On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted a detailed resolution that outlined the civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paved the way for peaceful settlement of t

On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted a detailed resolution that outlined the civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paved the way for peaceful settlement of the conflict and the safe return home of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced persons. The resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allowed the security forces to carry weapons to protect themselves and use force in carrying out the resolution's directives. The resolution "authorizes member states and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo" as set out in the military agreement between NATO and the FRY. That peacekeeping operation was meant to enforce the cease-fire, demilitarize the KLA and other Kosovo Albanian groups, and establish a secure environment for the return of the refugees.

The force had a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. The NATO countries were united that in the absence of the NATO Joint Guardian force at the core of any international security presence in Kosovo, the refugees would not return and the other NATO objectives would not be met. A NATO force at the core of an international security presence was regarded as the magnet to attract the refugees back. In the absence of a NATO force with American participation, it was the view of the US Government that it was unrealistic to think the Kosovar Albanians would disarm the KLA, something of great interest to Russia. The US believed that if NATO forces deployed, the rationale for the Kosovar Liberation Army having an armed force to protect itself against Serbs would disappear. The Rambouillet envisaged something like 2,500 Serb military and 2,500 police for a year, though with the commencement of Operation Allied Force NATO required all of those forces going, in views of the probability that the Kosovar Albanians would not come home to a situation where those same forces remain at their posts. NATO envisaged the standing up of thousands of Kosovar Albanian police, including possibly people from the KLA, who would be trained by the international community and could serve police functions.

NATO did not contemplate a partition of Kosovo. It had been unofficially suggested that one possible solution was a de facto partition of Kosovo whereby the Russians would patrol the north, the mineral-rich areas, and NATO would patrol the south.

Before Allied Force began operating, NATO had plans to put in a peacekeeping force of 28,000 people. Of that, 4,000 people would have been Americans. By mid-May 1999 NATO had reassessed its Op Plan for the Joint Guardian mission to see to what degree they would need reinforcement beyond the level that was originally foreseen for the KFOR [Kosovo force] international security presence in Kosovo. NATO had 16,000 troops deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia trained for their mission as well as dealing with the enormous refugee inflow. Certain reinforcements from the UK and from Germany were arrived as of mid-May.

The NATO pre-deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was conducted to be in a position to move very quickly into Kosovo to set up an initial military command structure and an initial infrastructure to get the basic functions going. The goal was not only for other NATO troops to come in quickly but also for the transition authority and for the humanitarian relief organizations, which in the very early stages would need a great deal of military back-up, to establish themselves by the time the NATO core element was on the ground in Kosovo.

On 1 June 1997, the Headquarters, 16th Air Expeditionary Wing was designated and activated at Aviano Air Base, Italy. The 16th Air Expeditionary Wing provided direction, control, support, administrative control, and uniform code of military justice authority for more than 1,300 United States Air Force personnel stationed throughout Europe in support of Operation Joint Guard and then Operation Joint Forge. These units, located in Istres, France; Rimini and San Vito, Italy; Tuzla and Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Zagreb, Croatia; Taszar, Hungary, and Rhein Main, Germany comprised the lion's share of the USAF contingent of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR). Since its inception, 16th Air Expeditionary Wing worked a number of high-profile initiatives in support of the SFOR mission. These included the relocation of KC-135 operations from Pisa, Italy to Istres, France; the installation of air navigation aid equipment at Tuzla, Air Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina to support Russian and SFOR partner air operations; quality-of life-improvements for U-2 crews and support personnel at Istres France, and the holiday visit of President Bill Clinton to the Operation Joint Forge area of responsibility.

Under a plan approved in 2001 by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, the US Army programmed selected active and reserve forces for service in Bosnia and Kosovo through May 2005. This was a prudent measure taken to provide predictability for soldiers and units to ensure they were given adequate time to train for the Balkans mission. The rotation plan would also provide better linkages between the active and reserve forces, mitigate the effects of high operational tempo, and better sustain the Army's overall levels of readiness for contingency operations. Under the plan, units from the active Army and reserve component would support the SFOR mission in Bosnia or the Kosovo Force (KFOR) for 6-month periods. All units for the planned SFOR rotations 9 through 16 would be drawn from active Army divisions, Army National Guard divisions, the Army Reserve, and a mix of active/reserve units. The Army set a historical precedent when it designated the 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard, as the headquarters for active and reserve forces conducting the SFOR mission between March and October 2000.

On 2 December 2003, SFOR confirmed that due to the improved security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that it would reduce to a deterrent force of approximately 7,000 multinational soldiers by June 2004. SFOR considered how to adjust the operation further, including its possible termination by the end of 2004 and a transition possibly to a new NATO military liaison and advisory mission (with NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo) and to a new European Union mission. In response, Multinational Brigade (North) also transformed its future force structure to meet the requirements of the new deterrent force. Planning for that force structure was conducted by the existing MNB(N) headquarters to help them prepare to execute the deterrent force mission when the 34th Infantry Division transferred authority to the 38th Infantry Division in April 2004.

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed that in light of the improved security situation in the country SFOR could be concluded at the end of that year. A ceremony in Sarajevo on 2 December 2004 marked the conclusion of the NATO-led SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the beginning of the European Union's follow-on mission EUFOR. The NATO-led SFOR was brought to a successful conclusion almost exactly 9 years since NATO deployed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in what was the Alliance's first peacekeeping operation. The end to Operation Joint Forge in 2004 also meant that the US Army's planned SFOR-16 rotation would not occur, making the SFOR-15 rotation, led by the 38th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (Indiana Army National Guard), the last deployment in support of SFOR.

The European Union subsequently deployed its own mission, EUFOR, to take on key security tasks in the country. EUFOR derived its mandate from a new UN Security Council resolution and had an initial strength of 7,000 that was equal in size to SFOR. The EUFOR mission was supported by NATO under the so-called 'Berlin Plus' arrangements that provide the framework for NATO-EU cooperation.

The successful termination of SFOR did not spell the end of NATO's engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Alliance retained a military headquarters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the nature of NATO's engagement was very different. The NATO Headquarters, which was headed by a one-star US general with a staff of around 150, was to focus on defense reform in the country, as well as counter-terrorism, apprehending war-crimes suspects, and intelligence-gathering.

On 4 May 1993 the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were c

On 4 May 1993 the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were compounded by an expanded and intrusive mandate; greatly diminished military capabilities; more aggressive Somali opposition; uncertain support from the United States; differences within the coalition; and uncertainty by the Security Council, the Secretariat, and others.

Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.

UNOSOM II became a badly flawed peace, with military forces which came to be seen by parties to the local conflict as co-belligerents rather than impartial peacekeepers. In Somalia, peace enforcement was only an implicit element of the original U.N. mandate, which focused on peace-building (disarmament, political reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation). However, after a confrontation between the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the U.N. led to the killing of twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers, the Security Council made the operation's peace-enforcement mission explicit. It was executed by both U.N. forces and a 1,000-man U.S. rapid-reaction force under U.S. operational control, with the authority of the United Nations. There was also a 3,000-man U.S. logistics unit under U.N. operational control. A lack of decisiveness, cohesion, and command and control by the undermanned U.N. mission (half the strength of UNITAF, with some 20,000 personnel) and a series of armed clashes between U.S./U.N. forces and the SNA created a virtual state of war and undermined the effectiveness of the U.N. operation. Confusion over the dual-command relationship between the U.S. and UNOSOM II was another complicating factor, with a U.S. general officer serving as both the U.N. deputy forces commander and commander of U.S. forces.

A clash on 3-4 October 1993 left eighteen U.S. personnel dead and seventy-eight wounded, along with over one thousand Somali casualties. Public outcry in the United States contributed to the decision to withdraw U.S. forces in March 1994. That, coupled with continued internal strife and SNA hostility toward the U.N., led to a total U.N. withdrawal in March 1995. This was executed skillfully, without casualties, in a carefully planned combined U.S.-U.N. action.

The killing of Army Rangers in Somalia provoked a resurgence of a debate that began before the Gulf War: when is it appropriate to use military force -- and, more to the point, can you justify using the military in regions in which Americans either do not see their interests at stake or are willing to help only so long as the costs remain very low? Somalia drove home the reality that the Gulf War experience could not serve as a model for other situations where the diplomatic lineup was more confused, the stakes less clear, and the difference between good guys and bad guys less simple to discern. It was also an early indication of the coming debate on the international community's role in internal strife.