on the Marne, less than 40 miles from Paris.
In the next few days the Germans sought to exploit and expand the deep and exposed salient which they had established. But by 4 June they had been stopped everywhere. Some 27,500 American troops took part in the check of the German advance. The 3d Division foiled enemy attempts in the period 1-4 June to secure a firm bridgehead across the Marne at Chateau-Thierry. West of the town the 2d Division, which included a Marine brigade, defended the road to Paris, and on 6 June successfully counterattacked in Belleau Wood.... More
Description Aisne 27 May - 5 June 1918. The next major German attack fell on 27 May on the thinly held but formidable terrain along the Aisne River known as the Chemin des Dames. The original objective of this neAisne 27 May - 5 June 1918. The next major German attack fell on 27 May on the thinly held but formidable terrain along the Aisne River known as the Chemin des Dames. The original objective of this new offensive was to draw southward the Allied reserves accumulated back of the British sector, in preparation for a final German attempt to destroy the British Army in Flanders. The French and British defenders were taken completely by surprise, and their positions were overrun rapidly on a forty-mile front. German progress on the first day was so rapid (advances up to 13 miles were made at some points) that Ludendorff altered his plans and decided to make the diversionary attack a main effort. Most of the Aisne bridges were captured intact. The thrust toward Rheims failed but Soissons was taken, and by 31 May the Germans had reached the outskirts of Chateau-Thierry on the Marne, less than 40 miles from Paris.
In the next few days the Germans sought to exploit and expand the deep and exposed salient which they had established. But by 4 June they had been stopped everywhere. Some 27,500 American troops took part in the check of the German advance. The 3d Division foiled enemy attempts in the period 1-4 June to secure a firm bridgehead across the Marne at Chateau-Thierry. West of the town the 2d Division, which included a Marine brigade, defended the road to Paris, and on 6 June successfully counterattacked in Belleau Wood.... More
Description Montdidier-Noyon, 9 - 13 June 1918. Ludendorff followed up his stalled Aisne offensive with a small-scale drive in the Montdidier-Noyon sector on 9 June 1918. Twenty-one German division attacked the FMontdidier-Noyon, 9 - 13 June 1918. Ludendorff followed up his stalled Aisne offensive with a small-scale drive in the Montdidier-Noyon sector on 9 June 1918. Twenty-one German division attacked the French on a twenty-three mile front extending from Montdidier to the Oise River. The French anticipated the assault and contained it after a nine-mile penetration by the Germans, counterattacking strongly. The fighting was over by 12 June, and the enemy had little to show for the heavy losses incurred. No large American units were in the immediate vicinity of this action, although the 1st Division at Cantigny was subjected to artillery fire and diversionary raids.... More
Description Montdidier-Noyon, 9 - 13 June 1918. Ludendorff followed up his stalled Aisne offensive with a small-scale drive in the Montdidier-Noyon sector on 9 June 1918. Twenty-one German division attacked the FMontdidier-Noyon, 9 - 13 June 1918. Ludendorff followed up his stalled Aisne offensive with a small-scale drive in the Montdidier-Noyon sector on 9 June 1918. Twenty-one German division attacked the French on a twenty-three mile front extending from Montdidier to the Oise River. The French anticipated the assault and contained it after a nine-mile penetration by the Germans, counterattacking strongly. The fighting was over by 12 June, and the enemy had little to show for the heavy losses incurred. No large American units were in the immediate vicinity of this action, although the 1st Division at Cantigny was subjected to artillery fire and diversionary raids.... More
Description SThe Battle of Château-Thierry was fought on July 18, 1918 and was one of the first actions of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) under General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing. It was a battle in WSThe Battle of Château-Thierry was fought on July 18, 1918 and was one of the first actions of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) under General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing. It was a battle in World War I as part of the Second Battle of the Marne, initially prompted by a German offensive launched on 15 July against the AEF, an expeditionary force consisting of troops from both the Army and Marine Corps, and the newest troops on the front.
On the morning of 18 July 1918, the French (some of them colonial) and American forces between Fontenoy and Château-Thierry launched a counter-assault under the overall direction of Allied généralissime Ferdinand Foch against the German positions. This assault on a 40 km (25 mi) wide front was the first in over a year. The American army played a role fighting for the regions around Soissons and Château-Thierry, in collaboration with predominantly French forces. The allied forces had managed to keep their plans a secret, and their attack at 04:45 took the Germans by surprise when the troops went "Over the Top" without a preparatory artillery bombardment, but instead followed closely behind a rolling barrage which began with great synchronized precision. Eventually, the two opposing assaults (lines) inter-penetrated and individual American units exercised initiative and continued fighting despite being nominally behind enemy lines.... More
Description Champagne-Marne, 15 - 18 July 1918. In the four great offensives from 21 March to 13 June 1918 the Germans gained considerable ground, but failed to achieve a decisive advantage at any point on the frChampagne-Marne, 15 - 18 July 1918. In the four great offensives from 21 March to 13 June 1918 the Germans gained considerable ground, but failed to achieve a decisive advantage at any point on the front. Furthermore, success was bought at a price in manpower and material which they could ill afford. Their more then 600,000 casualties were irreplaceable, whereas the Allied loss of some 800,000 men was soon more than compensated for by new American units arriving at the front in ever-mounting numbers. By July 1918 Allied troops outnumbered German on the Western Front. Other factors also contributed to the decline of German morale, notably the pinch of the blockade and the effectiveness of the Allied propaganda, which was distributed widely by air at the front and in German cities behind the lines. But Ludendorff refused to consider peace negotiations, and planned two more offensives for July which he hoped would bring victory. The first of the new drives was designed to capture Rheims, to make more secure the supply of the Merge salient, and to draw in Allied reserves. The second and larger offensive, destined never to be launched, would strike once again at the British in Flanders.
When the two-pronged German assault on either side of Rheims began on 15 July the Allies were prepared for it. Plans for the attack had leaked out of Berlin, and Allied airplanes had detected the unusual activity behind the enemy front. Foch had time to draw up reserves, and Petain, the French commander, skillfully deployed his troops in defense-in-depth tactics. Consequently the German drive east of Rheims fell far short of its objective. The attack west of the city succeeded in pushing across the Marne near Chateau-Thierry, but was checked there by French and American units. Among the A.E.F. units involved in this action were the 3d, 26th, 28th, and 42d Divisions, the 369th Infantry, and supporting elements (in all about 85,000 Americans). It was here that the 38th Infantry of the 3d Division gained its motto, "Rock of the Marne."
By 17 July the Champagne-Marne offensive had petered out and the initiative passed to the Allies. The German people had built up great hopes for the success of this Friedensturm (peace offensive); its failure was a tremendous psychological blow to the whole nation.
Marne near Chateau-Thierry. Among the A.E.F. units involved were the 3d, 26th, 28th, and 42d Divisions, and the 369th Infantry(in all about 85,000 Americans). It was here that the 38th Infantry of the 3d Division gained its motto, "Rock of the Marne.... More
Description General Foch scheduled the Rainbow Division for more battle immediately following the July 15-16, 1918 victory at Champagne. He ordered it to join a Franco-American drive northeast. His goal was to brGeneral Foch scheduled the Rainbow Division for more battle immediately following the July 15-16, 1918 victory at Champagne. He ordered it to join a Franco-American drive northeast. His goal was to break up the bulge at Château-Thierry, the point of the German battle line where it projected farthest into the French position. Foch knew he had to capture the Marne Valley if he was to finally close the road to Paris to the Germans. This called for the kind of maneuver war and open field fighting that Pershing had pushed for.
Moving up from the destroyed French town of Château-Thierry, the Rainbow was ordered to exploit the Germans’ sudden and widespread retreat. Weeks earlier, the Germans had believed victory to be at hand. Since then their morale had slumped and the advantage in numbers of rifles available had tilted to the Allies. The Supreme Commander, General Foch, in addition to launching the drive at Château-Thierry, had also launched a successful surprise attack near Soissons. The 1st and 2nd US Divisions participated in an important way. It unsteadied the salient of Tardenois and caused the Germans there to pull back. Very professionally, they positioned rearguards in an organized and desperate defense. It gave them time for an orderly withdrawal and the removal of artillery and stores.
The Allied Command showed confidence in the “Rainbow” when its mission shifted from winning one decisive battle to join in another with barely a pause for rest. It pulled out of Champagne on July 20 after fighting there on July 15 and 16. It moved by train to the area around Château-Thierry and camped there for three days before receiving orders to attack the Germans. The 42nd was moved from control by a French Corps to the American I Corps, but remained in the VI French Army under General Jean Marie Joseph Degoutte. The growing reputation of the 167th for hard fighting brought it to be trusted at the point of the new effort. The 84th Brigade was to jump off first on the attack and the 167th Infantry was to make the Brigade’s first contact with the Germans.
The timing was right and the Rainbow was ready. US I Corps Commander Major General Hunter Liggett, who controlled the 42nd in this operation said later: “It proved itself to be a first class division in every sense, swift in attack and tenacious in attack and defense.” Liggett’s headquarters was located near Epieds. From there, he controlled the 39th Division (French) on its right and the 167th (French) Division on the left with the US 42nd Division in the center.
The Rainbow Division always wanted to go into battle as one unit with the infantry regiments and the artillery going in together. Its units had been building trust with each other and worked well together. But, this time the 42nd would be committed piecemeal over a period of several days. It caused a sense of unease throughout the division and was to lead to future controversies.
The 167th (Alabama) received its warning order for the operation while at La-Ferté near Château-Thierry at 3:20 on the afternoon of July 24, 1918. They were to load in an hour, but in typical army “hurry up and wait” fashion, a departure was rescheduled for 7:45 that evening. The trucks did not show up on time and the troops left Ussy-sur-Marne at 11:30 that night. It took 75 of the camions (trucks) with French Indochinese drivers to move a combat-loaded battalion. Sixteen fully equipped men were crowded on to each vehicle. Driving all night over rough roads in thick dust and fumes, they reached the I Corps in Epieds shortly after dawn on July 25, 1918, The sister regiment of the 167th, the 168th (Iowa), arrived there at about the same time after it, too, had taken an all night ride. German aircraft were adjusting artillery fire by flying in and out of occasional breaks in the clouds. It was raining off and on.
The New Englanders of the 26th “Yankee” Division had recently driven the enemy out of Epieds. A German howitzer was overturned in the street, fires were smoldering and small mounds of German ammunition and equipment were strewn about among enemy dead. There was an active American aid station in the village. American dead lay in the fields on the outskirts. The village was overrun by “Rainbow” soldiers trying to move on. The place was a good target for German artillery. Incoming rounds crashed all around. On the next day German aircraft shot down one of the four American balloons there.
The Approach March of the 167th (Alabama)
Officers of the 167th assembled in the cold rain at Courpoil, about a mile and a half northeast of Epieds. It was about 7:00 a.m. and they were told their units would be moving forward to make contact with the Germans in the afternoon. Everybody was wet. Despite its being July, the wind was cold and chilling. The troops got a hot meal and tried to rest. French speaking First Lieutenant Maurice W. Howe had established the 3rd Battalion P.C.(Post of Command). He later reported the loss of 11 men due to bombardment there and on the move forward.
The 167th took up a combat approach march formation at 2:30 in the afternoon and headed northeast through open fields and woods toward the Forêt de Fère. Soldiers in each of the battalions’ Sanitary Detachments carried stretchers and boxes of medical supplies on their shoulders. It was hard for them to keep up with the troops as they packed the bulky rolls of bandages and medical paraphernalia. Two medics were with each rifle company. Infantrymen’s canteens were topped off and each man carried hardtack and 250 rounds of ammunition in web belts or bandoliers. Some carried small sacks of hand grenades.
There were German and American dead in the open fields and along the hedges on the route of march.
The 84th Brigade of the “Rainbow” had orders to pass through and replace all of the US 26th Division. It had engaged the Germans west of the Croix Rouge Farm and been stopped. The New Englanders had fought for two weeks, since July 10, and suffered big losses around Epieds and in the Forêt de Fère. The division was at less than half strength. It had taken a week to advance 10 miles at a cost of more than 4,000 casualties.
I Corps, to which the “Rainbow” was being assigned, had two divisions, the US 26th (YD) and the French 167th. The US Corps Commander, Major General Hunter Liggett, had nothing but praise for the French but he was unhappy with the New Englanders. He had ordered them to take over the sector held by the French and it proved to be beyond their capacity. Liggett suspended the order after determining that Major General Clarence Edwards, the commanding general of the division, had failed to put it into effect. On July 24 Liggett told Edwards that neither he nor his subordinates obeyed orders.
The “Rainbow” was to take over all of the I Corps front on the nights of July 25 and 26.
Enemy airplanes flew low all day on July 25. They observed the 167th (Alabama) as its battalions trudged forward and also flew over the 168th (Iowa), which was dug in under the trees at Bois de Fary.
A story is told about the 167th as it approached the abandoned 26th Division skirmish line on the afternoon of July 25. A colonel of an Illinois artillery regiment was making a reconnaissance northeast of Courpoil. He saw a battalion of American infantry coming toward him, deployed in the approach march. He stopped as it went by, knowing it belonged to the “Alabam” regiment, and asked the major where he was going. The major said: “Perhaps Colonel Screws who is with the support battalion can tell you, I don’t know until we bump.” The artillery colonel waited until the last unit came along and then easily picked out Colonel Screws with a large fiercely burning cigar in his mouth. He said: “Hello, Bill. Where are you going?” Screws replied, not even taking the cigar out of his mouth: “Damn if I know, but I am on my way.”
The 167th column was led by its 1st Battalion under the command of Major John W. Carroll, and its 3 rd Battalion under the command of Major Dallas B. Smith. They were to be the next day’s assault units. The 2nd Battalion under Captain Everette Jackson took up the rear and was regimental reserve. The assault battalions had been designated for that hard job because they held easier jobs in the previous battle at Champagne. There the 2nd Battalion received the worst of the German attack.
The Skirmish Line
When the 1st and 3rd Battalions reached the abandoned front at dusk they took up positions in foxholes left by the US 26th Division. Each battalion had a Machine Gun Company attached. 1st Battalion had the 167th Machine Gun Company and 3rd Battalion had B Company of the 151st (Georgia) Machine Gun Company. All were in place in the woods by 7:00 o’clock. There were no permanent trenches in the underbrush-covered forests, though the YD had dug some temporary foxholes and shallow trenches. The 2nd Battalion under Captain Everette Jackson would remain in the rear until after the next day’s battle.
These were the worst conditions under which the 167th had ever gone into action. The attached Machine Gun Company (B Company) from the 151st (Georgia) also started at great disadvantage. After the all night truck trip from Château-Thierry, they were doubly exhausted from carrying the heavy guns and man-handling the ammunition carts through the mud and rain for 5 miles from Epieds. Mules would normally have been used for pulling machine gun carts but the animals were being marched to Epieds. The men, guns and carts had been brought on the camions for quicker delivery. Nevertheless, the Machine Gun Battalion’s unit assigned to the 3rd Battalion got into position on schedule. That unit and its willingness to work hard and suffer hardship were greatly appreciated by the infantrymen from Alabama.
This was the most mobile combat operation the 167th had participated in. It was expected to go through the forest that day, July 25, and to take the Croix Rouge Farm on July 26. None in the regiment had seen the objective but officers were told that the farmhouse was in the middle of an open field about a mile square. There were a few logging trails in the woods leading to the front. The woods were littered with debris of combat and smelled of rotting animal flesh, the fumes of high explosives and the sweetish smell of mustard gas. It continued to rain. The cold was penetrating. There had been intermittent artillery fire on the move up and it continued along with some sniper fire throughout the night of July 25 and all day on the day of the assault, Friday, July 26. The situation was daunting and certainly not as advertised. In his own hand, MacArthur later wrote of that time when he had been colonel and “Rainbow” Division chief of staff:
“It was presumed that the Germans were pulling back and our orders were to pass him. But the high command was just in error. The Germans were not retreating with only a small rear guard left to cover their withdrawal. Instead, strong forces had settled down on rugged slopes and in protecting woods. Behind stout stone walls and scattered buildings they had massed machine guns and mortars in determined defense. The death song of German bullets from front and flank made impossible any advances over cleared fields swept by fire. Our artillery was not in sufficient strength to silence the German positions. There was terror and death lurking along the poppy covered hillsides, in the forests, and behind the coverlets of that green countryside. It was to be six of the bitterest days and nights of the Rainbow.”
Neither the Alabama nor Iowa Regiments had artillery support although both had been told by 84th Brigade they would have it from the 28th (Pennsylvania) Division. This absence of Allied artillery was to give the Germans a big advantage for the next few days. Colonel Screws described putting his regiment into position on July 25:
“I was ordered to make a relief of the front line troops of the 26th Division in the woods south of La Croix Rouge Farm at four P.M….I had made a reconnaissance in the woods in the place where I was to make the relief. I…instructed the battalion commanders on the front line to send out strong patrols, and to keep going until they had gained contact with the enemy.…At about six P.M. I received at my PC, Post of Command, just south of the Chateau at the Lake de la Logette and at the southern end of the woods of La Croix Rouge Farm, a report from the patrols that the enemy were about 400 to 500 meters in our front in the woods; that they were occupying a very strong position and that the woods were sprinkled with machine guns. I had two men wounded on those patrols. The information was sent in immediately to Brigade Headquarters. They told me afterwards they forwarded it the same night to Division Headquarters and Division Headquarters said they had forwarded it back to Corps.”
The German Occupied Fortified Farmhouse
According to German records, the large farm compound and the open land around it had been prepared by them a month before as an antiaircraft post. A captured map showed that four antiaircraft machine guns had been dug into a trench running east-west in an open field on the east side of the fortified farmhouse. The Germans had since prepared the farmhouse to defend it from approaches on the ground. They had machine gun and sniper positions throughout the area. Just two days before, on July 23, their 23rd Infantry Division had moved into the position that included the fortified farmhouse.
Croix Rouge Farm Fortified Farmhouse
Croix Rouge Farm Fortified Farmhouse
Reinforcements from the 10th Landwehr Division joined the German position on the night of July 25. They called it the Caesar Position. The 10th Landwehr men were reported to have had very difficult days behind them and were not at their best because of flu. They replaced a battalion of a Schutzen regiment and reported receiving incoming fire from the Americans on the night of their arrival.
The walled compound of the large farmhouse dominated a slight rise from which fire could be delivered in all directions. The Germans had planned a strong defense with a large number of water-cooled 7.92mm machine guns, each served by a five-man crew. About 25 of the guns were later captured. Camouflaged and placed into strengthened, fortified positions, they covered tree lines and trails. Together they could pump out 10,000 rounds a minute and were accurate up to 1,000 yards. Fields of interlocking fire had been measured and mapped by the Germans. Trees had red paint marks on them to help with sighting. Snipers were put into planned positions.
The Germans had already fought the US 26th (New England) Division and the 167th (French) Division and 29th (French) Division to a standstill in the vicinity of Croix Rouge Farm, and they were confident defenders.
Part of the Forêt de Fère extended a couple of miles east of the Croix Rouge Farm clearing. There the Germans had concentrated large quantities of ammunition for use in the “Peace Offensive”, the drive on Paris that failed several weeks earlier. German artillery was nearby and used the stored ammunition freely in the fighting at the Croix Rouge Farm. Artillery concentrations were registered throughout the area and extended deep into American positions. They were fired throughout July 25 and July 26.
German machine guns and riflemen were in positions along the road passing the farmhouse and on its walls. Conditions were cold and miserable. Rain was more or less continuous.
The 167th (French) on the Left of the 167th (Alabama)
The 167th (French) Division was on the left of the 167th (Alabama) skirmish line. They were the furthest advanced of the Allied lines in the sector. Captured German documents said the July 26 assault on Croix Rouge Farm was made by a joint French and American force.
Normally equal to an American regiment, the French division had suffered heavy losses and was down to companies of about 30 men each. The total French force numbered about 340. They had been there a long time and were worn out. Colonel Screws later said the French did not attack on July 26.
167th (Alabama) Attacks
Screws set up his P.C .on the night of July 25 in a gully alongside a trail to the rear of his two assault Battalions. Captain Everette Jackson’s reserve 2nd Battalion was to the rear of it.
The 1st Battalion was on the left of the regiment’s position in an area of thinned forest. It provided little protection but was open enough for the men to run through when the attack started. The 3rd Battalion was on the right in thicker and safer woods, though it made movement slower. Both battalions maintained skirmish lines about 1,000 yards east of the Croix Rouge Farm and several hundred yards from the German line, but within range of pre positioned German snipers and machine guns. No one got much sleep that night. Steak and coffee were brought forward at dawn on the cold and dripping day of battle.
Incoming fire made it impossible to stabilize the skirmish line. Patrols on the left flank were turned back. The two battalions tried but failed to improve their positions. They used foxholes left by the 26th Division and dug more. They were hit throughout the day with intermittent sniper, machine gun and artillery fire. This activity on the front and both flanks hindered communication.
The Croix Rouge Farm battle map
The Croix Rouge Farm battle map
Worried about his left flank, where a patrol had been turned back the evening before, Colonel Screws sent out a strong patrol on the morning of July 26. Led by B Company’s First Lieutenant Robert Espy, Abbeville, it was not turned back. Lieutenant Colonel Bare, who was positioned with 1st Battalion, received a personal benefit from it. Hearing bullets whizzing by his head and seeing some hitting the ground around him, he moved close to a birch tree. A bullet hit the tree about six inches from his jaw. Flying bark blistered his face. He heard Lieutenant Espy say, “I see him colonel.” Without another word Espy upped his rifle, fired one shot and knocked the German out of the big oak tree about 100 yards away.
The 1st and 3rd Battalions had casualties all day and sent them to their aid stations. Every rifle company had been asked for eight men to help the Regimental Aid Station as stretcher-bearers. It took four men to carry a stretcher. They wore blue armbands with the letters LB (Litter Bearer) and did not carry weapons. Major Watts’ Sanitary Department located the Regimental Aid Station in a barn just north of Lake de la Logette, between Colonel Screws’ P.C. and Captain Jackson’s reserve, the 2nd Battalion.
Colonel Screws called battalion commanders and regimental staff to his P.C. on the morning of July 26. He told them to expect an order to attack and went over his plan. The executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bare, and the operations officer, Captain Mortimer Jordan, were assigned positions immediately behind 1st Battalion on the left. They would be responsible for reorganizing casuals and disorganized units. First Lieutenant Powell, commander of I Company, Opelika, was given the same job behind the attacking 3rd Battalion on the right. Powell would shortly be killed.
The battalion Commanders returned to their positions behind the front line and went over the plan with their company commanders and the commanders of the Machine Gun Companies and Mortar Sections. Rain continued to fall periodically. Skies were overcast. There were no German planes flying. There was no observed German artillery fire as long as the Americans stayed in the woods, but previously plotted concentrations were intermittently fired. The troops had slept little in 48 hours.
Colonel Screws sent a penciled note at 2:00 on the afternoon of July 26 to Major John W. Watts, the regimental surgeon. It gave him a line of departure for the assault on a sketch map and estimated the time of attack to be 4:00 p.m. Screws had previously approved the location of the battalion and regimental aid stations as recommended by Major Watts.
Majors Carroll and Smith Launch the 1st and 3rd Battalion Assaults
At about 3:00 on the afternoon of July 26, the brigade commander, Brigadier General Robert A. Brown, assembled his two regimental commanders and the commanding officers of the 101st and 102nd Field Artillery of the 26th Division, at his P.C. To the amazement of Colonel Screws, Brown read orders to attack that afternoon in broad daylight, jumping off at 4:50 p.m. Screws protested and suggested falling back from the woods while bringing artillery down on the strong German position. He asked if the French at his left had received orders and were going to jump off at the same time. The French had no orders and no French were present at the brigade commander’s meeting. Watches were synchronized, and regimental commanders left for their respective P.C.s.
Colonel Screws handed copies of the attack order to Lieutenant Colonel Bare with instructions to deliver them to his two assault battalions. It was about 10 or 15 minutes before jump off time. Bare hopped into the regiment’s motorcycle side car and was driven to 3rd battalion headquarters where he delivered the order to Major Dallas B. Smith. He and the driver then proceeded along a muddy trail through the woods toward Major Carroll’s 1st Battalion P.C. A big tree was blown down across the road and it was impossible to take the motorcycle around it. Running through the woods, Bare and his driver reached Major Carroll’s headquarters and delivered the order. Carroll was ten or fifteen minutes late in getting his Battalion into the attack.
His men were dug in about 500 yards due west of the farmhouse. Orders were to go through the stretch of thin woods around them and cross the open land between those woods and the farmhouse. From there they were to proceed northeast across the open land behind the farmhouse until reaching the La Ventellette woods, about a mile further on. The 1st Battalion was to clean out the machine guns around the farmhouse and go on to the edge of the distant woods. The 167th Machine Gun Company was to accompany the 1st Battalion. It was not possible to carry out the orders.
Major Smith’s 3rd Battalion was due south and southwest of the farmhouse. Its orders were to clear the strip of forest between it and the farmhouse, then to assault the fortress-like farmhouse by crossing the open land to its northeast. The farmhouse stood in the open center of a large V of trenches, facing west, filled with camouflaged machine guns. Long lines of German machine guns were also dug in along the road running north and south directly behind the farmhouse. They dominated the roads, trails and fields approaching it.
The two assault battalions started moving from their skirmish lines in the woods at about the same time. They were in irregular lines going through the woods and forward progress was uneven. German riflemen stayed in place, waiting until the attacking Americans drew abreast, when they fired and fell back.
Major Carroll’s 1st Battalion advanced fastest through the thin woods on the left flank of the regiment. They went toward, then through the field in front, with men falling as they went, advancing at a run across the muddy, shell hole pocked open land in the face of heavy rifle and machine gun fire. The initial assault by the 1st Battalion was made by elements of C and D Companies but they were chewed up as they passed through elements of A Company and B Company, which were laying down fields of fire. A Company was on the right and B Company on the left.
Traversing German machine guns cut into the attacking platoons. The 167th Machine Gun Company attached to the 1st Battalion was hard hit. Its commander, Captain Julian M. Strassburger, was killed as the battle opened.
The initial 1st Battalion assault failed and was pinned down for about an hour in the open field. American dead and wounded were strewn all around. The day appeared lost.
A captured German after action report by the Battalion Commander Hildebrandt said that the American attack came in very thick lines with one infantry group attacking north of the farm and one south of it, both with several machine guns. He complimented the fire discipline of his own men, saying they had stopped and started it several times, which he thought worked. He praised German messengers who brought up ammunition and believed all his men had behaved well while receiving fire that went to the nerves in a difficult situation. Part of his 8th Company had fought the enemy while crying and vomiting from gas.
Hildebrandt wrote that two of his company leaders had, through binoculars, seen the Americans bringing up reinforcements in columns after the failure of their first assault. He said the first enemy attack was destroyed within 15 minutes. He reported a “friendly fire” situation between his own 8th and 5th Companies that had been caused by smoke and that resulted in casualties.
The same report described an hour going by during which more American reinforcements were brought forward with loud noises and whistles from the forest in the west. The Germans claimed that fire effectiveness continued to be good, inflicting overall heavy losses on the Americans attacking against his 6th and 7th Companies. The report claimed that the attackers were met with machine gun and rifle fire lasting until 9:00 that evening.
The Second Effort by Major John W. Carroll’s 1st Battalion
The 1st Battalion’s second effort was made by men from Captain Gardner Green’s C Company and Captain Lacey Edmundson’s D Company that had not been used in the first attack. They were joined by men from Captain Fletcher Haley’s A Company and Captain Bryan Whitehurst’s B Company through which the first assault had been launched. That attack started at about 6:00 p.m. when two platoons under Bessemer’s First Lieutenant Ernest E. Bell, D Company, and two platoons under Abbeville’s First Lieutenant Robert Espy of B Company rushed forward. That assault was successful from the beginning. Firing as they went, spread out across the field, the Alabama soldiers savagely fought German riflemen and machine gunners in their defensive positions. The two officers and their combined forces of about 100 men went through them at a run, killing many with the rifle, pistol and bayonet and rifle butt. Driving remnants back, they sealed the fate of the Germans on the north side of the farmhouse. Bell’s group of 58 from D Company had 23 survivors. Bell was wounded in the assault. Espy’s group from B Company of about the same size had 18 survivors.
Lieutenant Robert Espy, in addition to sharing in the honors of being co-leader of the successful second attack, had led the strong patrol launched that morning by Colonel Screws to protect the 167th left flank. Espy received the Distinguished Service Cross. Colonel Screws later stated that Espy saved the regiment.
The Germans counterattacked after the second assault by the Espy and Bell platoons but were met with 1st Battalion bayonets. During that German counterattack Major John W. Carroll, 1st Battalion commander, was heard to shout, “Save your fire men! We’ll give ‘em hell with the bayonet.”
A full 65 percent of Major Carroll’s 1st Battalion was killed or wounded that afternoon. Carroll received a Regimental Citation for his leadership. Captain Edmundson’s D Company had 80 percent killed or wounded in the assault. Edmundson was gassed.
Major Dallas B. Smith’s 3rd Battalion Attack
First Lieutenant Maurice Howe, L Company, wrote of the timing of the 3rd Battalion’s assault on the farmhouse from the south and southwest: “We attacked at 4:50 p.m., reached edge of woods back of Croix Rouge Farmhouse in one hour and forty minutes, at 6:30, which, for fighting in the woods is quite reasonable…arrived at farmhouse at 7:00.”
K and L Companies, bounded forward from the protection of the trees south of the farmhouse into the open fields at about 6:30. They used bayonets freely. Major Claude M. Stanley, commander of the 168th (Iowa) Infantry’s 2nd Battalion, spoke of “hearing the Rebel Yell as Alabama soldiers held their rifles high and raced across the field.”
First Lieutenant Henry L. Griggs, I Company, Opelika, wrote by hand, “this was the hardest fighting my battalion had during the war and was the only hand to hand fighting I saw during the war.”
Both 1st and 3rd Battalions’ initial attacks, coming at different times, failed to overrun the enemy. The regiment’s mortar sections were ineffective, some lasting as mortar men for about ten minutes. The officer in command of 3rd Battalion’s Mortar Platoon was ordered to fall in with riflemen in M Company. Its First Sergeant Norman L. Summers wrote:
“German shells and high explosives were bursting all around us and it was pitiful to see the sights. Some of our men were blown to pieces. Some had their arms and legs blown into tatters. Dead horses were lying everywhere and the stench was awful. Dead Americans, French and Germans were lying everywhere. It began to get dark. Shells were bursting on all sides.…Large trees were blown to pieces. Long red flashes came from German machine guns. Heavy undergrowth made progress difficult. As I was advancing a boy at my side was shot down by a German machine gun. I ditched just in time to keep him from getting me but I will never forget the look on his face as he went down.”
The 3rd Battalion commander, Major Dallas B. Smith of Opelika describes the action in which he was wounded and for which he was also to receive a Distinguished Service Cross:
“We hadn’t advanced a hundred yards toward the Croix Rouge Farm when it was a matter of hand to hand fighting…using both the bayonet as we had been taught during so many hours of instruction, and the butt of the rifle, the latter being more effective. My battalion suffered many casualties. Lieutenant Powell commanding I Company was killed, Captains Waldron and Esslinger wounded…they were three of my four company commanders. I reorganized the Battalion into two small companies.”
Lieutenant Powell had been killed leading I Company in the charge through the woods. Its losses were about 30 killed and 100 wounded during the battle.
Major Smith said, “It is difficult for me to comment on the Croix Rouge Farm for the reason that I always felt, and I know our regimental commander felt…that it would be a sacrifice of troops to make an attack through those woods without some artillery.”
Final Effort by Major Dallas B. Smith’s 3rd Battalion
The 3rd Battalion appeared doomed when six-foot-tall First Lieutenant Edward R.“Shorty” Wrenn and his detail came up with their one-pounder mortar on a two-wheeled cart. They were very successful. For the first time in the battle, the mortars were effective. It was a day saving event. Wrenn, a former Auburn football player from Talladega, who had been been promoted from Corporal to Sergeant to Lieutenant, was decorated with a Distinguished Service Cross and the French Croix de Guerre for his contribution.
Major Dallas Smith’s battalion pushed toward the fortified farmhouse and the road running north-south behind it. Platoon after platoon had been stopped by German fire. The 3rd Battalion companies had difficulty maintaining organization.
A mixed group of infantrymen and machine gunners was thrown together by Lieutenants Murphy and Kairn of Company B, 151st (Georgia) Machine Gun Battalion, which was attached to Major Smith’s battalion. They charged the farmhouse. Lieutenants Sharp and Alan K. Smith of K Company and Lieutenant Young of I Company also led small groups in charges. Young was seriously wounded. Another force from K and L Companies got closer and took out German machine gunners east of the farmhouse.
With all the attacking forces under heavy fire, the remnants of a platoon from L Company swept forward. Led by First Lieutenant Maurice W. Howe, 15 or 20 men reached the house about 7:00 p.m. There they linked up with a few Iowans and the two machine gun lieutenants. They cleaned out German soldiers dug in along the west side of the road to Fére-en-Tardenois and in the large vegetable cellar at the farmhouse.
Men wounded from the fighting on the east side of the road were brought in after dark. A runner was sent to Major Dallas Smith advising that he assist if he wanted the position held. Major Smith replied that he could not help. Father Carpenter, S.J., Catholic chaplain in the 166th (Ohio) was there. Germans were still active. All wounded from the farmhouse were removed to the woods.
Lines were reorganized and contact was made with Major Carroll’s 1st Battalion on the left and with Major Worthington’s 1st Battalion of the 168th (Iowa) Infantry) which had advanced its troops on the right.
Captain Bryant Whitehurst, B Company, took command of the group of Alabamians at the farmhouse.
Maneuvers of the 168th (Iowa) Infantry
At the beginning of the operation, the weakened New Englanders of the 26th Division failed to furnish guides to either the Alabamians or the Iowans. After leaving Epieds on the afternoon of July 25, neither regiment of the 84th Brigade knew where the other was.
The 167th (Alabama) moved forward that afternoon of July 25 and the 168th (Iowa) did not. Seeking shelter from German artillery the Iowans dug in under the trees of Bois de Fary at noon. They waited. Heavy incoming fire, followed by a pitch black night and tangled woods persuaded them not to move up that night.
Consequently, the costly gap continued to exist between the two regiments of the 84th Brigade. Even after waiting for dawn of July 26 to start to the front, progress for the 168th was difficult. It was the beginning of a frustrating, disorganized and very costly day.
No one from the 168th (Iowa) knew where its enemy was. Incoming artillery and carnage was everywhere. The Iowa battalions did not know their positions with regard to each other. Their 1st Battalion Commander, Major Emory C. Worthington, could not be located and none of his men knew what their orders were.
The 167th and 168th Regiments eventually liaised and worked to establish flank contact but there was no connection until afternoon. By then the 168th (Iowa) regiment’s 1st Battalion under Major Worthington was facing in a northeasterly direction with its assault line a few hundred yards south of the opening in the woods facing the Croix Rouge Farm. It had replaced the 2nd Battalion of the 168th (Iowa) but did not effectively join in the attack. The 2nd Battalion had moved to an even more dangerous place in the Forêt de Fère south of the fortified Croix Rouge Farm.
Neither the 1st nor 2nd Battalions of the Iowans jumped off on time. By late afternoon, about twenty minutes after its 4:50 p.m. jump off time, Major Claude M. Stanley’s 2nd Battalion fixed bayonets and started toward the north-south road about half a mile south of the fortified farmhouse. Their assault force took heavy losses and only a few of its men survived to join the 167th 3rd Battalion in the final assault on Croix Rouge Farm which took place at 7 PM on July 26. This combined force of the depleted 167th and 168th swept forward at bayonet point and finally took the farmhouse.
Though positioned well to the rear of the action, the reserve 3rd Battalion of the 168th (Iowa) also suffered severe losses from German artillery.
After the Battle
Drizzling rain continued throughout the early night of July 26. Combat slowed. The ground was covered with dead and dying. Groans of the wounded were everywhere. Already very dark, it was made even more so when a hard rain started. Every effort was made to find the wounded and get them to aid stations. The band, every member of the Sanitary Staff and all available soldiers were litter bearers. Narrow paths, with mud and water-filled shell holes made stretcher bearing extremely difficult.
Medics were shorthanded. Five of the 12 men assisting the two doctors in the 1st Battalion Aid Station had been wounded.
That station was located in a hut beside a trail in the woods. The 3 rd Battalion had a similar set up. Casualties walked in or were brought in by stretcher bearers. The doctors performed emergency operations and the medics gave morphine and other injections, put on splints and bandages, wrote out tags, moved men on and off the operating table and treated walking wounded. There was no protection from the weather other than the huts where doctors worked. Men were lying outside on stretchers, waiting while covered with blankets or raincoats. Some were just standing around waiting as the more seriously wounded were helped. The ambulances, slow coming up, would take them back down the logging trail to the Regimental Aid Station or through muddy logging trails on to the clearing station that had been established at Epieds. Major Watts, regimental surgeon, reported:
“Night came on and with it rain, the terribly wounded men staggering along through the deep mud and cold water, stretcher bearers slipping and falling with the mutilated and sometimes lifeless bodies they carried. All of the sanitary personnel of the headquarters section and the battalion sections in support were brought forward and pressed into service dressing the wounded. A dental officer was wounded by rifle or machine gun fire while serving as Assistant Battalion Surgeon with the Assault Battalion. Runners were sent to the rear to contact the ambulance head, but the ambulances had not yet arrived there. The wounded accumulated in great numbers, the aid stations were literally full of them, both Americans and Germans. Those who were unable to walk to the rear were made as comfortable as possible. Many of the wounded lay on the wet ground with practically no protection. The Germans had located us and seeing an ever increasing crowd started a heavy shelling, making two direct hits on the regimental aid post and killing one of the Hospital Corps men while he was in the act of administering morphine to one of his wounded comrades. The ambulances finally located us and drove to the site of the regimental aid post under heavy shellfire; they swung around and were quickly loaded to capacity and departed at once for the field hospital station. The wounded were being brought in during the entire night and were evacuated to the rear as rapidly as possible. The assault battalions advanced about a thousand yards and gained their objective at a cost of approximately one casualty for each yard gained. For when the casualty list was completed the following morning, we sent a list to Regimental Headquarters of over eleven hundred names of wounded who had passed through the aid stations from 5:30 p.m. July 26 to 7:00 a.m. July 27.”
Throughout the rainy night of July 26, German artillery fired explosives and gas into the American positions around the farmhouse, in the Forêt de Fère and throughout the Croix Rouge battlefield, Lieutenant D. W. Green, Company L, said, “I visited the farm house at about midnight and reported the place deserted. Troops were all back in the line of the woods.”
The two attacking battalions of the 167th had suffered heavily in the four hour battle that went back and forth. The attack order originally said that artillery preparation was to have begun at 2:50 in the afternoon and the infantry assault was to have been preceded by an accompanying rolling barrage that moved 200 meters in advance of the infantry advance. Actually, no American artillery fired until after the battle was over.
Lieutenant Colonel Bare said, “The fight at Croix Rouge Farm was purely an Infantry action. It was Infantry against Infantry and to the Infantry alone goes the credit for the capture of one of the strongest enemy positions in the Château-Thierry sector” He continued, “So severe was the fire of the German artillery and machine guns that it is difficult to understand how the two Battalions ever reached their objective.”
Colonel Screws said, “The 167th Infantry jumped off on time; the French did not go…. The 168th (Iowa) Infantry were somewhat late in jumping off. The result was that my regiment had a hand-to-hand fight with the 4th Prussian Guards. Our casualties were so heavy that the next day when I received orders to proceed to the second objective, the Ourcq River, I only had one full strength battalion, and two half battalions making the 167th practically one battalion short all during the fight on the Ourcq.”
Bare described the battlefield and closing action:
“The ground was literally covered with killed and wounded, both American and German. For some distance you could actually walk on dead men. The two Battalions in the attack suffered so heavily that it took a large proportion of those not killed and wounded to move the wounded back to the first aid station, which was established by the side of Lake de la Logette, some two and a half miles to our rear. Just about dusk I received information that on our left there was some movement on the part of enemy troops, which indicated that they might be forming for a counterattack. I sent out a patrol and they reported back in about an hour that they could discover no enemy troops nor could they discover any French on our left who, according to the order, would keep in liaison with us during the attack. However, in a very short time after the patrol had returned, although it was pitch dark, we could hear movement of troops which indicated that it was a counter attack. A great many of the men who had carried the wounded to the first aid station were at that time reporting back to me where I had taken up position at the cross roads. So I called for officers who were to form a provisional company with which to ward off the counter attack if possible. When I asked how many officers were present, it developed that Captain Mortimer H. Jordan of Birmingham and Lieutenant Royal Little of Providence, R.I. were the only ones. I instructed Lieutenant Little to take charge and organize a provisional company of all men who were able to immediately form a line to ward off the attack. This was accomplished with scarcely any loud talking and in a remarkably short period of time the men moved forward as if they had been drilling together for months. I would estimate they had proceeded about a hundred yards when they could see moving objects by looking over the open spaces against the sky line. Our troops opened rifle fire and the enemy, who had formed for a counter attack, retreated in disorder towards the Ourcq River. The provisional company remained in position during the night, which was a terrible one. The ground was wet and soggy and the German artillery kept up a constant fire all night long. We later made connection with the French on our left. I requested the 2nd Battalion, which was in reserve to come forward to fill in the gap.”
The Official “Rainbow” Division History says, “The capture of the Croix Rouge Farm and clearing belongs to that list of military exploits which cannot fail to excite the admiration of those who hear the tale, because of the determination and gallantry displayed.”
Father Francis P. Duffy of the 165th (New York) Regiment said, “Croix Rouge Farm was the last stand of the Germans south of the Ourcq”. In 1928 he said, “There was no more gallant and sustained attack during the entire war than the taking of Croix Rouge Farm by Dallas Smith’s battalion on July 26, ten years ago.”
Colonel Screws’ anticipation of the attack order and his planning conferences on the morning of the attack were critical to his regiment’s success under very difficult conditions. There was no communication in the field through wire, radio or pyrotechnics. His assault battalions and their companies had been briefed and made ready to jump off using only the watch when the order finally arrived from 84th Brigade and set a time. Otherwise the 167th, like its flanking infantry regiments, the Iowa regiment and the French regiment, would have failed to jump off on time. Proper anticipation, planning and strict adherence to orders by relying on the watch was memorialized in 1930 by George C. Marshall when he was a Colonel and Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. It published a monograph of lessons to be learned from World War I. Colonel Screws’ lesson was the importance of all units getting an attack off on time despite breakdowns in communication.
Some 162 officers and men from the 167th (Alabama) died at Croix Rouge Farm. The list included 3 lieutenants and 2 captains, both company commanders. Twenty lieutenants were wounded while out front and leading the multiple attacks in the open. There were deeds of great personal courage. Officers and men from Alabama died exercising leadership by example.
Colonel Screws confirmed his regiment’s use of the bayonet at the Croix Rouge Farm and of taking prisoners from the 10th Landwehr Division.
When day broke at the Croix Rouge Farm on Saturday, July 27, any further advance seemed out of the question, but a hot meal and no incoming artillery helped. Ammunition and rations were brought up to the decimated 1st and 3rd Battalions.
Private Daniel D. Vann was in the assault element of B Company, 167th (Alabama) regiment, at Croix Rouge Farm and was seriously wounded during the July 26th attack. He was machine gunned in the arm and lower torso. Family history relates that he was in a pile of the dead when someone noticed his hand move. Dan survived the war but never walked again. Several years later he eventually died as a result.
Burial parties went to work. They reported 283 Germans killed, many with bayonet wounds. Both German and American dead were buried where they fell.
Search parties brought in more wounded. Twenty two German prisoners were rounded up on the battlefield. The regiment’s head count had been sharply reduced. Survivors of the 1st and 3rd Battalions were combined, reducing the 167th from three battalions to two.
At about 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, July 27, before leaving the Croix Rouge Farm, First Lieutenant Maurice W. Howe was given command of what was left of L Company, K Company and two platoons of I Company, a total of 210 men. The battalion was made into two companies, with the second company being M Company and others under the command of Captain Ravee Norris.
The enemy was to make an obstinate defense along the ridges on the east side of the Ourcq River. Bitter fighting would very shortly take place there. The French were withdrawn from the sector. After US troops crossed the Ourcq, it was a straight-up battle between the Germans and Americans. Colonel Screws had been frustrated at the Croix Rouge Farm for not having the full support of the Rainbow in the fighting there. He was highly pleased to learn that the entire Rainbow was coming up for the fight on the other side of the Ourcq.
Captain Everette Jackson commanded the reserve 2nd Battalion and brought it up to the farmhouse on July 27. Shortly after 3:00 p.m., he ordered his command to pass through the combined 1st and 3rd Battalions and lead the advance of the regiment to the Ourcq River.
Captain Jackson’s 2nd Battalion filtered through the woods on each side of the road going northeast. By the end of the day it had crossed the Ru de la Taverne, a small branch that ran into the Ourcq, to the east of Villers-sur-Fère. The combined 1st and 3rd Battalions stopped in a wood there behind 2nd Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Bare established the regiment’s forward P.C. with them. Water and hot food were brought up. Captain Jackson and his men reached their objective on the west side of the Ourcq at about 8:30 p.m. There was no incoming artillery fire though German patrols came into the area that night and were heard talking. Despite that, for the first time in three days and nights the men had a chance to stretch out and get some sleep.
Description SThe Battle of Château-Thierry was fought on July 18, 1918 and was one of the first actions of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) under General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing. It was a battle in WSThe Battle of Château-Thierry was fought on July 18, 1918 and was one of the first actions of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) under General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing. It was a battle in World War I as part of the Second Battle of the Marne, initially prompted by a German offensive launched on 15 July against the AEF, an expeditionary force consisting of troops from both the Army and Marine Corps, and the newest troops on the front.
On the morning of 18 July 1918, the French (some of them colonial) and American forces between Fontenoy and Château-Thierry launched a counter-assault under the overall direction of Allied généralissime Ferdinand Foch against the German positions. This assault on a 40 km (25 mi) wide front was the first in over a year. The American army played a role fighting for the regions around Soissons and Château-Thierry, in collaboration with predominantly French forces. The allied forces had managed to keep their plans a secret, and their attack at 04:45 took the Germans by surprise when the troops went "Over the Top" without a preparatory artillery bombardment, but instead followed closely behind a rolling barrage which began with great synchronized precision. Eventually, the two opposing assaults (lines) inter-penetrated and individual American units exercised initiative and continued fighting despite being nominally behind enemy lines.... More
Description Champagne-Marne, 15 - 18 July 1918. In the four great offensives from 21 March to 13 June 1918 the Germans gained considerable ground, but failed to achieve a decisive advantage at any point on the frChampagne-Marne, 15 - 18 July 1918. In the four great offensives from 21 March to 13 June 1918 the Germans gained considerable ground, but failed to achieve a decisive advantage at any point on the front. Furthermore, success was bought at a price in manpower and material which they could ill afford. Their more then 600,000 casualties were irreplaceable, whereas the Allied loss of some 800,000 men was soon more than compensated for by new American units arriving at the front in ever-mounting numbers. By July 1918 Allied troops outnumbered German on the Western Front. Other factors also contributed to the decline of German morale, notably the pinch of the blockade and the effectiveness of the Allied propaganda, which was distributed widely by air at the front and in German cities behind the lines. But Ludendorff refused to consider peace negotiations, and planned two more offensives for July which he hoped would bring victory. The first of the new drives was designed to capture Rheims, to make more secure the supply of the Merge salient, and to draw in Allied reserves. The second and larger offensive, destined never to be launched, would strike once again at the British in Flanders.
When the two-pronged German assault on either side of Rheims began on 15 July the Allies were prepared for it. Plans for the attack had leaked out of Berlin, and Allied airplanes had detected the unusual activity behind the enemy front. Foch had time to draw up reserves, and Petain, the French commander, skillfully deployed his troops in defense-in-depth tactics. Consequently the German drive east of Rheims fell far short of its objective. The attack west of the city succeeded in pushing across the Marne near Chateau-Thierry, but was checked there by French and American units. Among the A.E.F. units involved in this action were the 3d, 26th, 28th, and 42d Divisions, the 369th Infantry, and supporting elements (in all about 85,000 Americans). It was here that the 38th Infantry of the 3d Division gained its motto, "Rock of the Marne."
By 17 July the Champagne-Marne offensive had petered out and the initiative passed to the Allies. The German people had built up great hopes for the success of this Friedensturm (peace offensive); its failure was a tremendous psychological blow to the whole nation.
Marne near Chateau-Thierry. Among the A.E.F. units involved were the 3d, 26th, 28th, and 42d Divisions, and the 369th Infantry(in all about 85,000 Americans). It was here that the 38th Infantry of the 3d Division gained its motto, "Rock of the Marne.... More
Description Oise-Aisne, 18 August - 11 November 1918. In mid-August the French started a series of drives on their front, which extended about 90 miles from Reims westward through Soissons to Ribecourt on the OisOise-Aisne, 18 August - 11 November 1918. In mid-August the French started a series of drives on their front, which extended about 90 miles from Reims westward through Soissons to Ribecourt on the Oise River. These operations continued into late September, when they merged into Foch's great final offensive of October-November. Five French armies (from right to left the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Third, and First) advanced abreast, in coordination with the British on the Somme to the north and the Americans to the east.
The American 32d Division was a part of the French Tenth Army, which spearheaded the penetration of the enemy's main line on 22 August. The 32d was instrumental in the capture of Juvigny on 30 August, which secured tactically important high ground for the Allies. The German front was so badly breached that the enemy was compelled to abandon the Vesle River line. On 9 September the 32d Division was ordered east to join the American First Army.
The American III Corps (28th and 77th Divisions) was a part of the French Sixth Army east of Soissons, which held in late August the western part of the Vesle River sector extending from Braine to Courlandon. As the Germans retired from the Vesle northward to the Aisne valley in early September, the III Corps took part in the aggressive pursuit operations. Its two divisions carried out successful local attacks, but failed to break into the German line before they were relieved to join the American First Army-the 28th on 7-8 September and the 77th on 14-16 September.
No American divisions participated in the subsequent Oise-Aisne operations, which by 11 November had carried the French armies to the Belgian border. A total of about 85,000 Americans took part in the Oise-Aisne Campaign.... More
Description The Siberian Intervention or Siberian Expedition of 1918–1922 was the dispatch of troops of the Entente powers to the Russian Maritime Provinces as part of a larger effort by the western powers and J The Siberian Intervention or Siberian Expedition of 1918–1922 was the dispatch of troops of the Entente powers to the Russian Maritime Provinces as part of a larger effort by the western powers and Japan to support White Russian forces against the Bolshevik Red Army during the Russian Civil War. The Imperial Japanese Army continued to occupy Siberia even after other Allied forces withdrew in 1920.
The American Expeditionary Force Siberia was commanded by Major General William S. Graves and eventually totaled 7,950 officers and enlisted men. The AEF Siberia included the U.S. Army's 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments, plus large numbers of volunteers from the 13th and 62nd Infantry Regiments along with a few from the 12th Infantry Regiment.[13] To operate the Trans-Siberian railroad, the Russian Railway Service Corps was formed of US personnel.
Although General Graves did not arrive in Siberia until September 4, 1918, the first 3,000 American troops disembarked in Vladivostok between August 15 and August 21, 1918. They were quickly assigned guard duty along segments of the railway between Vladivostok and Nikolsk-Ussuriski in the north.
Unlike his Allied counterparts, General Graves believed their mission in Siberia was to provide protection for American-supplied property and to help the Czechoslovak Legions evacuate Russia, and that it did not include fighting against the Bolsheviks. Repeatedly calling for restraint, Graves was often at odds with commanders of British, French and Japanese forces who wanted the Americans to take a more active part in the military intervention in Siberia.
United States
Letter written by U.S. Army 1LT James E. Kean highlighting his unit's mission in Russia – June 26, 1919
North Russia Expeditionary Force (also known as the Polar Bear Expedition): approximately 5,000 personnel from the US Army, including the:
310th Engineers,
339th Infantry,
337th Field Hospital,
and 337th Ambulance Company.
Also the 167th and 168th Railroad Companies, which were sent to Murmansk to operate the Murmansk to Petrograd line. US Navy: the cruiser USS Olympia during August and September 1918 (including 53 personnel attached to British naval units)... More
Description St. Mihiel, 12 - 16 September 1918. By September 1918, with both the Marne and the Amiens salients eliminated, there remained but one major threat to lateral rail communications behind the Allied lineSt. Mihiel, 12 - 16 September 1918. By September 1918, with both the Marne and the Amiens salients eliminated, there remained but one major threat to lateral rail communications behind the Allied lines-the old St. Mihiel salient near the Paris-Nancy line. Active preparations for its reduction began with the transfer of Headquarters First Army, effective 13 August, from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre in the Marne region to Neufchateau on the Meuse, immediately south of St. Mihiel. On 28 August the first echelon of headquarters moved closer to the front at Ligny-en-Barrois.
American unite from Flanders to Switzerland were shifted into the area near the salient. The fourteen American and four French divisions assigned to the First Army for the operation contained ample infantry and machinegun units for the attack. But because of the earlier priority given to shipment of infantry (at the insistence of the British and French) the First Army was short of artillery, tank, air and other support units essential to a well-balanced field army. The French made up this deficiency by loaning Pershing over half the artillery and nearly half the airplanes and tanks needed for the St. Mihiel operation.
Shortly before the offensive was to begin, Foch threatened once again to disrupt Pershing's long-held desire to carry out a major operation with an independent American force. On 30 August the Allied Commander in Chief proposed to exploit the recently gained successes on the Aisne-Marne and Amiens fronts by reducing the size of the St. Mihiel attack and dividing the American forces into three groups-one for the salient offensive and two for fronts to the east and west of the Argonne Forest. Pershing, however, remained adamant in his insistence that the First Army should not now be broken up, no matter where it might be sent into action. Fina1ly a compromise was reached. The St. Mihiel attack was subordinated to the much larger offensive to be launched on the Meuse-Argonne front in late September, but the First Army remained intact. Pershing agreed to limit his operations by employing only the minimum force needed to reduce the salient in three or four days. Simultaneously he was to prepare his troops for a major role in the Meuse-Argonne drive.
The St. Mihiel offensive began on 12 September with a threefold assault on the salient. The main attack was made against the south face by two American corps. On the right was the I Corps (from right to left the 82d, 90th, 5th, and 2d Divisions in line with the 78th in reserve) covering a front from Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle westward to Limey; on the left, the IV Corps (from right to left the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions in line with the 3d in reserve) extending along a front from Limey westward to Marvoisin. A secondary thrust was carried out against the west face along the heights of the Meuse, from Mouilly north to Haudimont, by the V Corps (from right to left the 26th Division, the French 15th Colonial Division, and the 8th Brigade, 4th Division in line with the rest of the 4th in reserve). A holding attack against the apex, to keep the enemy in the salient, was made by the French II Colonial Corps (from right to left the French 39th Colonial Division, the French 26th Division, and the French 2d Cavalry Division in line). In First Army reserve were the American 35th, 80th, and 91st Divisions.
Tota1 Allied forces involved in the offensive numbered more than 650,000-some 550,000 American and 100,000 Allied (mostly French) troops. In support of the attack the First Army had over 3,000 guns, 400 French tanks, and 1,500 airplanes. Col. William Mitchell directed the heterogeneous air force, composed of British, French, Italian, Portuguese, and American units, in what proved to be the largest single air operation of the war. American squadrons flew 609 of the airplanes, which were mostly of French or British manufacture.
Defending the salient was German "Army Detachment C," consisting of eight divisions and a brigade in the line and about two divisions in reserve. The Germans, now desperately short of manpower, had begun a step-by-step withdrawal from the salient only the day before the offensive began. The attack went so well on 12 September that Pershing ordered a speedup in the offensive. By the morning of 13 September the 1st Division, advancing from the east, joined hands with the 26th Division, moving in from the west, and before evening all objectives in the salient had been captured. At this point Pershing halted further advances so that American units could be withdrawn for the coming offensive in the Meuse-Argonne sector.
This first major operation by an American Army under its own command took 16,000 prisoners at a cost of 7,000 casualties, eliminated the threat of an attack on the rear of Allied fortifications at Nancy and Verdun, greatly improved Allied lateral rail communications, and opened the way for a possible future offensive to seize Metz and the Briey iron fields.... More
Description Meuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objectivMeuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objective of driving the enemy out of France before winter and ending the war in the spring of 1919. The basis for his optimism was the success of Allied attacks all along the front in August. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Allies already had active operations in progress between the Moselle and Meuse, the Oise and Aisne, and on the Somme and Lys Rivers. Foch acknowledged that the Germans could stave off immediate defeat by an orderly evacuation combined with destruction of materiel and communications. Therefore the overall aim of the fall offensive would be to prevent a step-by-step enemy retirement. As Foch anticipated, the Germans eventually contributed to the success of his strategy. Their High Command could not bring itself to sacrifice the huge stores collected behind the front lines, and so delayed the withdrawal of its armies.
Foch's great offensive, planned to begin in the last week of September, called for a gigantic pincers movement with the objective of capturing Aulnoye and Mézières, the two key junctions in the lateral rail system behind the German front. Lose of either of these junctions would hamper seriously the German withdrawal. Despite grumbling from the English that they lacked the necessary manpower, a chiefly British army was assigned the teak of driving toward Aulnoye. The A.E.F. was designated for the southern arm of the pincers, the thrust on Mézières. Simultaneously the Belgian-French-British army group in Flanders would drive toward Ghent, and the French armies in the Oise-Aisne region would exert pressure all along their front to lend support to the pincers attack.
Pershing decided to strike his heaviest blow in a zone about 20 miles wide between the Heights of the Meuse on the east and the western edge of the high, rough, and densely wooded Argonne Forest. This is difficult terrain, broken by a central north-south ridge that dominates the valleys of the Meuse and Aire Rivers. Three heavily fortified places-Montfaucon, Cunel, and Barricourt-as well as numerous strong points barred the way to penetration of the elaborate German defenses in depth that extended behind the entire front. This fortified system consisted of three main defense lines backed up by a fourth line less well-constructed. Pershing hoped to launch an attack with enough momentum to drive through these lines into the open area beyond, where his troops could then strike at the exposed German flanks and, in a coordinated drive with the French Fourth Army coming up on the left, could cut the Sedan- Mézières railroad.
The task of assembling troops in the concentration area between Verdun and the Argonne was complicated by the fact that many American unite were currently engaged in the St. Mihiel battle. Some 600,000 Americans had to be moved into the Argonne sector while 220,000 French moved out. Responsibility for solving this tricky logistical problem fell to Col. George C. Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), First Army. In the ten-day period after St. Mihiel the necessary troop movements were accomplished, but many untried divisions had to be placed in the vanguard of the attacking forces.
On the 20-mile Meuse-Argonne front where the main American attack w to be made, Pershing disposed three corps side by side, each with three divisions in line and one in corps reserve. In the center was the V Corps (from right to left the 79th, 37th, and 91st Divisions with the 32d in reserve), which would strike the decisive blow. On the right was the III Corps (from right to left the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions with the 3d in reserve), which would move up the west aide of the Meuse. On the left was the I Corps (from right to left the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions with the 92d in reserve), which would advance parallel to the French Fourth Army on its left. Eastward across the Meuse the American front extended in direct line some 60 miles; this sector was held by two French Corps (IV and II Colonial) and the American IV Corps in the St. Mihiel sector. Pershing had available to support his offensive nearly 4000 guns, two-thirds manned by American artillerymen; 190 light French tanks, mostly with American personnel; and some 820 aircraft, 600 of them flown by Americans.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive falls into three phases. During the initial phase (26 September-3-October) the First Army advanced through most of the southern Meuse-Argonne region, captured enemy strong points, seized the first two German defense lines, and then stalled before the third line. Failure of tank support, a difficult supply situation, and the inexperience of American troops all contributed to checking its advance.
In the second phase (4-31 October) the First Army, after the inexperienced divisions had been replaced by veteran units, slowly ground its way through the third German line. The enemy was forced to throw in reserves, drawn from other parts of the front, thus aiding the Allied advances elsewhere. In the face of a stubborn defense, American gains were limited and casualties were severe, especially as a result of the newly devised enemy tactic of attacking frontline troops with airplanes. First Army air unite retaliated with bombing raids which broke up German preparations for counterattacks. By the end of October the enemy had been cleared from the Argonne and First Army troops were through the German main positions. Two notable incidents of this phase of the campaign were the fight of the "Lost Battalion" of the 77th Division (2-7 October), and the feat of Corp. (later Sgt.) Alvin C. York, who single-handedly killed 15 Germans and captured 132 on 8 October.
In mid-October the organization of the Second Army was completed, at Toul in the St. Mihiel sector, to provide means for better control of the lengthening American front and solutions of the diverse tactical problems that it presented. Pershing assumed command of the new army group thus formed.
Before the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, and most Allied units serving with the A.E.F. were withdrawn. On 1 November First Army units began the assault of the now strengthened German fourth line of defense. Penetration was rapid and spectacular. The V Corps in the center advanced about six miles the first day, compelling the German units west of the Meuse to withdraw hurriedly. On 4 November the III Corps forced a crossing of the Meuse and advanced northeast toward Montmédy. Elements of the V Corps occupied the heights opposite Sedan on 7 November, thus finally accomplishing the First Army's chief mission-denial of the Sedan- Mézières railroad to the Germans. Marshal Foch, at this juncture, shifted the First Army left boundary eastward so that the French Fourth Army might capture Sedan, which had fallen to the Prussians in 1870. American units were closing up along the Mouse and, east of the river, were advancing toward Montmédy, Briny, and Metz, when hostilities ended on 11 November.
General Pershing authorized the results of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the greatest battle in American history up to that time, in his Final Report: "Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25 percent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machineguns, and large quantities of material." More than 1,200,000 Americans had taken part in the 47-day campaign.... More
Description Meuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objectivMeuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objective of driving the enemy out of France before winter and ending the war in the spring of 1919. The basis for his optimism was the success of Allied attacks all along the front in August. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Allies already had active operations in progress between the Moselle and Meuse, the Oise and Aisne, and on the Somme and Lys Rivers. Foch acknowledged that the Germans could stave off immediate defeat by an orderly evacuation combined with destruction of materiel and communications. Therefore the overall aim of the fall offensive would be to prevent a step-by-step enemy retirement. As Foch anticipated, the Germans eventually contributed to the success of his strategy. Their High Command could not bring itself to sacrifice the huge stores collected behind the front lines, and so delayed the withdrawal of its armies.
Foch's great offensive, planned to begin in the last week of September, called for a gigantic pincers movement with the objective of capturing Aulnoye and Mézières, the two key junctions in the lateral rail system behind the German front. Lose of either of these junctions would hamper seriously the German withdrawal. Despite grumbling from the English that they lacked the necessary manpower, a chiefly British army was assigned the teak of driving toward Aulnoye. The A.E.F. was designated for the southern arm of the pincers, the thrust on Mézières. Simultaneously the Belgian-French-British army group in Flanders would drive toward Ghent, and the French armies in the Oise-Aisne region would exert pressure all along their front to lend support to the pincers attack.
Pershing decided to strike his heaviest blow in a zone about 20 miles wide between the Heights of the Meuse on the east and the western edge of the high, rough, and densely wooded Argonne Forest. This is difficult terrain, broken by a central north-south ridge that dominates the valleys of the Meuse and Aire Rivers. Three heavily fortified places-Montfaucon, Cunel, and Barricourt-as well as numerous strong points barred the way to penetration of the elaborate German defenses in depth that extended behind the entire front. This fortified system consisted of three main defense lines backed up by a fourth line less well-constructed. Pershing hoped to launch an attack with enough momentum to drive through these lines into the open area beyond, where his troops could then strike at the exposed German flanks and, in a coordinated drive with the French Fourth Army coming up on the left, could cut the Sedan- Mézières railroad.
The task of assembling troops in the concentration area between Verdun and the Argonne was complicated by the fact that many American unite were currently engaged in the St. Mihiel battle. Some 600,000 Americans had to be moved into the Argonne sector while 220,000 French moved out. Responsibility for solving this tricky logistical problem fell to Col. George C. Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), First Army. In the ten-day period after St. Mihiel the necessary troop movements were accomplished, but many untried divisions had to be placed in the vanguard of the attacking forces.
On the 20-mile Meuse-Argonne front where the main American attack w to be made, Pershing disposed three corps side by side, each with three divisions in line and one in corps reserve. In the center was the V Corps (from right to left the 79th, 37th, and 91st Divisions with the 32d in reserve), which would strike the decisive blow. On the right was the III Corps (from right to left the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions with the 3d in reserve), which would move up the west aide of the Meuse. On the left was the I Corps (from right to left the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions with the 92d in reserve), which would advance parallel to the French Fourth Army on its left. Eastward across the Meuse the American front extended in direct line some 60 miles; this sector was held by two French Corps (IV and II Colonial) and the American IV Corps in the St. Mihiel sector. Pershing had available to support his offensive nearly 4000 guns, two-thirds manned by American artillerymen; 190 light French tanks, mostly with American personnel; and some 820 aircraft, 600 of them flown by Americans.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive falls into three phases. During the initial phase (26 September-3-October) the First Army advanced through most of the southern Meuse-Argonne region, captured enemy strong points, seized the first two German defense lines, and then stalled before the third line. Failure of tank support, a difficult supply situation, and the inexperience of American troops all contributed to checking its advance.
In the second phase (4-31 October) the First Army, after the inexperienced divisions had been replaced by veteran units, slowly ground its way through the third German line. The enemy was forced to throw in reserves, drawn from other parts of the front, thus aiding the Allied advances elsewhere. In the face of a stubborn defense, American gains were limited and casualties were severe, especially as a result of the newly devised enemy tactic of attacking frontline troops with airplanes. First Army air unite retaliated with bombing raids which broke up German preparations for counterattacks. By the end of October the enemy had been cleared from the Argonne and First Army troops were through the German main positions. Two notable incidents of this phase of the campaign were the fight of the "Lost Battalion" of the 77th Division (2-7 October), and the feat of Corp. (later Sgt.) Alvin C. York, who single-handedly killed 15 Germans and captured 132 on 8 October.
In mid-October the organization of the Second Army was completed, at Toul in the St. Mihiel sector, to provide means for better control of the lengthening American front and solutions of the diverse tactical problems that it presented. Pershing assumed command of the new army group thus formed.
Before the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, and most Allied units serving with the A.E.F. were withdrawn. On 1 November First Army units began the assault of the now strengthened German fourth line of defense. Penetration was rapid and spectacular. The V Corps in the center advanced about six miles the first day, compelling the German units west of the Meuse to withdraw hurriedly. On 4 November the III Corps forced a crossing of the Meuse and advanced northeast toward Montmédy. Elements of the V Corps occupied the heights opposite Sedan on 7 November, thus finally accomplishing the First Army's chief mission-denial of the Sedan- Mézières railroad to the Germans. Marshal Foch, at this juncture, shifted the First Army left boundary eastward so that the French Fourth Army might capture Sedan, which had fallen to the Prussians in 1870. American units were closing up along the Mouse and, east of the river, were advancing toward Montmédy, Briny, and Metz, when hostilities ended on 11 November.
General Pershing authorized the results of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the greatest battle in American history up to that time, in his Final Report: "Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25 percent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machineguns, and large quantities of material." More than 1,200,000 Americans had taken part in the 47-day campaign.... More
Description Meuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objectivMeuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objective of driving the enemy out of France before winter and ending the war in the spring of 1919. The basis for his optimism was the success of Allied attacks all along the front in August. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Allies already had active operations in progress between the Moselle and Meuse, the Oise and Aisne, and on the Somme and Lys Rivers. Foch acknowledged that the Germans could stave off immediate defeat by an orderly evacuation combined with destruction of materiel and communications. Therefore the overall aim of the fall offensive would be to prevent a step-by-step enemy retirement. As Foch anticipated, the Germans eventually contributed to the success of his strategy. Their High Command could not bring itself to sacrifice the huge stores collected behind the front lines, and so delayed the withdrawal of its armies.
Foch's great offensive, planned to begin in the last week of September, called for a gigantic pincers movement with the objective of capturing Aulnoye and Mézières, the two key junctions in the lateral rail system behind the German front. Lose of either of these junctions would hamper seriously the German withdrawal. Despite grumbling from the English that they lacked the necessary manpower, a chiefly British army was assigned the teak of driving toward Aulnoye. The A.E.F. was designated for the southern arm of the pincers, the thrust on Mézières. Simultaneously the Belgian-French-British army group in Flanders would drive toward Ghent, and the French armies in the Oise-Aisne region would exert pressure all along their front to lend support to the pincers attack.
Pershing decided to strike his heaviest blow in a zone about 20 miles wide between the Heights of the Meuse on the east and the western edge of the high, rough, and densely wooded Argonne Forest. This is difficult terrain, broken by a central north-south ridge that dominates the valleys of the Meuse and Aire Rivers. Three heavily fortified places-Montfaucon, Cunel, and Barricourt-as well as numerous strong points barred the way to penetration of the elaborate German defenses in depth that extended behind the entire front. This fortified system consisted of three main defense lines backed up by a fourth line less well-constructed. Pershing hoped to launch an attack with enough momentum to drive through these lines into the open area beyond, where his troops could then strike at the exposed German flanks and, in a coordinated drive with the French Fourth Army coming up on the left, could cut the Sedan- Mézières railroad.
The task of assembling troops in the concentration area between Verdun and the Argonne was complicated by the fact that many American unite were currently engaged in the St. Mihiel battle. Some 600,000 Americans had to be moved into the Argonne sector while 220,000 French moved out. Responsibility for solving this tricky logistical problem fell to Col. George C. Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), First Army. In the ten-day period after St. Mihiel the necessary troop movements were accomplished, but many untried divisions had to be placed in the vanguard of the attacking forces.
On the 20-mile Meuse-Argonne front where the main American attack w to be made, Pershing disposed three corps side by side, each with three divisions in line and one in corps reserve. In the center was the V Corps (from right to left the 79th, 37th, and 91st Divisions with the 32d in reserve), which would strike the decisive blow. On the right was the III Corps (from right to left the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions with the 3d in reserve), which would move up the west aide of the Meuse. On the left was the I Corps (from right to left the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions with the 92d in reserve), which would advance parallel to the French Fourth Army on its left. Eastward across the Meuse the American front extended in direct line some 60 miles; this sector was held by two French Corps (IV and II Colonial) and the American IV Corps in the St. Mihiel sector. Pershing had available to support his offensive nearly 4000 guns, two-thirds manned by American artillerymen; 190 light French tanks, mostly with American personnel; and some 820 aircraft, 600 of them flown by Americans.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive falls into three phases. During the initial phase (26 September-3-October) the First Army advanced through most of the southern Meuse-Argonne region, captured enemy strong points, seized the first two German defense lines, and then stalled before the third line. Failure of tank support, a difficult supply situation, and the inexperience of American troops all contributed to checking its advance.
In the second phase (4-31 October) the First Army, after the inexperienced divisions had been replaced by veteran units, slowly ground its way through the third German line. The enemy was forced to throw in reserves, drawn from other parts of the front, thus aiding the Allied advances elsewhere. In the face of a stubborn defense, American gains were limited and casualties were severe, especially as a result of the newly devised enemy tactic of attacking frontline troops with airplanes. First Army air unite retaliated with bombing raids which broke up German preparations for counterattacks. By the end of October the enemy had been cleared from the Argonne and First Army troops were through the German main positions. Two notable incidents of this phase of the campaign were the fight of the "Lost Battalion" of the 77th Division (2-7 October), and the feat of Corp. (later Sgt.) Alvin C. York, who single-handedly killed 15 Germans and captured 132 on 8 October.
In mid-October the organization of the Second Army was completed, at Toul in the St. Mihiel sector, to provide means for better control of the lengthening American front and solutions of the diverse tactical problems that it presented. Pershing assumed command of the new army group thus formed.
Before the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, and most Allied units serving with the A.E.F. were withdrawn. On 1 November First Army units began the assault of the now strengthened German fourth line of defense. Penetration was rapid and spectacular. The V Corps in the center advanced about six miles the first day, compelling the German units west of the Meuse to withdraw hurriedly. On 4 November the III Corps forced a crossing of the Meuse and advanced northeast toward Montmédy. Elements of the V Corps occupied the heights opposite Sedan on 7 November, thus finally accomplishing the First Army's chief mission-denial of the Sedan- Mézières railroad to the Germans. Marshal Foch, at this juncture, shifted the First Army left boundary eastward so that the French Fourth Army might capture Sedan, which had fallen to the Prussians in 1870. American units were closing up along the Mouse and, east of the river, were advancing toward Montmédy, Briny, and Metz, when hostilities ended on 11 November.
General Pershing authorized the results of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the greatest battle in American history up to that time, in his Final Report: "Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25 percent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machineguns, and large quantities of material." More than 1,200,000 Americans had taken part in the 47-day campaign.... More
Description Meuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objectivMeuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objective of driving the enemy out of France before winter and ending the war in the spring of 1919. The basis for his optimism was the success of Allied attacks all along the front in August. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Allies already had active operations in progress between the Moselle and Meuse, the Oise and Aisne, and on the Somme and Lys Rivers. Foch acknowledged that the Germans could stave off immediate defeat by an orderly evacuation combined with destruction of materiel and communications. Therefore the overall aim of the fall offensive would be to prevent a step-by-step enemy retirement. As Foch anticipated, the Germans eventually contributed to the success of his strategy. Their High Command could not bring itself to sacrifice the huge stores collected behind the front lines, and so delayed the withdrawal of its armies.
Foch's great offensive, planned to begin in the last week of September, called for a gigantic pincers movement with the objective of capturing Aulnoye and Mézières, the two key junctions in the lateral rail system behind the German front. Lose of either of these junctions would hamper seriously the German withdrawal. Despite grumbling from the English that they lacked the necessary manpower, a chiefly British army was assigned the teak of driving toward Aulnoye. The A.E.F. was designated for the southern arm of the pincers, the thrust on Mézières. Simultaneously the Belgian-French-British army group in Flanders would drive toward Ghent, and the French armies in the Oise-Aisne region would exert pressure all along their front to lend support to the pincers attack.
Pershing decided to strike his heaviest blow in a zone about 20 miles wide between the Heights of the Meuse on the east and the western edge of the high, rough, and densely wooded Argonne Forest. This is difficult terrain, broken by a central north-south ridge that dominates the valleys of the Meuse and Aire Rivers. Three heavily fortified places-Montfaucon, Cunel, and Barricourt-as well as numerous strong points barred the way to penetration of the elaborate German defenses in depth that extended behind the entire front. This fortified system consisted of three main defense lines backed up by a fourth line less well-constructed. Pershing hoped to launch an attack with enough momentum to drive through these lines into the open area beyond, where his troops could then strike at the exposed German flanks and, in a coordinated drive with the French Fourth Army coming up on the left, could cut the Sedan- Mézières railroad.
The task of assembling troops in the concentration area between Verdun and the Argonne was complicated by the fact that many American unite were currently engaged in the St. Mihiel battle. Some 600,000 Americans had to be moved into the Argonne sector while 220,000 French moved out. Responsibility for solving this tricky logistical problem fell to Col. George C. Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), First Army. In the ten-day period after St. Mihiel the necessary troop movements were accomplished, but many untried divisions had to be placed in the vanguard of the attacking forces.
On the 20-mile Meuse-Argonne front where the main American attack w to be made, Pershing disposed three corps side by side, each with three divisions in line and one in corps reserve. In the center was the V Corps (from right to left the 79th, 37th, and 91st Divisions with the 32d in reserve), which would strike the decisive blow. On the right was the III Corps (from right to left the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions with the 3d in reserve), which would move up the west aide of the Meuse. On the left was the I Corps (from right to left the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions with the 92d in reserve), which would advance parallel to the French Fourth Army on its left. Eastward across the Meuse the American front extended in direct line some 60 miles; this sector was held by two French Corps (IV and II Colonial) and the American IV Corps in the St. Mihiel sector. Pershing had available to support his offensive nearly 4000 guns, two-thirds manned by American artillerymen; 190 light French tanks, mostly with American personnel; and some 820 aircraft, 600 of them flown by Americans.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive falls into three phases. During the initial phase (26 September-3-October) the First Army advanced through most of the southern Meuse-Argonne region, captured enemy strong points, seized the first two German defense lines, and then stalled before the third line. Failure of tank support, a difficult supply situation, and the inexperience of American troops all contributed to checking its advance.
In the second phase (4-31 October) the First Army, after the inexperienced divisions had been replaced by veteran units, slowly ground its way through the third German line. The enemy was forced to throw in reserves, drawn from other parts of the front, thus aiding the Allied advances elsewhere. In the face of a stubborn defense, American gains were limited and casualties were severe, especially as a result of the newly devised enemy tactic of attacking frontline troops with airplanes. First Army air unite retaliated with bombing raids which broke up German preparations for counterattacks. By the end of October the enemy had been cleared from the Argonne and First Army troops were through the German main positions. Two notable incidents of this phase of the campaign were the fight of the "Lost Battalion" of the 77th Division (2-7 October), and the feat of Corp. (later Sgt.) Alvin C. York, who single-handedly killed 15 Germans and captured 132 on 8 October.
In mid-October the organization of the Second Army was completed, at Toul in the St. Mihiel sector, to provide means for better control of the lengthening American front and solutions of the diverse tactical problems that it presented. Pershing assumed command of the new army group thus formed.
Before the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, and most Allied units serving with the A.E.F. were withdrawn. On 1 November First Army units began the assault of the now strengthened German fourth line of defense. Penetration was rapid and spectacular. The V Corps in the center advanced about six miles the first day, compelling the German units west of the Meuse to withdraw hurriedly. On 4 November the III Corps forced a crossing of the Meuse and advanced northeast toward Montmédy. Elements of the V Corps occupied the heights opposite Sedan on 7 November, thus finally accomplishing the First Army's chief mission-denial of the Sedan- Mézières railroad to the Germans. Marshal Foch, at this juncture, shifted the First Army left boundary eastward so that the French Fourth Army might capture Sedan, which had fallen to the Prussians in 1870. American units were closing up along the Mouse and, east of the river, were advancing toward Montmédy, Briny, and Metz, when hostilities ended on 11 November.
General Pershing authorized the results of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the greatest battle in American history up to that time, in his Final Report: "Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25 percent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machineguns, and large quantities of material." More than 1,200,000 Americans had taken part in the 47-day campaign.... More
Description Meuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objectivMeuse-Argonne, 26 September - 11 November 1918. At the end of August Marshal Foch had submitted plane to the national commanders for a final offensive along the entire Western Front, with the objective of driving the enemy out of France before winter and ending the war in the spring of 1919. The basis for his optimism was the success of Allied attacks all along the front in August. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Allies already had active operations in progress between the Moselle and Meuse, the Oise and Aisne, and on the Somme and Lys Rivers. Foch acknowledged that the Germans could stave off immediate defeat by an orderly evacuation combined with destruction of materiel and communications. Therefore the overall aim of the fall offensive would be to prevent a step-by-step enemy retirement. As Foch anticipated, the Germans eventually contributed to the success of his strategy. Their High Command could not bring itself to sacrifice the huge stores collected behind the front lines, and so delayed the withdrawal of its armies.
Foch's great offensive, planned to begin in the last week of September, called for a gigantic pincers movement with the objective of capturing Aulnoye and Mézières, the two key junctions in the lateral rail system behind the German front. Lose of either of these junctions would hamper seriously the German withdrawal. Despite grumbling from the English that they lacked the necessary manpower, a chiefly British army was assigned the teak of driving toward Aulnoye. The A.E.F. was designated for the southern arm of the pincers, the thrust on Mézières. Simultaneously the Belgian-French-British army group in Flanders would drive toward Ghent, and the French armies in the Oise-Aisne region would exert pressure all along their front to lend support to the pincers attack.
Pershing decided to strike his heaviest blow in a zone about 20 miles wide between the Heights of the Meuse on the east and the western edge of the high, rough, and densely wooded Argonne Forest. This is difficult terrain, broken by a central north-south ridge that dominates the valleys of the Meuse and Aire Rivers. Three heavily fortified places-Montfaucon, Cunel, and Barricourt-as well as numerous strong points barred the way to penetration of the elaborate German defenses in depth that extended behind the entire front. This fortified system consisted of three main defense lines backed up by a fourth line less well-constructed. Pershing hoped to launch an attack with enough momentum to drive through these lines into the open area beyond, where his troops could then strike at the exposed German flanks and, in a coordinated drive with the French Fourth Army coming up on the left, could cut the Sedan- Mézières railroad.
The task of assembling troops in the concentration area between Verdun and the Argonne was complicated by the fact that many American unite were currently engaged in the St. Mihiel battle. Some 600,000 Americans had to be moved into the Argonne sector while 220,000 French moved out. Responsibility for solving this tricky logistical problem fell to Col. George C. Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), First Army. In the ten-day period after St. Mihiel the necessary troop movements were accomplished, but many untried divisions had to be placed in the vanguard of the attacking forces.
On the 20-mile Meuse-Argonne front where the main American attack w to be made, Pershing disposed three corps side by side, each with three divisions in line and one in corps reserve. In the center was the V Corps (from right to left the 79th, 37th, and 91st Divisions with the 32d in reserve), which would strike the decisive blow. On the right was the III Corps (from right to left the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions with the 3d in reserve), which would move up the west aide of the Meuse. On the left was the I Corps (from right to left the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions with the 92d in reserve), which would advance parallel to the French Fourth Army on its left. Eastward across the Meuse the American front extended in direct line some 60 miles; this sector was held by two French Corps (IV and II Colonial) and the American IV Corps in the St. Mihiel sector. Pershing had available to support his offensive nearly 4000 guns, two-thirds manned by American artillerymen; 190 light French tanks, mostly with American personnel; and some 820 aircraft, 600 of them flown by Americans.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive falls into three phases. During the initial phase (26 September-3-October) the First Army advanced through most of the southern Meuse-Argonne region, captured enemy strong points, seized the first two German defense lines, and then stalled before the third line. Failure of tank support, a difficult supply situation, and the inexperience of American troops all contributed to checking its advance.
In the second phase (4-31 October) the First Army, after the inexperienced divisions had been replaced by veteran units, slowly ground its way through the third German line. The enemy was forced to throw in reserves, drawn from other parts of the front, thus aiding the Allied advances elsewhere. In the face of a stubborn defense, American gains were limited and casualties were severe, especially as a result of the newly devised enemy tactic of attacking frontline troops with airplanes. First Army air unite retaliated with bombing raids which broke up German preparations for counterattacks. By the end of October the enemy had been cleared from the Argonne and First Army troops were through the German main positions. Two notable incidents of this phase of the campaign were the fight of the "Lost Battalion" of the 77th Division (2-7 October), and the feat of Corp. (later Sgt.) Alvin C. York, who single-handedly killed 15 Germans and captured 132 on 8 October.
In mid-October the organization of the Second Army was completed, at Toul in the St. Mihiel sector, to provide means for better control of the lengthening American front and solutions of the diverse tactical problems that it presented. Pershing assumed command of the new army group thus formed.
Before the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, and most Allied units serving with the A.E.F. were withdrawn. On 1 November First Army units began the assault of the now strengthened German fourth line of defense. Penetration was rapid and spectacular. The V Corps in the center advanced about six miles the first day, compelling the German units west of the Meuse to withdraw hurriedly. On 4 November the III Corps forced a crossing of the Meuse and advanced northeast toward Montmédy. Elements of the V Corps occupied the heights opposite Sedan on 7 November, thus finally accomplishing the First Army's chief mission-denial of the Sedan- Mézières railroad to the Germans. Marshal Foch, at this juncture, shifted the First Army left boundary eastward so that the French Fourth Army might capture Sedan, which had fallen to the Prussians in 1870. American units were closing up along the Mouse and, east of the river, were advancing toward Montmédy, Briny, and Metz, when hostilities ended on 11 November.
General Pershing authorized the results of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, the greatest battle in American history up to that time, in his Final Report: "Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25 percent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machineguns, and large quantities of material." More than 1,200,000 Americans had taken part in the 47-day campaign.... More
Description
In the second phase (4-31 October) the First Army, after the inexperienced divisions had been replaced by veteran units, slowly ground its way through the third German line.
Description Vittorio Veneto, 24 October - 4 November 1918. Late in the war, Americans participated on a limited scale in campaigns in Italy. The 332d Regiment with attached hospital troops was sent from the A.E.FVittorio Veneto, 24 October - 4 November 1918. Late in the war, Americans participated on a limited scale in campaigns in Italy. The 332d Regiment with attached hospital troops was sent from the A.E.F. to the Italian Front in July 1918 for the morale effect which it was hoped that the sight of Americana would have on the Italians. This force of about 1,200 men took part in the last great Italian offensive against the Austrians, the Battle of Vittorio Veneto.... More
Description Before the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, andBefore the third and final phase (1-11 November) of the offensive got under way, many of the exhausted divisions of the First Army were replaced, roads were built or repaired, supply was improved, and most Allied units serving with the A.E.F. were wi... More