CW4 John Beebe - Military Timeline

The provenance of the nomenclature "Fire Base Glory" was unclear, since no associated units used that nickname, and there did not appear to have been a "Fire Base Glory" in any previous deployment. The fact of the existence of this location was poorly attested, by a single Army News story. The possiblity could not be excluded that this report reflected a misunderstanding of "Firebase Gloria," the subject of the 1989 movie The Siege of Firebase Gloria starring R. Lee Ermey, Wings Hauser, and Albert Popwell. Based on the true story, this film follows the struggle of a group of Marines as they attempt to defend Firebase Gloria during the 1968 Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, even though they were greatly outnumbered.

A quick response by Iraqi firefighters on Fire Base Glory helped ensured the safety of soldiers, as well as save government equipment after an Army front-end loader struck an unseen land mine on post. Specialist Curtis Lee Cashion of 877th Engineer Battalion from Hamilton, Alabama, was driving the loader at the time of the explosion. The ball of fire engulfed the front scoop and hydraulic system, and Cashion immediately jumped out of the vehicle and moved to safety. 1st Lieutenant Jason Sayre, mayor staff officer-in-charge of Fire Base Glory, saw the explosion through his office window and immediately called the fire team into action. Within 3 minutes, the 3-man Iraqi team had sprung into action and extinguished the fire. The men, David Salim Mahmoud, Ausama Amed Ali, and Mahmoud Younis Mahiob, were recommended for the Commanding General's "Hero Program," and were commended by 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Commander Major General David H. Petraeus in a ceremony on 23 October 2003.

In early 2004, FOB Glory / Fire Base Glory was renamed Camp Marez.

On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted a detailed resolution that outlined the civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paved the way for peaceful settlement of t

On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted a detailed resolution that outlined the civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paved the way for peaceful settlement of the conflict and the safe return home of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced persons. The resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allowed the security forces to carry weapons to protect themselves and use force in carrying out the resolution's directives. The resolution "authorizes member states and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo" as set out in the military agreement between NATO and the FRY. That peacekeeping operation was meant to enforce the cease-fire, demilitarize the KLA and other Kosovo Albanian groups, and establish a secure environment for the return of the refugees.

The force had a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. The NATO countries were united that in the absence of the NATO Joint Guardian force at the core of any international security presence in Kosovo, the refugees would not return and the other NATO objectives would not be met. A NATO force at the core of an international security presence was regarded as the magnet to attract the refugees back. In the absence of a NATO force with American participation, it was the view of the US Government that it was unrealistic to think the Kosovar Albanians would disarm the KLA, something of great interest to Russia. The US believed that if NATO forces deployed, the rationale for the Kosovar Liberation Army having an armed force to protect itself against Serbs would disappear. The Rambouillet envisaged something like 2,500 Serb military and 2,500 police for a year, though with the commencement of Operation Allied Force NATO required all of those forces going, in views of the probability that the Kosovar Albanians would not come home to a situation where those same forces remain at their posts. NATO envisaged the standing up of thousands of Kosovar Albanian police, including possibly people from the KLA, who would be trained by the international community and could serve police functions.

NATO did not contemplate a partition of Kosovo. It had been unofficially suggested that one possible solution was a de facto partition of Kosovo whereby the Russians would patrol the north, the mineral-rich areas, and NATO would patrol the south.

Before Allied Force began operating, NATO had plans to put in a peacekeeping force of 28,000 people. Of that, 4,000 people would have been Americans. By mid-May 1999 NATO had reassessed its Op Plan for the Joint Guardian mission to see to what degree they would need reinforcement beyond the level that was originally foreseen for the KFOR [Kosovo force] international security presence in Kosovo. NATO had 16,000 troops deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia trained for their mission as well as dealing with the enormous refugee inflow. Certain reinforcements from the UK and from Germany were arrived as of mid-May.

The NATO pre-deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was conducted to be in a position to move very quickly into Kosovo to set up an initial military command structure and an initial infrastructure to get the basic functions going. The goal was not only for other NATO troops to come in quickly but also for the transition authority and for the humanitarian relief organizations, which in the very early stages would need a great deal of military back-up, to establish themselves by the time the NATO core element was on the ground in Kosovo.

On 20 December 1996, NATO transitioned its operation in support of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina from implementation to stabilization. As a result, Operation Joint Endeavor ended

On 20 December 1996, NATO transitioned its operation in support of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina from implementation to stabilization. As a result, Operation Joint Endeavor ended and Operation Joint Guard began. NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) was similarly replaced by a Stabilization Force (SFOR). The US Task Force Eagle, comprised at that time of 20,000 soldiers led by elements of the 1st Infantry Division, continued to be the US component of the NATO mission. On 20 June 1998, the decision was made to scale down the size of SFOR and NATO transitioned from Operation Joint Guard to Operation Joint Forge.

On 20 December 1996, NATO transitioned its operation in support of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina from implementation to stabilization. As a result, Operation Joint Endeavor ended

On 20 December 1996, NATO transitioned its operation in support of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina from implementation to stabilization. As a result, Operation Joint Endeavor ended and Operation Joint Guard began. NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) was similarly replaced by a Stabilization Force (SFOR). The US Task Force Eagle, comprised at that time of 20,000 soldiers led by elements of the 1st Infantry Division, continued to be the US component of the NATO mission. On 20 June 1998, the decision was made to scale down the size of SFOR and NATO transitioned from Operation Joint Guard to Operation Joint Forge.

On 4 May 1993 the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were c

On 4 May 1993 the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were compounded by an expanded and intrusive mandate; greatly diminished military capabilities; more aggressive Somali opposition; uncertain support from the United States; differences within the coalition; and uncertainty by the Security Council, the Secretariat, and others.

Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.

UNOSOM II became a badly flawed peace, with military forces which came to be seen by parties to the local conflict as co-belligerents rather than impartial peacekeepers. In Somalia, peace enforcement was only an implicit element of the original U.N. mandate, which focused on peace-building (disarmament, political reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation). However, after a confrontation between the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the U.N. led to the killing of twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers, the Security Council made the operation's peace-enforcement mission explicit. It was executed by both U.N. forces and a 1,000-man U.S. rapid-reaction force under U.S. operational control, with the authority of the United Nations. There was also a 3,000-man U.S. logistics unit under U.N. operational control. A lack of decisiveness, cohesion, and command and control by the undermanned U.N. mission (half the strength of UNITAF, with some 20,000 personnel) and a series of armed clashes between U.S./U.N. forces and the SNA created a virtual state of war and undermined the effectiveness of the U.N. operation. Confusion over the dual-command relationship between the U.S. and UNOSOM II was another complicating factor, with a U.S. general officer serving as both the U.N. deputy forces commander and commander of U.S. forces.

A clash on 3-4 October 1993 left eighteen U.S. personnel dead and seventy-eight wounded, along with over one thousand Somali casualties. Public outcry in the United States contributed to the decision to withdraw U.S. forces in March 1994. That, coupled with continued internal strife and SNA hostility toward the U.N., led to a total U.N. withdrawal in March 1995. This was executed skillfully, without casualties, in a carefully planned combined U.S.-U.N. action.

The killing of Army Rangers in Somalia provoked a resurgence of a debate that began before the Gulf War: when is it appropriate to use military force -- and, more to the point, can you justify using the military in regions in which Americans either do not see their interests at stake or are willing to help only so long as the costs remain very low? Somalia drove home the reality that the Gulf War experience could not serve as a model for other situations where the diplomatic lineup was more confused, the stakes less clear, and the difference between good guys and bad guys less simple to discern. It was also an early indication of the coming debate on the international community's role in internal strife.