The Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in performance of outstanding services for at least six continuous months during a period of military operat
... Moreions against an armed enemy on or after January 1, 1944. Hide
Description
Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2007-2008
29 Oct 07 to 10 Dec 08
DA GO 2013-29
The Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in performance of outstanding services for at least six continuous months during a period of military operat
... Moreions against an armed enemy on or after January 1, 1944. Hide
Description
Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2010-2011 16 Feb 10 to 16 Feb 11
DA GO 2013-66
The Superior Unit Award may be awarded during peacetime for outstanding meritorious performance of a difficult and challenging mission carried out under extraordinary circumstances. The unit must disp
... Morelay such outstanding devotion and superior performance of exceptionally difficult tasks as to set it apart from and above other units with similar missions. The award is not given for operations of a purely humanitarian nature. Hide
The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of Sout
... Moreh Vietnam. The actions cited are for the same services that would have resulted in the award of a Valorous Unit Citation by the Army or a Navy Unit Citation. Hide
This campaign was from 30 March 1972 to 28 January 1973. On 30 March 1972 the North Vietnamese Army launched its greatest offensive of the entire war. The enemy deployed the greatest array of troops
... Moreand modern weapons to date in a major effort to end the war with conventional forces and seized considerable territory in an effort to exercise control of key provinces throughout Vietnam.
During this critical period the Vietnamization program continued in the face of the North Vietnamese invasion and the successful counterattack by the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Army aviation units played an impressive role throughout the period, flying reconnaissance, close support missions, and transporting troops. As U.S. combat troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, the role of helicopter units increased in importance and they responded to the challenge of continuing to support while preparing the RVNAF to assume their function. Similarly, advisors of all services contributed immeasurably to the defeat of the enemy invasion and the continued Vietnamization process. Army and Marine advisors fought side-by-side with their RVNAF counterparts to stop and defeat the enemy invasion, as the Vietnamese counteroffensive gained momentum and the reduction of field advisers continued. The advisory effort shifted to emphasize training and to assure that the VNAF attained self-sufficiency prior to the complete withdrawal of the U.S forces.
Recapture of Quang Tri City on 16 September 1972 marked the complete failure of the enemy to hold any of the targeted provincial capitols. Massive aid replaced materiel lost during the spring counteroffensive. Retraining and reconstruction of selected RVNAF units increased their capabilities. The completion of the massive logistical buildup of RVNAF was accomplished, which enabled the RVNAF to become more self-sufficient as direct U.S. participation diminished. The US ground role in Vietnam was totally replaced by the RVNAF. During December 1972 and January 1973 the RVIVAF flew more than 45% of air sorties within Vietnam. In November 1972, the RVNAF began a C-130 training program and by January 1973 realized a significant increase in their capability. RVNAF forward air controllers began directing USAF and RVNAF strike aircraft in January 1973. The US policy of Vietnamization continued.
US combat and combat support operations were conducted in support of RVNAF ground operations during the North Vietnamese invasion and the counteroffensive including intensive interdiction of enemy supply routes into Vietnam. Since US ground forces had been reduced to seven battalions, the US ground combat role was limited to defense of key installations. Further reduction in troop ceilings led to the redeployment of all US ground combat battalions, leaving an Army contingent of combat support and service support units. Hide
This campaign was from 1 December 1971 to 29 March 1972.. The U.S. continued to reduce its ground presence in South Vietnam during late 1971 and early 1972, but American air attacks increased while bo
... Moreth sides exchanged peace proposals.
In early January 1972 President Nixon confirmed that U.S. troop withdrawals would continue but promised that a force of 25,000-30,000 would remain in Vietnam until all American prisoners of war were released. Secretary of Defense Laird reported that Vietnamization was progressing well and that U.S. troops would not be reintroduced into Vietnam even in a military emergency. U.S. troop strength in Vietnam dropped to 136,500 by 31 January 1972, to 119,600 by 29 February, and then to 95,500 by the end of March.
During the last week of December 1971 U.S. Air Force and Navy planes carried out 1,000 strikes on North Vietnam, the heaviest U.S. air attacks since November 1968. Allied commanders insisted that it was necessary because of a huge buildup of military supplies in North Vietnam for possible offensive operations against South Vietnam and Cambodia. Stepped up North Vietnamese anti-aircraft and missile attacks on U.S. aircraft that bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos also contributed to the decision. During January 1972 American planes maintained their intermittent bombardment of missile sites in North Vietnam and on he Laotian border and also struck North Vietnamese troop concentrations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.
On 25 January President Nixon announced an eight part program to end the war which included agreement to remove all U.S. and foreign allied troops from Vietnam no later than six months after a peace agreement was reached. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong delegates rejected the proposal and insisted upon complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina and cessation of all forms of U.S. aid to South Vietnam. Hide
This campaign was from 1 Jul 1970 to 30 June 1971. Fighting continued in Cambodia during early February before and after South Vietnam began its U.S.-aided drive in Laos, Lam Son 719, the most signifi
... Morecant operation during this campaign.
Lam Son 719 was conducted out of I Corps by Vietnamese troops with US fire and air support. Their object was to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to destroy enemy bases at Techepone, Laos. The operation consisted of four phases. In Phases I, called Operation DEWEY CANYON II, the 1st Brigade, US 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) occupied the Khe Sanh area and cleared Route No. 9 up to the Laotian border. In the meantime, the US 101st Airborne Division conducted diversionary operations in the A Shau Valley. The US 45th Engineer Group had the mission of repairing Route No. 9 up to the Laotian border. This lasted from 30 January to 7 February 1971. During Phase II US forces continued to provide fire support, helilift, and tactical and strategic air support for ARVN units. This phase was 8 February to March 1971. Phase III ran from March to 16 March 1971; Phase IV was the withdrawal phase.
Faced with mounting losses, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, the commander of the invasion forces, decided to cut short the operation and ordered a withdrawal.
Lam Son 719, though it was less than a signal success, forestalled a Communist offensive in the spring of 1971. Enemy units and replacements enroute south were diverted to the scene of the action. Hide
This campaign was from 1 July to 30 November 1971. This period witnessed additional progress in the Vietnamization program which included turning over the ground war to South Vietnam, sustaining the
... Morewithdrawal of U.S. troops, but also continuing, U.S. air strikes on enemy targets.
South Vietnam assumed full control of defense for the area immediately below the demilitarized zone on 11 July, a process begun in 1969. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced completion of Phase I of Vietnamization on 11 August which meant that the U.S. relinquished all ground combat responsibilities to the Republic of Vietnam. The participation of U.S. forces in ground combat operations had not ceased, however, U.S. maneuver battalions were still conducting missions, and the 101st Airborne Division joined the 1st Army of Vietnam 1st Infantry Division in Operation JEFFERSON GLEN that took place in Thua Thien Province in October. This was the last major combat operation in Vietnam which involved U.S. ground forces. Following the close of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN on 8 October, the 101st began stand-down procedures and was the last U.S. division to leave Vietnam.
U.S. troop strengths decreased during Consolidation I. American battle deaths for July 1971 were 66, the lowest monthly figure since May 1967. By early November, U.S. troop totals dropped to 191,000, the lowest level since December 1965. In early November, President Nixon announced that American troops had reverted to a defensive role in Vietnam. Hide
The Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in performance of outstanding services for at least six continuous months during a period of military operat
... Moreions against an armed enemy on or after January 1, 1944. Hide
Description
Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968
1 Jan-31 Dec 68,
DAGO 39, 70
This campaign was from 1 November 1969 to 30 April 1970. An increase in enemy-initiated attacks, at the highest level since 4-5 September signaled the start of the first phase of the Communist winter
... Morecampaign. This was highlighted by intensified harassment incidents, and attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In November-December these were heaviest in Corps Tactical Zones III and IV (around Saigon), primarily directed against Vietnamese military installations in order to disrupt the pacification program. The most significant enemy activity occurred in November with heavy attacks upon By Prang and Duc Lap in CTZ II (Central Vietnam).
By February 1970 the focus of enemy activity began to shift to CTZ I and II. Attacks increased steadily, reaching a peak in April 1970. Hostile forces staged their heaviest attacks in the Central Highlands near Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps at Dak Seang, Dak Pek, and Ben Het in I CTZ. The enemy also conducted numerous attacks by fire and several sapper attacks against U.S. fire support bases. This high level of enemy activity began in I CTZ in April and continued through May.
During the period 1 November 1969 through 30 April 1970 U.S. and allied forces concentrated on aggressive operations to find and destroy enemy main and local forces, the penetration of base camps and installations and the seizure of enemy supplies and materiel. These operations sought to deny the enemy the initiative and to inflict heavy losses in men and materiel. Further progress was made in Vietnamization through improving the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. As a result of these advances three brigades of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and several major U.S.M.C. units were withdrawn from Vietnam during this period.
The enemy made several efforts to take the offensive at Dak Seang, which was attacked on 1 April 1970 and remained under siege throughout the month, and at Quang Duc in the By Prong-Duc Lap area which ended on 28 December. Only Vietnamese forces were engaged in both of these operations, the Quang Duc campaign involving some 12,000 ARVN troops. South Vietnamese forces again took the offensive on 14 April in a bold 3-day operation in the Angel's Wing area along the Cambodian border. The Vietnamese Army completed this mission in an aggressive professional manner without U.S. support-further evidence of their growing proficiency. Hide
This campaign was from 1 May to 30 June 1970. This campaign was mainly concerned with the Allied incursion into Cambodia, codenamed Operation ROCK CRUSHER. As American withdrawal from South Vietnam pr
... Moreoceeded, increasing concern arose over the enemy's strength in the sanctuaries inside Cambodia. With the emergence in Cambodia of an antiCommunist government under Lon Nol, President Nixon relaxed the restrictions on moving against the bases inside Cambodia. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong began to move on the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. At this juncture Lon Nol appealed to the United States for help. American and allied Vietnamese forces began large-scale offensives in Cambodia on 1 May. Eight major US Army and South Vietnamese operations took place in Cambodia in May and June with the object of cutting enemy communication lines, seizing the sanctuary areas and capturing the shadowy Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) described as the control center for enemy military operations against III CTZ. Hide
This campaign was from 2 November 1968 to 22 February 1969. In November 1968 the South Vietnam government with American support began a concentrated effort to expand security in the countryside. This
... Moreproject was known as the "Accelerated Pacification Campaign."
This period covers the election of President Richard M. Nixon and a change of policy brought about by his administration after January 1969 when he announced a coming end to US combat in Southeast Asia and a simultaneous strengthening of South Vietnam's ability to defend itself. Formal truce negotiations began in Paris on January 25, 1969. The period can be characterized as marking time in preparation for an about face. Forty-seven ground combat operations were recorded during this period, the following being the most important:
(1). Operation NAPOLEON in the Dong Ha area initiated previously (1967) by Marine units, terminated on 9 December 1968.
(2). Operation WHEELER WALLOWA by 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) in north-central Quan Tin Province. This ended on 11 November.
(3). Operation MACARTHUR initiated by 4th U.S. Infantry Division in II Corps tactical zone terminated on 31 January 1969.
(4). Operation COCHISE GREEN conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province.
(5). Operation TOAN THANG II consisted of ground operations throughout III CTZ. This was a multi-division operation involving allied forces.
(6). Operation SEA LORDS was a coast and riverine operation. On 6 December Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT was started to disrupt enemy infiltration of materials from the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia. Air operations continued to be important with over 60,000 sorties flown. Hide
This campaign was from 23 February to 8 June 1969. From Tet 1969 through the month of June, the enemy again tried to sustain an offensive. His inability to do so can be largely attributed to aggressi
... Moreve allied ground operations. Between 23 February and 8 June 1969, a total of 70 significant named ground operations were terminated resulting in heavy enemy loss of life and materiel. The main operations concluded during this period were:
(1). The 3d Marine Division's Operation KENTUCKY aimed at preventing enemy infiltration through the Demilitarized Zone in central Quang Tri Province. Throughout the early part of January 1969, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces continued to avoid major contacts with Free World Forces. Their continual movement to avoid friendly forces or to search for food and supplies contributed to a decrease in the enemy-initiated ground attacks and attacks-by-fire in Quang Tri Province.
(2). Operation NEVADA EAGLE, initiated on 17 May 1968 in Thua Thien Province, continued in 1969 as the U.S. 101st Airborne Division continued to defeat enemy personnel, and capture rice caches, material, and installations within its large area of operations, where it undertook offensive sweeps along Route 547 and around Song Bo.
(3). Two battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment were engaged in Operation SCOTLAND II. Initiated on 15 April 1968, this multi-battalion search and clear operation was centered in and around Khe Sanh.
(4). The IV Corps Tactical Zone Dry Weather Campaign began on 1 December 1968 in support of the overall mission to prevent Viet Cong units from interfering with pacification efforts. This operation, "Speedy Express," interdicted lines of enemy communication and denied him the use of base areas. In 1969 the 1st Brigade, 9th U.S. Infantry Division continued the operation in Dinh Tuong Province, using its highly successful night ambush tactics while the 2d Brigade continued its mission with the Mobile Riverine Force. Although engagements in Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS were typically small, the 9th Infantry Division fought several sizeable engagements with impressive results.
On 23 February U.S. Navy units and installations at Da Nang, Tan An, Ben Luc, Go Dan Ha, and Tra Cu came under numerous and widespread attacks associated with a new enemy offensive, but since many units in these areas were poised to meet these attacks they caused only minimal damage. April saw the heaviest cumulative enemy activity in the barrier interdiction camapign to date. Hide
This campaign was from 9 June to 31 October 1969. During the summer and fall of 1969, conduct of operations was increasingly turned over to Vietnamese, US troops withdrew in greater numbers amid reaff
... Moreirmations of support for the Republic of South Vietnam government. President Nixon announced the reduction of the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam which would be demonstrated initially by the withdrawal of 25,000 troops by 31 August 1969.
American troop strength had peaked at 543,400 in April 1969 but dropped to 505,500 by mid October. More scattered than before, enemy attacks were concentrated on South Vietnamese positions. U.S. combat deaths were down in the early fall as American units switched to small unit actions. The trend was not constant, however, because U.S. troops deaths which had fallen well below l00 a week in the fall, rose above 100 later in the year. Hide
The Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in performance of outstanding services for at least six continuous months during a period of military operat
... Moreions against an armed enemy on or after January 1, 1944. Hide
Description
Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967
1 Jan-31 Dec 67
DAGO 54, 68
This campaign was from 1 June 1967 to 29 January 1968.The conflict in South Vietnam remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions,
... More the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam swung back toward Saigon to conduct another clearing operation, MANHATTAN. This took peace in the Long Nguyen base area just north of the previously cleared "Iron Triangle."
South Vietnamese Armed Forces became more active and capable under U.S. advisors. During the year the Vietnamese Special Forces assumed responsibility for several Special Forces camps and for the CIDG companies manning them. In each case all of the U.S. advisors withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese in full command.
With an increased delegation of responsibility to them, the South Vietnamese conducted major operations during 1967, and, in spite of VC attempts to avoid battle, achieved a number of contacts.
Despite the success of U.S. and South Vietnamese Army operations, there were indications in the fall of 1967 of another enemy build-up, particularly in areas close to Laos and Cambodia. In late October, the VC struck again at the Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh. Fortunately Vietnamese reinforcements saved the camp. At the same time, approximately 12,000 VC troops converged on a Special Forces camp at Dak To. This camp was located in northern Kontum Province, where the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. In response to this potential threat, the U.S. and South Vietnam committed a total of sixteen battalions to the region to counter a disturbing enemy resurgence at Kontum and Loc Ninh. Hide
This campaign was from 30 January to 1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale
... More attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.
The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.
At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.
Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.
Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.
The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts. Hide
This campaign was from 2 April to 30 June 1968. During this period friendly forces conducted a number of battalion-size attritional operations against the enemy.
Operations PEGASUS-Lam
... MoreSon 207 relieved the Khe Sanh Combat Base on 5 April and thereby opened Route 9 for the first time since August 1967. This operation not only severely restricted the North Vietnamese Army's use of western Quang Tri Province but also inflicted casualties on the remnants of two North Vietnamese divisions withdrawing from the area. This success was followed by a singular allied spoiling operation in the A Shau Valley, Operation DELAWARE-Lam Son. These two operations prevented the enemy from further attacking I Corps Tactical Zone population centers and forced him to shift his pressure to the III Corps Tactical Zone.
During the period 5-12 May 1968 the Viet Cong launched an offensive with Saigon as the primary objective. Friendly forces defended the city with great determination. Consequently Saigon was never in danger of being overrun. Small Viet Cong units that did manage to get into the outskirts were fragmented and driven out with great loss of enemy life. By the end of June 1968 friendly forces had decisively blunted the enemy's attacks, inflicted very heavy casualties, and hindered his ability to attack urban areas throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The enemy was forced to withdraw to his sanctuaries.
The strength of the U.S. Army in Vietnam reach a peak of nearly 360,000 men during this period. Hide
This campaign was from 1 July to 1 November 1968. During this period a country-wide effort was begun to restore government control of territory lost to the enemy since the Tet offensive. The enemy att
... Moreempted another such offensive on 17-18 August but his efforts were comparatively feeble and were quickly overwhelmed by Allied forces.
In the fall of 1968 the South Vietnamese government, with major U.S. support, launched an accelerated pacification campaign. All friendly forces were coordinated and brought to bear on the enemy in every tactical area of operation. In these intensified operations, friendly units first secured a target area, then Vietnamese government units, regional forces/popular forces, police and civil authorities screened the inhabitants, seeking members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. This technique was so successful against the political apparatus that it became the basis for subsequent friendly operations. Government influence expanded into areas of the countryside previously dominated by the Viet Cong to such an extent that two years later at least some measure of government control was evident in all but a few remote regions. Hide
This campaign was from 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of political
... More, economic, sociological, and military factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that American military objectives should be to cause North Vietnam to cease its control and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos, to assist South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and to assist South Vietnam in pacification extending governmental control over its territory.
North Vietnam continued to build its own forces inside South Vietnam. At first this was done by continued infiltration by sea and along the Ho Chi Minh trail and then, in early 1966, through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). U.S. air elements received permission to conduct reconnaissance bombing raids, and tactical air strikes into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, but ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces fought a war of attrition against the enemy, relying for a time on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war.
During 1966 there were eighteen major operations, the most successful of these being Operation WHITE WING (MASHER). During this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division, Korean units, and ARVN forces cleared the northern half of Binh Dinh Province on the central coast. In the process they decimated a division, later designated the North Vietnamese 3d Division. The U.S. 3d Marine Division was moved into the area of the two northern provinces and in concert with South Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units, conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.
The largest sweep of 1966 took place northwest of Saigon in Operation ATTLEBORO, involving 22,000 American and South Vietnamese troops pitted against the VC 9th Division and a NVA regiment. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos.
By 31 December 1966, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 385,300. Enemy forces also increased substantially, so that for the same period, total enemy strength was in excess of 282,000 in addition to an estimated 80,000 political cadres. By 30 June 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800, but enemy strength had increased as well.
On 8 January U.S. and South Vietnamese troops launched separate drives against two major VC strongholds in South Vietnam-in the so-called "Iron Triangle" about 25 miles northwest of Saigon. For years this area had been under development as a VC logistics base and headquarters to control enemy activity in and around Saigon. The Allies captured huge caches of rice and other foodstuffs, destroyed a mammoth system of tunnels, and seized documents of considerable intelligence value.
In February, the same U.S. forces that had cleared the "Iron Triangle", were committed with other units in the largest allied operation of the war to date, JUNCTION CITY. Over 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions engaged the enemy, killing 2,728. After clearing this area, the Allies constructed three airfields; erected a bridge and fortified two camps in which CIDG garrisons remained as the other allied forces withdrew.
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This campaign was from 25 December 1965 to 30 June 1966. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of pol
... Moreitical, economic, sociological, and military factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that American military objectives should be to cause North Vietnam to cease its control and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos, to assist South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and to assist South Vietnam in pacification extending governmental control over its territory.
North Vietnam continued to build its own forces inside South Vietnam. At first this was done by continued infiltration by sea and along the Ho Chi Minh trail and then, in early 1966, through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). U.S. air elements received permission to conduct reconnaissance bombing raids, and tactical air strikes into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, but ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces fought a war of attrition against the enemy, relying for a time on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war.
During 1966 there were eighteen major operations, the most successful of these being Operation WHITE WING (MASHER). During this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division, Korean units, and ARVN forces cleared the northern half of Binh Dinh Province on the central coast. In the process they decimated a division, later designated the North Vietnamese 3d Division. The U.S. 3d Marine Division was moved into the area of the two northern provinces and in concert with South Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units, conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.
The largest sweep of 1966 took place northwest of Saigon in Operation ATTLEBORO, involving 22,000 American and South Vietnamese troops pitted against the VC 9th Division and a NVA regiment. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos.
By 31 December 1966, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 385,300. Enemy forces also increased substantially, so that for the same period, total enemy strength was in excess of 282,000 in addition to an estimated 80,000 political cadres. By 30 June 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800, but enemy strength had increased as well.
On 8 January U.S. and South Vietnamese troops launched separate drives against two major VC strongholds in South Vietnam-in the so-called "Iron Triangle" about 25 miles northwest of Saigon. For years this area had been under development as a VC logistics base and headquarters to control enemy activity in and around Saigon. The Allies captured huge caches of rice and other foodstuffs, destroyed a mammoth system of tunnels, and seized documents of considerable intelligence value.
In February, the same U.S. forces that had cleared the "Iron Triangle", were committed with other units in the largest allied operation of the war to date, JUNCTION CITY. Over 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions engaged the enemy, killing 2,728. After clearing this area, the Allies constructed three airfields; erected a bridge and fortified two camps in which CIDG garrisons remained as the other allied forces withdrew. Hide
Third Korean Winter, 1 December 1952 - 30 April 1953. Meanwhile the armistice talks had stalled. Discord over several issues, but principally the exchange of prisoners of war, had prevente
... Mored any agreement in the latter part of 1951. This disagreement was heightened in January 1952. The U.N. delegates proposed to give captives a choice of repatriation, so that those who did not wish to return to Communist control could be repatriated elsewhere. The enemy delegates protested vigorously, insisting that all captives held by the Eighth Army be returned to their side. When the enemy failed to respond to U.N. efforts to settle the question, the U.N. delegation on 7 October called an indefinite recess in the armistice negotiations. Both military operations and armistice talks remained stalemated and, as the year 1952 ended, peace prospects seemed as remote as at its beginning.
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Korea, Summer 1953, 1 May - 27 July 1953. There was little activity anywhere along the front as 1953 began. Then, as spring approached, the enemy renewed his attacks against the Eighth Arm
... Morey 's outpost line. By July these attacks had increased in frequency and intensity until they were nearly as heavy as those of May 1951.
In January 1953 Van Fleet had twelve South Korean and eight U.N. divisions to defend the army front. Total strength of combat, service, and security troops was nearly 768,000. Opposing the U.N. forces were seven Chinese armies and two North Korean corps, totaling about 270, 000 troops. Another 531,000 Chinese and North Korean troops remained in reserve. With service and security forces, total enemy strength in Korea was estimated at more than a million men.
Other than a few patrol clashes, little fighting occurred during January and February 1953. On 11 February Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor took command of the Eighth Army as Van Fleet returned to the United States for retirement. The enemy increased his attacks during March, striking at outposts of the 2d and 7th Divisions and the 1st Marine Regiment. During the period 9-10 March the Chinese were successful in ambushing several U.N. patrols, inflicting heavy casualties in each instance. After these flare-ups the front quieted down until late May, when the enemy struck at the outposts of the U.S. 25th Division that were guarding the approaches to the Eighth Army's western positions. Although the enemy was successful in occupying three of the division outposts, he suffered nearly 3,200 casualties.
On the night of 10 June three Chinese divisions struck the ROK II Corps in the vicinity of Kumsong, attacking down both sides of the Pukhan River. Several attacks forced these units to withdraw about two miles. Both sides lost heavily; the Chinese suffered about 6,000 casualties and the ROK units about 7,400. By 18 June the attacks had subsided. By the end of the month, action along the entire front had returned to routine patrolling and light attacks.
Operation LITTLE SWITCH, an exchange of Allied and Communist sick and wounded prisoners, began on 20 April. When it was completed in the latter part of the month, 684 Allied prisoners had been exchanged for more than 6,000 Communists.
Armistice negotiations were resumed in April. The prisoner-of-war question was settled by providing each side an opportunity to persuade those captives who refused repatriation to their homeland to change their minds. By 18 June the terms of the armistice were all but complete; but on this date President Syngman Rhee ordered the release of 27,000 anti-Communist North Korean prisoners of war unilaterally, in protest against armistice terms which left Korea divided. U.N. officials disclaimed any responsibility for this action; but the enemy delegates denounced it as a serious breach of faith and delayed the final armistice agreement for another month. Enemy forces took advantage of this delay. On 13 July the Chinese launched a three-division attack against the left flank of the ROK II Corps and a one-division attack against the right flank of the U.S. IX Corps, forcing U.N. forces to withdraw about eight miles to positions below the Kumsong River. By 20 July, however, U.N. forces had counterattacked, retaken the high ground along the Kumsong River, and established a new main line of resistance. No attempt was made to restore the original line, as it was believed that the armistice would be signed at any time. Enemy casualties in July totaled about 72,000 men. Out of the five Chinese armies that had been identified in the attacks, the enemy had lost the equivalent of seven divisions.
By 19 July the negotiators at Panmunjom had reached an accord on all points. Details were worked out within a week and the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at 1000 hours 27 July 1953.
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The Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to units for exceptionally meritorious conduct in performance of outstanding services for at least six continuous months during a period of military operat
... Moreions against an armed enemy on or after January 1, 1944. Hide
Description
Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950-1951
26 Oct-31 Dec 51
DA AO 62-52
As 1951 drew to a close, a lull had settled over the battlefield. Fighting tapered off to a routine of patrol clashes, raids, and bitter small-unit struggles for key outpost positions. The lull result
... Moreed from Ridgway's decision to halt offensive operations in Korea, because the cost of major assaults on the enemy's defenses would be more than the results could justify. Furthermore, the possibility of an armistice agreement emerging from the recently reopened talks ruled out the mounting of any large-scale offensive by either side. On 21 November Ridgway ordered the Eighth Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of its front. Attacks were limited to those necessary to strengthen the main line of resistance and to establish an adequate outpost line.
In the third week of December the U.S. 45th Division, the first National Guard division to fight in Korea, replaced the 1st Cavalry Division in the I Corps sector north of Seoul. The 1st Cavalry Division returned to Japan.
In the air, U.N. bombers and fighter-bombers continued the interdiction campaign (Operation STRANGLE, which the Far East Air Forces had begun on 15 August 1951) against railroad tracks, bridges, and highway traffic. At sea, naval units of nine nations tightened their blockade around the coastline of North Korea. Carrier-based planes blasted railroads, bridges, and boxcars, and destroyers bombarded enemy gun emplacements and supply depots. On the ground, the 155-mile front remained generally quiet in the opening days of 1952. Later in January the Eighth Army opened a month-long artillery-air campaign against enemy positions, which forced the enemy to dig in deeply. During March and April Van Fleet shifted his units along the front to give the ROK Army a greater share in defending the battle line and to concentrate American fire power in the vulnerable western sector. Hide
In May the enemy became bolder, increasing his probing attacks and patrols, intensifying his artillery fire, and aggressively interrupting U.N. patrols. In May 1952 an estimated total of 102,000 artil
... Morelery and mortar rounds fell in Eighth Army positions.
As a result of increased Chinese ground action in the 45th Division sector, the division planned an operation to establish eleven patrol bases across its front. Operation COUNTER began on 6 June. By the 7th, ten of the eleven objectives had been taken. The last one (Hi11 191, eight miles west of Ch'orwon) was captured after a 48-hour battle on 14 June. The Chinese immediately launched counterattacks along the entire division front, climaxing their efforts on the night of 28-29 June with an unsuccessful 4-hour attack. The division sustained over 1,000 casualties during the month of June; Chinese losses were estimated at more than 5,000.
Throughout the first half of 1952, the U.N. forces waged a. war of containment. The frontline soldier, meanwhile, hoped that the armistice negotiators would soon reach an agreement.
As the Korean War went into its third year, in June 1952, the deadlock continued. July began with a series of small-scale attacks by both sides. Torrential rains restricted activity in the last week of July and through most of August. For some time the enemy had gradually increased the volume of mortar and artillery fire in support of his attacks, and in September fired a total of 45,000 rounds against the Eighth Army's front.
During the summer of 1952 the air war over Korea intensified. In addition to striking at supply centers, troop concentrations, power plants, factories, and rail and road networks, U.N. aircraft rendered valuable assistance to frontline troops by bombing, or searing with napalm, enemy bunkers, trenches, gun positions, and communications lines. On 29 August the largest U.N. air raid of the Korean War was carried out on P'yongyang, the North Korean capital. During the month of September alone the U.S. Fifth Air Force shot down 64 MIG-15's at a cost of seven Sabrejets.
A series of enemy attacks in October 1952 produced some of the heaviest fighting in more than a year. Most of it centered around two key heights, Hills 281 and 395, northwest of Ch'orwon. The attacks were opened on 6 October with the largest volume of mortar and artillery fire received by the Eighth Army during the war. By 15 October the disputed ground was held firmly by U.N. forces, and the enemy withdrew. Over 2,000 Chinese dead were counted on these two hills after the 10-day battle. Hide
On 1 November Chinese elements were identified south of the Changjin Reservoir, and within ten days twelve divisions of the Chinese Communist Forces were identified. In the northwest, strong enemy att
... Moreacks against the Eighth Army smashed the ROK divisions. Very hard fighting took place near Ch'osan, Unsan, and Tokch'on. While the 24th Division pulled back to Chongju on the west coast, the 1st Cavalry and 2d Divisions fought along the Ch'ongch'on River. In the air over Korea, U.N. pilots were opposed for the first time by speedy Russian MIG-15 Jet fighters.
By 10 November, as the Chinese attacks were abating, the Eighth Army and the X Corps conducted only small-scale operations, and a comparative lull hung over much of the front. By 21 November elements of the U.S. 7th Division occupied Hyesanjin on the Yalu River in northeastern Korea, the most northerly point to be reached by U.S. forces during the war. The ROK Capital Division meanwhile progressed rapidly up the east coast to the Naman-So-dong area. By 24 November the U.N. positions extended from So-dong in the northeast to Hyesanjin on the Yalu, and thence in a southwesterly direction through the areas around Sang-ni, Handae, Yudam-ni, Yongwen, Ipsok, Patch'on and south of Chongju to the Yellow Sea.
Previous to the entry of Chinese forces in North Korea, MacArthur had ordered the Eighth Army and the X Corps on 24 October to attack toward the Manchurian border and restore peace in Korea before the onset of winter. The difficulty of securing adequate logistical support delayed the attack. In the latter part of the month, brief clashes with Chinese troops posed a new threat. The purpose and extent of the Chinese intervention was not yet clear; but in the face of this new opposition, Walker had withdrawn his extended forces back to the lower bank of the Ch'onch'on River, leaving only a small bridgehead above Sinanju.
The fact of Chinese participation in the conflict caused MacArthur to reconsider his plans for an all-out attack to the Yalu River, but not to abandon them. Walker's forces were to move northward through western and central Korea, while Almond's troops were to attack to the northwest to cut the enemy line of communications and give maximum assistance to the Eighth Army. On 24 November the Eighth Army, with the ROK II Corps, launched its planned offensive. For the first twenty-four hours little enemy opposition was encountered, but on the next day enemy troops initiated a violent counterattack against the Eighth Army in the mountainous territory surrounding the central North Korean town of Tokch'on. The X Corps began its attack early on 27 November, and had made slight advances before evening, when a second enemy force, moving down both sides of the Changjin Reservoir, struck at the 1st Marine Division and elements of the U.S. 7th Division.
It was quickly apparent that the bulk of the enemy forces were organized Chinese Communist units. It was now evident to the UN Commend that the Chinese had amassed two large armies in northern Korea, by marching them from Manchuria under cover of darkness and expertly camouflaging them during the day. They were comparatively safe from detection by UN air observers in the rugged mountain terrain, and UN aircraft were prohibited from making reconnaissance flights across the frontier. Thus the strength of the attacking Chinese forces came as a surprise to most of the U.N. Command.
The main enemy effort was directed against the ROK II Corps, which collapsed under the weight of the Chinese assault. As the Communists strove to extend their breakthrough of the U.N. line, Walker rushed his reserve units (the 1st Cavalry Division, the Turkish Brigade, and the British 27th Commonwealth and 29th Independent Infantry Brigades) to the area, but failed to stem the Communist advance. Assaulted by wave after wave of enemy troops, the Eighth Army front withdrew south across the Ch'ongch'on River. These forces, fighting hand to hand with the enemy along the river banks and retreating over reads choked with troops, refugees, trucks, and tanks, suffered heavy losses. The U.S. 2d Division wee assigned to fight a delaying action until other units could retire and regroup in defensive positions near P'yongyang. On 5 December the Eighth Army fell back from P'yongyang to positions about 25 miles south of the city. By the middle of December it had withdrawn below the 38th parallel and formed a defensive perimeter north and east of Seoul.
On 27 November 1950 the Chinese began their offensive against the X Corps, attacking the Marine and 7th Division elements in the Changjin Reservoir area with six divisions. Since the most northerly UN units-the ROK I Corps, the U.S. 17th Infantry Regiment, and other elements at the Yalu-might be cut off by the weight of the Chinese offensive, the X Corps was forced to withdraw these elements. Troops at the reservoir were also ordered to fall back. MacArthur then ordered Almond to concentrate the X Corps in the Hamhung-Hungnam area; and early in December directed the Corps to withdraw to South Korea by a waterborne evacuation.
Most of the Corps reached the port of Hungnam without serious incident. However, some 14,000 men of the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions were trapped in the Hagaru-Kot'o area and were forced to fight their way to the coast along a narrow escape route. As the main column progressed along the road, a provisional battalion of marines and soldiers, aided by close and efficient air support, cleared the Chinese Communist forces from the high ground which dominated the road. Almond sent Task Force Dog, a reinforced battalion of the 3d Division, forward to Chinhung to relieve the Marine battalion there and to assist the withdrawal by providing support and rear guard action. Air Force, Navy, and Marine cargo planes parachuted daily airdrops of ammunition, food, and medicines to the column, and evacuated battle casualties. Fighter elements bombed and strafed the enemy-held mountainsides and Communist troop concentrations. On 9 December 1950 the two forces met in the mountains a few miles south of Kot'o and both moved toward Hamhung to be evacuated.
The water movement of the X Corps from North Korea required 173 vessels. About 350,000 measurement tons of cargo, including 17,500 vehicles, were salvaged; some 105,000 troops and more than 98,000 civilians were evacuated from Hungnam, Songjin, and Wonsan. Evacuation began on 11 December and was completed on 24 December, despite constant enemy fire and observation.
The Hungnam evacuation left North Korea once again controlled by Communist forces. Before the enemy renewed his attacks, General Walker was killed in an auto accident north of Seoul (23 December 1950). On 26 December Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway succeeded him in command of the Eighth Army in Korea.
On 30 December MacArthur warned the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese Communist forces could drive the U.N. forces out of Korea if they so desired. The United States, although anxious to avoid a full-scale war in Korea, was also determined to resist the Chinese-North Korean aggressors. Therefore the Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur to defend his positions; to retire, if forced to, through a series of defensive positions as far back as the former Pusan Perimeter Line; to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy; and to maintain his units intact. If necessary to avoid severe losses, he was authorized to withdraw to Japan.
Within this framework of operations, MacArthur invested General Ridgway with complete authority to plan and execute operations in Korea, and ceased the close supervision which he had formerly exercised over the Eighth Army and the X Corps. The latter, which had heretofore been a separate command, was assigned to the Eighth Army, thus placing all U.N. ground forces under that army's control. By this time fifteen nations of the U.N. had troops in Korea-the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Belgium, and Sweden. As 1951 began, U.N. ground forces numbered about 495,000, of which 270,000 were ROK troops. The U.N. Command estimated that the enemy had about 486,000 men, 21 Chinese and 12 North Korean divisions, committed to the Korean front, and more than a million enemy troops stationed in reserve near the Yalu.
In late December, Ridgway, in establishing the defensive line along the 38th parallel, concentrated the bulk of the Eighth Army in the central and western sectors because of the obvious enemy concentration above Seoul. The west flank was held by the I Corps; the central sector by the IX Corps; and the ROK I, II, and III Corps held the eastern mountainous sector. The X Corps was reorganizing near Pusan. The 1st Marine Division, until recently a part of the X Corps, was held in Eighth Army reserve.
At daybreak on 1 January 1951, after a night of mortar and artillery bombardment, the enemy launched an attack all along the U.N. line. The main effort was directed against the U.S. I and IX Corps in the west and central sectors. A force of seven Chinese armies and two North Korean corps pushed deeply into the U.N. line toward Seoul in the west and Wonju in the center.
As the offensive gained momentum, Ridgway ordered the U.N. forces to fall back to a line which ran along the south bank of the frozen Han River to Yangp'yang, through Hongch'on and Chunmunjin to the Sea of Japan. A delaying force remained around Seoul to deny the enemy use of the Han River bridges. When the attacking forces, following up their initial success, crossed the Han to the east and west of Seoul, it became clear that the Seoul bridgehead could not be held any longer. Ridgway, following a policy of rolling with the punch rather then risking destruction by defending in place, decided to withdraw south to a line in the vicinity of the 37th parallel on 3 January. This line ran from P'yongt'aek, east through Ansong, northeast to Wonju, and in an irregular trace to the east coast town of Samch'ok. When Seoul fell on 4 January, the port of Inch'on was also evacuated.
After the fall of Seoul, Chinese attacks tapered off in the west. Many enemy units were shifted eastward so as to be in position to attack southwestward behind the U.S. I and IX Corps, and capture Wonju and the railroad and highway between Hongch'on and Pusan, the main U.N. north-south supply route. Wonju was abandoned by U.N. forces on 7 January. By 10 January large numbers of the enemy had phased through the gap and into the defensive zone of the ROK III Corps. To meet this threat Ridgway ordered the 1st Marine Division to prevent the enemy penetration from north of the Andong-Yongdok road on the east, and to protect the supply routes of the ROK units.
In the western sector, which was comparatively quiet, Ridgway planned Operation WOLFHOUND, a reconnaissance in force in the I Corps sector, to reestablish contact and secure more exact information about the enemy. On 15 January the task force-the 27th Infantry Regiment, reinforced-advanced northward along the Seoul highway toward Osan. On the 16th it reached Suwon with practically no opposition. Satisfied by the reconnaissance, the U.N. Command ordered the task force to withdraw south.
By the third week in January the situation in the central and eastern sectors had eased, and pressure on our troops was gradually decreasing. However, although quiet prevailed on the front, air reconnaissance revealed that the enemy was accumulating reserves of supplies and bringing up thousands of replacements. Hide
A reconnaissance in force by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division on 22 January revealed that the enemy had withdrawn from frontline positions. The task force returned after having met little resistan
... Morece. Ridgway then scheduled a larger reconnaissance in force, Operation THUNDERBOLT, with each Corps using one U.S. division and one ROK regiment. The operation began on 25 January and advanced slowly and cautiously against light resistance during the rest of the month. U.N. air support destroyed points of resistance and the enemy's lines of communication were subjected to damaging attacks, which kept a large part of his supplies from reaching the front. By 30 January his resistance stiffened and it continued to be vigorous until 9 February. Then it abruptly gave way. By 10 February U.N. forces secured Inch'on and Kimpo airfield, and the U.S. I Corps closed up to the south bank of the Han River.
On the central front, U.N. armored patrols reached the deserted city of Wonju and elements of the X Corps captured Hoengsong on 2 February against light resistance. On 5 February the X Corps began Operation ROUNDUP, a plan calling for ROK units of the Corps to disrupt the regrouping of North Korean forces south of the town of Hongch'on. On the second day of the attack the ROK units met stiffening resistance, and pressure on the X Corps increased steadily as signs pointed to a large enemy buildup on its front. On the night of 11-12 February, Chinese Communist forces struck the ROK divisions north of Hoengsong and made immediate penetrations which forced the ROK troops to fall back rapidly. U.N. troops withdrew south toward Wonju and abandoned Hoengsong on 13 February. On this same day enemy forces struck at Chip'yong-ni, a road junction and key point of the central zone. The U.S. 23d Infantry Regiment and the French Battalion, forming a defensive perimeter around the town, held off a force of three Chinese Communist divisions for three days before enemy pressure melted away. Meanwhile elements of the U.S. 7th Division and ROK units formed a defensive line north of Chech'on, to check a strong enemy force attacking northeast of Wonju.
In the west the U.S. I and IX Corps were gradually taking all ground in the zones up to the Han River, except for a sizeable enemy foothold south of the Han in an area between Seoul and Yangp'yong. On the night of 13-14 February the enemy launched a powerful counterattack from this area toward Suwon, but his effort was quickly contained with heavy losses to his troops. Meanwhile areas far to the south were being harassed by guerrilla and remnants of North Korean troops. U.N. counteractions succeeded in reducing these forces to about 18,000 by the end of February.
On 18 February combat patrols confirmed a report of the IX Corps that enemy forces along the entire central front were withdrawing. Thereupon Ridgway ordered the IX Corps to move forward, which it did against light scattered resistance. By 19 February the initiative all along the front had passed into U.N. hands.
Ridgway was determined to give the North Koreans and Chinese Communists neither rest nor opportunity to reorganize. On 21 February he launched a general advance (Operation KIILER) by the U.S. IX and X Corps to deny important positions to the enemy and to destroy as many enemy troops as could be found. The objective was a line running eastward from Yangp'yong to the Han River east of Seoul, thence to points north of Chip'yong-ni and Hwangsong-ni, and thence eastward so as to secure the east-west portion of the Wonju-Kangnung road between Wonju and Pangnimni.
Advances in both Corps zones were slow and unspectacular. The spring thaw and heavy rains caused swollen streams and deep mud which greatly hampered military operations. By 28 February the U.N. forces advanced to their assigned objectives, and the Communist foothold south of the Han collapsed. By 1 March the entire Eighth Army line was relatively stable.
Although the Eighth Army had attained its geographical objectives by 1 March, a large part of the enemy had succeeded in withdrawing during the bad weather which had disrupted Allied road and rail movement. With approval by MacArthur, Ridgway planned to continue the attack northward in the central and eastern sectors with Operation RIPPER, to seize Hongch'on and Ch'unch'on and a line designated IDAHO just south of the 38th parallel.
RIPPER began on 7 March 1951. After overcoming initial resistance, the IX Corps reached the first phase line on 11 March and began the attack to the second phase line on the 14th. U.N. patrols moved into the deserted city of Seoul on the night of 14-15 March, marking the fourth time that the capital had changed hands. In the X Corps zone, terrain rather than hostile forces proved to be the greatest obstacle; but despite the enemy and natural obstacles Operation RIPPER ground forward. In the east, ROK units were ordered to destroy the remnants of a North Korean division which had infiltrated southward in January. By 17 March, with this threat eliminated, the ROK forces had moved to Line IDAHO. UN forces entered Ch'unch'on, an enemy supply and communications center, on 19 March.
On 23 March the 187th Airborne RCT dropped at Munsan-ni, about 20 miles northwest of Seoul, to trap enemy troops fleeing northward; but because of the rapid enemy withdrawal it failed to achieve its purpose.
By the last of March Ridgway's forces had fought their way generally to the 38th parallel in position along line IDAHO. Again the U.N. Command was faced with the problem of crossing the parallel into North Korea.
Ridgway, with the approval of President Truman and MacArthur, elected to continue the advance, with the hope of achieving maximum destruction of enemy forces. U.N. commanders made their plans to advance with the knowledge that the enemy was engaged in a full-scale buildup of troops and materiel for his expected spring offensive.
On 5 April Ridgway opened Operation RUGGED, a general advance toward a new objective line called KANSAS. This line, running along the commanding ground north of the 38th parallel, was 115 miles long, including 14 miles of tidal water on the left flank and the 10-mile water barrier of the Hwach'on Dam in the center. By 9 April, the U.S. I and IX Corps and the ROK I Corps on the east coast had reached Line KANSAS, and the U.S. X and ROK III Corps in the central and central-east sectors were drawing up to it. The I and IX Corps continued to advance, attacking Ch'orwon, with the intention of seizing a line designated UTAH, an outward bulge of KANSAS, so as to be in a position to strike at the ''Iron Triangle."
On 11 April President Truman relieved General MacArthur of all his commands because of differences over national policy and military strategy, and replaced him with General Ridgway. Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army on 14 April, replacing Ridgway.
Meanwhile U.N. forces continued to edge forward. The Hwach'on Dam was taken on 16 April. On the east coast South Korean forces captured Taep'o-ri. Other ROK troops north of Seoul sent patrols across the Imjin River and far to the northeast. By 17 April U.N. units could not make contact with the enemy, and thereafter the general advance toward Line UTAH was virtually unopposed. Even as it continued, however, evidences of enemy preparations for a counterattack were apparent to the Eighth Army Command. By 19 April all U.S. I and IX Corps units were in positions Along Line UTAH, preparing for an advance to a new Line WYOMING. Hide
On 22 April enemy activity across the whole front suddenly increased and the U.N. advance halted abruptly. The expected spring offensive was at hand.
Following a four-
... Morehour artillery bombardment, three Chinese Communist armies attacked the U.N. line in the evening hours of 22 April. The main attack was against the U.S. I and IX Corps in the Seoul sector, coupled with a secondary thrust in the central Yonch'on-Hwach'on area and a p w h in the seat near Inje. U.N. lines held firm except in the IX Corps central sector, where ROK units were forced back in confusion. With the line broken, Van Fleet ordered the I and IX Corps to withdraw through a series of delaying positions to Line KANSAS, thus giving up the ground gained in recent U.N. offensives. When the enemy cut the Seoul-Kaesong highway on 26 April, Van Fleet withdrew the IX Corps back to the Hongch'on River.
Meanwhile, in the I Corps area, the enemy crossed the Imjin River on 22 April and drove the ROK unite south of the KANSAS Line on the 23d. On 27 April the enemy outflanked Uijongbu, forcing U.N. units to pulls back to within four miles of Seoul, and also made an unsuccessful attempt to outflank the city to the east. On the east-central front North Koreans captured Inje. By 29 April, however, their drive had been halted. On this date Van Fleet established a new line, designated NONAME-LINE, extending from north of Seoul to Sabangue and thence northeast across the 38th parallel to Taepo-ri on the east coast. Because the major enemy attack had been in the west, Van Fleet reshuffled his units to put more American divisions there. By the end of April, U.N. forces had stopped the enemy short of Seoul and the Han and held a strong, continuous defense line.
As the enemy withdrew to recoup losses, Van Fleet improved his defenses on NO-NAME-LINE and planned an offensive to carry the Eighth Army back to Line KANSAS; but signs of another impending enemy attack led him to postpone it.
On the night of 15-16 May an estimated 21 Chinese divisions, flanked by 3 North Korean divisions in the west and 6 in the east, struck in the central sector against the U.S. X and the ROK III Corps in the Naep'yong-ni-No-dong area. ROK units were again forced back by the swarming columns of Chinese and North Koreans. Once more Van Fleet reshuffled his units, moved in reserves, and laid down a tremendous curtain of artillery fire which exacted heavy casualties and stopped the enemy offensive.
On 17 May the enemy struck down the Pukhan River toward the Han in the western sector, against the I and IX Corps, with a force of about 250,000 men. This attack was also contained after three days of violent action. By 20 May U.N. troops brought the enemy to a standstill, having thus stopped two major offensives in two months.
Van Fleet decided to renew the offensive, so as to give the enemy no chance to gather himself for another counterstrike. On 18 May he opened a series of local attacks. Once more enemy forces pulled back and U.N. forces moved forward against light resistance. Within a few days the I Corps reached the Imjin River north of Munsan-ni and entered Uijongbu and Sinp'al-li. The IX Corps pushed toward Kap'yong, drove the enemy across the Hanch'on River, and moved toward the Hwach'on Reservoir. In the X Corps area the 1st Marine Division attacked Yanggu on 24 May. The 187th RCT headed for Inje, which it captured on the 27th. The Marines were pushing toward the Hwach' on Reservoir and Yanggu. The 7th Division of the I Corps took Hwach'on. By 31 May the U.N. forces scored a significant advance which brought them just about back to the KANSAS Line, and South Korea was virtually cleared of the enemy.
At this point the Joint Chiefs of Staff prescribed that the Eighth Army was not to go beyond the general vicinity of Line KANSAS. The only tactical operations permitted were those necessary to protect itself, to maintain contact, and to harass the enemy. This was the basic pattern of U.N. military operations which was to be followed throughout the remainder of the war.
On 1 June, therefore, Van Fleet ordered his reserve forces to strengthen KANSAS so as to make it virtually impregnable. Meanwhile the I and IX Corps were to continue Operation PILEDRIVER toward Line WYOMING (the bulge north of KANSAS that ran from the Imjin River to points just south of Ch'orwon and Kumhwa and thence southeast). Ch'orwon and Kumhwa were captured on 11 June. Two tank-infantry task fences reached P'yongyang, the northern tip of the Iron Triangle, on 13 June and found it deserted. The dominating high ground north of the city was held by the enemy, however, and U.N. forces withdrew. The Chinese reoccupied P'yongyang on 17 June. Meanwhile the X Corps on the east-central front pushed through mountains toward its sector of the KANSAS Line, which extended over a series of ridges from the Hwach'on Reservoir northeastward to the lower lip of the "Punchbowl," an aptly named circular depression north of Inje. Thus by mid-June the Eighth Army had attained the principal terrain objectives of Operation PILEDRIVER. Action for the rest of the month was confined to developing the KANSAS and WYOMING Lines, and to patrolling and local clashes.
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On 23 June 1951 Jacob Malik, Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., made a statement in a recorded broadcast in New York implying Chinese and North Korean willingness to discuss armistic
... Moree terms to end the Korean War. When Communist China indicated that it also desired peace, President Truman authorized General Ridgway to arrange for an armistice conference with the North Korean commander. Both aides agreed to begin negotiations at Kaesong on 10 July 1951. The chief delegate for the U.N. at the conference was Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. The enemy delegation was led by Lt. Gen. Nam Il.
It was agreed at the first meeting that military operations would continue until an armistice agreement was signed. However, neither aide was willing to start any large-scale offensive while peace talks were in progress. U.N. military action in this period was limited to combat patrolling, artillery and air bombardment, and the repulsing of enemy attacks.
In August of 1951 the strength of all U.N. ground forces under Eighth Army command totaled 549,224. This included 248,320 U.S. ground troops, Army and Marines, 268,320 in the ROK Army, and 32,874 in the ground units of the seventeen other United Nations.
Truce negotiations were broken off by the Communists on 22 August. Van Fleet then launched a series of limited-objective attacks to improve the Eighth Army's defensive positions. The U.S. X and ROK I Corps in east-central Korea fought for terrain objectives five to seven miles above Line KANSAS, among them Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges, to drive enemy forces from positions that favored an attack on Line KANSAS. By the last week in October these objectives had been secured.
Along the western portion of the front, action in September was characterized by local attacks, counterattacks, and combat patrols. By 12 October five divisions of the I Corps had advanced the front three to four miles to a new Line JAMESTOWN to protect the Ch'orwon-Seoul railroad. The IX Corps followed with aggressive patrolling toward Kumsong. On 21 October it seized the commanding heights just south of the city.
On 25 October armistice negotiations were resumed at the new site of Panmunjom.
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MacArthur planned an amphibious landing at Inch' on, a port of the Yellow Sea 25 miles west of Seoul, to be followed by an advance to recapture the city and block North Korean troop movements and supp
... Morely routes there. Concurrently the Eighth Army was to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and move northward, driving the North Koreans into the Inch'on landing forces which would be driving south. Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, commander of the newly activated X Corps, was to be in command of the invasion troops.
Early on 15 September a Marine battalion of the let Marine Division (which had loaded in Japan for the Inch'on Landing), covered by strong air strikes and naval gunfire, quickly captured Wolmi Island, just offshore from Inch'on. By afternoon, Marine assault waves rode the high tide into the port itself (UN Offensive-16 September to 2 November 1950). The remainder of the 1st Marine Division disembarked and pressed toward Kimpo Airfield, the Han River, and Seoul. The 7th Infantry Division came ashore; some elements turned southeastward toward Suwon, south of Seoul, while the remainder of the division joined the Marines in the advance toward Seoul. Kimpo Airfield was captured by the 18th, and put in use by the cargo-carrying planes of the Far East Air Forces to augment the stream of supplies being landed by the Navy at Inch'on. The 187th RCT was flown into Kimpo Airfield to strengthen U.N. defenses in that area. After heavy fighting between advancing U.N. forces and the determined North Korean forces, which had resolved to fight for Seoul street by street, MacArthur announced on 26 September that the city was again in friendly hands; but fighting continued there for several days. On 29 September MacArthur returned Seoul to President Rhee in a ceremony held in the blackened capitol building.
The Eighth Army began its offensive northward on 16 September. The ROK I and II Corps were in position on the north side of the perimeter. The U.S. I Corps, composed to the 1st Cavalry Division, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, the 24th Division, and the 1st ROK Division, was on the Taegu front. The remainder of the Eighth Army, positioned along the Naktong, included the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions and attached ROK units. Progress was limited at first, but as the portent of the converging attacks became clear to the North Koreans, they fled north with heavy losses in men and materiel. Elements of the 7th Division (X Corps) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Eighth Army) made contact late on 26 September just south of Suwon, thus effecting a juncture of U.N. forces. Organized enemy resistance continued in the Eighth Army sector until the last days of September. Although large numbers of enemy troops escaped through the eastern mountains, more than 100,000 prisoners were captured during this period; by 30 September the North Korean Army had ceased to exist as an organized force below the 38th parallel. However, remnants of the army, fighting as guerrillas, continued to pose a considerable threat to the security of the U.N. forces.
During the latter part of September the Eighth Army was reinforced by a battalion each of Philippine and Australian troops. Early in October the U.S. 3d Division arrived in the Far East.
Meanwhile Walker's ROK I Corps crossed the 38th parallel on 1 October 1950 and advanced up the east coast, capturing Wonsan, North Korea's major seaport, on 10 October. The R0K II Corps also crossed the parallel and advanced northward through central Korea. In the west, Walker's remaining forces relieved the X Corps in the Seoul area and crossed the parallel on 9 October toward P'yongyang. By mid-October the U.N. forces had penetrated about 20 miles into North Korean territory.
In the second half of October 1950 the advance quickened as enemy resistance weakened and thousands of enemy troops surrendered. U.N. objectives were the destruction of the remaining Communist divisions and the capture of important North Korean cities. ROK troops spread through central and east Korea. Some turned north toward the industrial area centering around Hamhung and Hungnam, others west along the Wonsan-P'yongyang road. In the west the 1st Cavalry Division, after fighting through pill box defenses at Kumch'on, a few miles north of the parallel, progressed up the Seoul-P'yongyang railroad. The 24th Division drove to the south bank of the Taedong River in the vicinity of Chinnamp'o, the port for P'yongyang. The 1st Cavalry and 1st ROK Divisions entered P'yongyang on 19 October and secured the city in the next forty-eight hours. On 20 October the 187th Airborne RCT, complete with vehicles and howitzers, dropped on Sukch'on and Sunch'on, about 30 miles above the city of P'yongyang, to trap North Koreans fleeing northward. In northwest Korea a ROK regiment, leading the advance of the Eighth Army, entered the town of Ch'osan on 26 October, thereby becoming the first U.N. element to reach the Yalu River. Farther south additional U.N. forces crossed the Ch'ongch'on River at Sinanju and pushed toward the Manchurian border. For all practical purposes the North Korean Army had dissolved by the last week in October, and had melted away in the mountains adjacent to Manchuria and the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile Almond's X Corps had been withdrawn from combat and prepared for amphibious landings on the east coast of Korea. Since the rapid advance of ROK ground units and the fall of Wonsan made a combat landing there unnecessary, the 1st Marine Division carried out an administrative landing at Wonsan on 26 October, despite the heavily mined harbor which caused a long delay in unloading. On 29 October the 7th Division landed unopposed at Iwon, 80 miles farther north.
General Almond, adding the ROK I Corps to his command, set out to capture the industrial and communications areas, the port installations, and the power and irrigation plants of northeastern Korea. The ROK I Corps moved up the coastline toward Ch'ongjin, 120 miles north of Iwon. The 1st Marine Division moved 50 miles north of Hamhung and its port of Hungnam, then turned inland toward the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, 45 miles to the northwest. Elements of the 7th Division attacked northwestward toward the Pujon Reservoir and the Yalu River. Hide
